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Technological Development and State Intervention: A Study of the Brazilian Capital Goods Industry

Fabio S. Erber, Thesis for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at The University of Sussex

This dissertation addresses the discussion of the problem of developing local design capacity in the capital goods industry in a less developed country (LDC) in the light of the possibility of using licensing from the more advanced countries (ACs), as well as the relationship of such development to State policies, focusing on the Brazilian case. The structure of presentation is as follows: In Chapter II, Fabio discuss the choice of design strategy by the capital goods enterprises – developing its own design or using another enterprise’s design – from the point of view of the firm. Chapter II analyses first the different requirements the design of capital goods must satisfy, indicating the main trends in such requirements, based on an extensive reading of engineering literature and discussions with engineers. It then analyses the different stages of the design process and the resources needed for each stage, comparing licensing with the development of designs by the firm (which the author calls, for short, self-reliance). It is an attempt, albeit limited, to open the R&D “black box” for the case of capital goods. Chapter III presents a theoretical discussion of the reasons why the State may support design activities in the capital goods industry, developing first the general arguments from the economic literature on R&D (e.g. Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962) for such support, and then discussing the licensing alternative in comparison with local development, focusing specifically on the case of the LDCs. Chapter IV analyses the results of the interviews, interpreting them in the light of the argument developed in the second Chapter. Chapter V discusses the main economic policies affecting the choice of design strategy of the Brazilian capital goods enterprises and the policy-making for the industry in detail, covering the period from the mid-fifties when the main features of the present structure of the industry were established, until approximately 1976. The chapter also includes the important changes in policies that were introduced after the interviews, some of which stimulated local design in the Brazilian capital goods industry. Besides using secondary sources, this chapter draws also on a study made at FINEP on the purchasing policies of State Enterprises in Brazil, presenting original material, as well as from Erber´s experience at FINEP and at National Development Bank (BNDE). Finally, Chapter VI presents an interpretation for the State policies and the strategy of the enterprises interviewed, based on the comparison between the reasons of State intervention discussed in Chapter III and the main traits of the Brazilian pattern of development. It concludes with a discussion of the possible implications of the recent policies adopted for the development of design capacity in Brazil.

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Development Banks and Technological Development

Fabio S. Erber, Submitted to the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) of Canada, the Organisation of American States (OAS), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank, 21st  (February, 1980)

This is a proposal for a comparative study of the role of Development Banks in less-developed countries (LDC), insofar as their importance for LDC development. The main objectives of project are: • To describe and evaluate the experience of Development Banks in LDCs as regards its positive and negative influence in local technological development. • To verify such experience in the broader contexto of the countries’ financial systems and Government policies, especially regarding Science and technology policy. • To suggest measures to improve the effectiveness of the Banks’ action as promoters of local technological development and, by extension, of social and economic development to policy-makers of the Development Banks and Government. The Project represents a pioneering effort in technology policy research (in LDCs and elsewhere) and it will also produce results of immediate relevance to policy-makers involved with local technological development in LDCs, in the Development Banks and in the Government. The studies will be carried out in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, Ivory Cost, Korea, Malaysia and Peru. The comparative framework of the Project will not only provide a basis for better policy suggestions, but, in the final stage, shall have research and policy conclusions applicable not only to the countries participating in the Project, but also to other countries, as well as international agencies and research and financial institutions of advanced countries.

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Relatório BNDES | Indústria Eletrônica...

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Parte 0 - Estrutura e Metodologia de Estudo

Elaborada por Paulo Bastos Tigre sob coordenação de Fabio Erber

Parte 1...

Política científica e tecnológica no Brasil: uma revisão da literatura

Fabio S. Erber, In Resenhas de economia brasileira, organizador João Sayad, São Paulo, Saraiva, 1979 (Série ANPEC)

A revisão não se propõe a ser exaustiva: concentra-se na literatura nacional (incluída nesta os brazilianists), as referências à literatura internacional tendo apenas um caráter indicativo. Mesmo quanto à literatura nacional convém utilizar uma boa tradição parlamentar e, desde o início, “to declare an interest”: toda revisão deste tipo (como de resto todo trabalho em ciência social) é enviesada. É possível que, dada a participação do autor na literatura, neste caso o viés seja maior, apesar dos esforços feitos para equilibrar o texto.Por questão de tempo e espaço deu-se ênfase aos textos que tratam da indústria de transformação, e a descrição das medidas de política científica e tecnológica e do aparato institucional que as implementa estão reduzidas a um mínimo.Com as reformas acima, a exposição foi ordenada seguindo, grosso modo, a lógica do “geral-para-o-particular”. Assim, na seção II apresentam-se aqueles trabalhos que discutem o papel da ciência e tecnologia no processo de desenvolvimento capitalista que, em verdade, tendem a enfocar principalmente o caso dos países centrais do sistema.As seções III e IV discutem os trabalhos que enfocam o caso brasileiro mais especificamente. A seção III trata dos estudos que discutem o problema da dependência tecnológica em suas várias ramificações, dos estudos que discutem a difusão de inovações no país, concluindo com a discussão dos trabalhos que analisam o papel do Estado na geração e difusão de ciência e tecnologia no Brasil.Na seção IV, discutem-se os trabalhos que enfatizam as consequências do uso da tecnologia para o desenvolvimento brasileiro – o seu papel no crescimento industrial, no balanço de pagamentos e sobre o emprego e distribuição de renda.Finalmente, na seção V procura dar um balanço na situação presente, apontando os resultados obtidos em termos de conhecimento, quanto ao entendimento dos fenômenos em tela, quer quanto à formulação de políticas. Conclui-se apresentando temas adicionais que deveriam ser objeto de pesquisa, especialmente pelos centros de pós-graduação em economia.

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Technological dependence and learning revisited

1. Introduction

Over the last fifteen years a considerable body of research on the technological development of LDCs has come to light. The ideas of what can be loosely called the "school of dependence" had an important influence on shaping some of the questions posed by this research and the...

Notas sobre a Indústria de Bens de Capital: Tecnologia e o Setor Público

Fabio S. Erber, José Tavares de Araújo Júnior, Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico, Rio de Janeiro 3 (1): 117-134, março 1973

Nestas notas são interessantes apenas o texto sobre os papéis e características do setor de bens de capital, que foi relevante no desenvolvimento econômico dos países desenvolvidos, e a formação dessa indústria no Brasil.

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Development Projects and Growth under Finance...

The growth of the Brazilian economy during President LULA’s tenure (2003- 2007) was limited and uneven, far below the Latin American average and further below the average of other “emergent”...

Escolha de tecnologias, preços dos fatores de produção e dependência – uma contribuição ao debate

Fabio S. Erber, Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico, Rio de Janeiro, 2(1): 105-116, jun 1972

Este artigo é uma contribuição ao debate sobre os resultados finais, em termos de emprego, do processo de industrialização no mundo subdesenvolvido. Ele discute os trabalhos realizados pelo IPEA por Sena, Goodman e Cavalcanti e por Bacha, da Mata e Modenesi. Resumidamente, diagnosticaram esses autores o custo relativamente baixo de capital em relação ao custo da mão de obra, que teria levado os empresários a adotar técnicas altamente intensivas de capital e sugere que a manipulação dos preços relativos dos dois fatores, através da redução do custo do trabalho, levaria os empresários a dotar técnicas mais intensivas de mão de obra. A análise do custo e da composição do capital foi realizada nas seções 1 e 2, enquanto a suposição de homogeneidade do fator trabalho foi discutida na seção 3. Erber chamou também a atenção, na seção 4, para a fato de que a escolha de tecnologias ocorre no momento da opção pelo produto e na formulação do projeto. Na última seção, coloca algumas dúvidas adicionais.

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Relatório BNDES | Indústria Eletrônica Brasileira: Produtores de Equipamentos de Processamento de Dados e Componentes Eletrônicos Semicondutores

Fabio S. Erber, Clélia Piragibe, Daniel Luiz Gleizer (apoio), Glory Macknight, Paulo Bastos Tigre, Sérgio Goldstein (apoio), Relatório final do convênio BNDES/IEI

A primeira parte apresenta o quadro de referência analítico que orientou o estudo. Divide-se em dois capítulos. No primeiro apresenta-se a evolução e a importância do conjunto de atividades industriais, tecnológicas e científicas do que se chamou o “complexo eletrônico” desempenha atualmente um papel estratégico crescente no processo de desenvolvimento de todos os países, tanto em termos econômicos como políticos, sociais e militares. Embora os dois ramos estudados se destaquem na dinâmica desse “complexo”, razão pela qual foram escolhidos, constituem partes de um sistema maior, cuja estrutura merece um tratamento detalhado, tanto para fins de estratégia empresarial como de política econômica e tecnológica. A apresentação dessa estrutura completa o primeiro capítulo.O segundo capítulo do quadro de referência apresenta uma análise do padrão de competição da indústria eletrônica, tomando como referência as características multidimensionais dos produtos eletrônicos, o ritmo do progresso técnico, a grande internacionalização das diversas atividades e a intervenção governamental. É uma análise conduzida a nível de produto, da firma e da indústria, servindo de base para a interpretação das condições brasileiras.A segunda parte do relatório apresenta uma descrição da situação mundial dos dois ramos estudados, imprescindível dado o nível de internacionalização das duas indústrias, que vai se refletir, no caso brasileiro, na presença importante de subsidiárias de firmas multinacionais, no uso de tecnologia importada por fabricantes nacionais, etc. Para os dois ramos apresentam-se, inicialmente, as características gerais do ramo (principais produtos, mercados e aplicações) para, em seguida, detalhar a estrutura de oferta desses produtos e, concluindo, discutir os principais aspectos da estratégia competitiva das firmas naqueles ramos. Essas características vão refletir-se sobre a situação brasileira, condicionando o seu desenvolvimento.A terceira parte do estudo divide-se em seis capítulos. O primeiro descreve o outro condicionante básico da dinâmica dos dois ramos no Brasil – as políticas governamentais para os dois ramos. A seguir, a análise desdobra-se pelos dois ramos, da mesma forma que se procedeu para a análise internacional. Assim, para cada um dos ramos apresenta-se uma caracterização quantitativa do desenvolvimento recente, de sua estrutura em termos de concentração, divisão de produtos, etc. O quarto e o quinto capítulos apresentam, para cada ramo, os resultados das entrevistas realizadas com os principais fabricantes instalados no Brasil sobre os aspectos mais relevantes da sua estratégia competitiva – desenvolvimento tecnológico, política de produtos, preços, etc. – e sobre os condicionantes dessa estratégia, como política governamental e a atuação das outras firmas. Esses resultados são analisados à luz do quadro esboçado na primeira parte, que serve também de referência à taxonomia de produtos e produtores utilizada. Cabe, porém, registrar uma dialética natural – os resultados das entrevistas informaram decisivamente o processo de elaboração do quadro analítico da primeira parte.Finalmente, no sexto capítulo apresenta-se uma comparação entre a dinâmica industrial dos dois ramos, apontando-se as semelhanças e diferenças entre eles existentes e discutindo o quanto dessas características podem ser consideradas intrínsecas nos dois ramos ou podem ser atribuídas a fatores exógenos como a política governamental.

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Parte 0 – Estrutura e Metodologia de Estudo

Elaborada por Paulo Bastos Tigre sob coordenação de Fabio Erber

Parte 1 – Quadro Analítico do Projeto

Elaborada por Clélia Virginia Santos Piragibe sob coordenação de Fabio Erber

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Parte 2.1 – A Indústria Internacional de Equipamentos de Processamento de Dados

Elaborada por Clélia Virginia Santos Piragibe, com apoio de Daniel Luiz Gleizer (estagiário) e sob a coordenação de Fabio Erber

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Parte 2.2 – Indústria Internacional de Componentes Eletrônicos Semicondutores

Elaborada por Glory Macknight sob coordenação de Fábio Erber

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Parte 2.3. – Indústria Internacional de Componentes Eletrônicos Semicondutores

Elaborada por Glory Macknight sob coordenação de Fábio Erber

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Parte 3 – A Política Governamental na Indústria Brasileira de Equipamentos de Processamento de Dados – continuação

Elaborada por Clélia Virginia Santos Piragibe sob coordenação de Fabio Erber

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Parte 4 – A Dinâmica competitiva e tecnológica na Indústria Brasileira de Equipamentos de Processamento de Dados

Elaborada por Clélia Virginia Santos Piragibe e Paulo Bastos Tigre, com o apoio de Daniel Luiz Gleiser e Sérgio Goldstein sob coordenação de Fabio Erber.

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Parte 5 – A Dinâmica da Indústria Eletrônica Brasileira e suas Implicações para a Política Governamental

Elaborada por Fábio Erber, Clélia Piragibe, Glory Macknight e Paulo Bastos Tigre

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Desenvolvimento Econômico: O Recorte Setorial

2. O Conceito de “SETOR” na Teoria Econômica 

O uso do conceito de “setor” reflete uma visão da economia que privilegia a complexidade, a diferença entre as partes que compõem o sistema econômico. É um conceito mesoeconômico, situado entre...

Development Projects and Growth under Finance Domination: The case of Brazil during the Lula Years (2003-2007)

Fabio S. Erber, Armand Colin | « Revue Tiers Monde » 2008/3 n° 195 / pages 597 à 629

Le gouvernement de LULA est arrivé au pouvoir à un moment de crise du modèle de développement libéral au Brésil. Il comprit tout de suite qu’il fallait trouver un autre projet de développement et fit plusieurs propositions destinées à retrouver une croissance forte et durable. Le succès de ces «conventions de développement» fut limité et la croissance resta faible et irrégulière. Le concept de «convention de développement» qui s’inscrit dans la tradition de l’économie politique est brièvement exposé au début de l’article. L’article démontre que les deux phénomènes – croissance molle et irrégulière, et absence de projet de développement – ont une origine commune: la domination de la politique économique par une coalition d’intérêts structurés par des taux d’intérêt élevés. Cette domination financière s’exprime dans les politiques monétaires, fiscales et de taux de change menées par la Banque centrale et le ministère des Finances, politiques qui sont justifiées du point de vue de la stabilité des prix, laquelle figure comme une condition préalable à tout projet de développement. Comme les phénomènes de path-dependence (dépendance de sentier institutionnel) jouent un rôle important dans notre démonstration, nous commençons l’étude par une description rapide des conditions politiques et économiques dans lesquelles se sont déroulées les élections de 2002, et des incertitudes qui en ont découlé aux premiers temps de l’administration LULA en 2003. Nous examinons ensuite les diverses stratégies de développement proposées par le gou- vernement, les politiques macroéconomiques effectivement mises en œuvre, les chiffres de la croissance pour la période et les contraintes que les politiques macroéconomiques faisaient peser sur la croissance. Nous concluons en interprétant le cas brésilien à la lumière de la récente théorie du développement et de l’expérience d’autres pays, en montrant que la présente convention hégémonique est une «convention de stabilité» et non une «convention de développement».

The growth of the Brazilian economy during President LULA’s tenure (2003- 2007) was limited and uneven, far below the Latin American average and further below the average of other “emergent” countries such as China, India and Russia. Such a performance cannot be ascribed to international conditions – quite the contrary, these were exceptionally favorable. Its causes have to be sought internally.

Given the uncertainty inherent to any development process, growth is facilitated if there is a “development convention”1 – a cognitive device, shared by the hegemonic decision-makers, which is used to establish a positive and a negative agenda: which problems come first and which solutions to such problems are legitimate. Such conventions are made up by codified and tacit knowledge – theories about economics, politics, and sociology belong to the first group and myths to the second one2. In other words, uncertainty is reduced and coordina- tion of the strategies of the social actors is induced when there is a “development project”3. If institutions are “the rules of the game”, a development convention is an institution. The role it plays in defining the positive and negative agendas of social actors, places it high in the hierarchical order – a “constitutional institution”.

A “development project” is always presented as “national”, leading to the “common good”. In fact, it reflects the distribution of power, both economic and political, prevailing in that society. Nonetheless, since development is a dynamic process of structural change, an efficient project must offer scope to emerging groups others than those present in the power block ruling that society, especially when the regime is democratic.

Although there are always several conventions competing for hegemony, one tends to be dominant, except during periods of crisis, such as the decade of the eighties in Brazil, when the developmental convention had lost its power, but the competing liberal convention had not become dominant yet.

Development conventions evolve and adapt to both national and international changing conditions. They are akin to Lakatos’research programs, in the sense of being made up of a “hard core” of an axiomatic nature, and of a “protective belt” used to accommodate changes. Such an evolution process is path-dependent – it shows incremental growth and presents ruptures at points of crises, and it is heavily influenced by the history of the society holding the convention4.

The LULA administration came to power at a moment of crisis of liberal development in Brazil. From its very beginning, it recognized the need for an alternative development project and, in fact, put forward several proposals to resume high and sustained growth. Such proposals met limited success and growth has been slow and irregular.

This paper, nested in the tradition of political economy, argues that both phenomena – slow and uneven growth and lack of a development project – have a common root: economic policies dominated by a coalition of interests structured by high interest rates. Such financial dominance is expressed in monetary, foreign exchange and fiscal policies carried out by the Central Bank and the Finance Ministry, which are justified in terms of price stability, the latter being laid down as a precondition to any development project.

Since “history matters” and path-dependence plays a major role in our argument, the next section sets the stage at the beginning of the LULA administration, outlining the political and economic factors surrounding his election in 2002, and the ensuing uncertainty at the beginning of the administration in 2003.

Section 3 examines the different development strategies proposed by the Government at the beginning of the two mandates, in 2003 and 2007, finding its complement in section 4, which presents the Central Bank’s views and the macroeconomic policies actually put into practice.

Section 5 presents the growth record of the period and the constraints macroeconomic policies put on growth.

The last section suggests some interpretations of the Brazilian case in the light of recent development theory, and of the experience of other countries.

1. Setting the Stage: Uncertainty and Change in 2003

In every culture, the first day of the year is heavily laden with symbolism of renewal but, in Brazil, the first of January of 2003 was truly exceptional: it was Inauguration Day for President LULA, elected by a coalition of parties led by the Workers Party (PT).

By 2002 it had been the fourth time LULA ran as candidate for the Presidential seat. His previous defeats could be ascribed to fear that he and his party would not be competent to deal with the hyper-inflation and foreign exchange crises (1989 and 1998, respectively) and the fear he would undo the successful Real stabilization plan carried out by his opponent (Fernando Henrique CARDOSO) (1994 and 1998). Fear also of the rhetorical allegiance of both LULA and the PT, to socialism, however ill-defined the latter was. Fear and social prejudice against a politician and a party of working class origin and which held strong links with the organized social movements (trade unions, landless peasant, etc). Such fears seemed to resist the obvious fact that the man and his party had become much more “pragmatic” over time. As LULA stated in a 1997 interview, his success was due to not being bound by “ideological schemes”5 (COUTO, 1999). By 2002 the PT had become a bureaucratic institution, where militants and social movements had lost influence (BETTO, 2006).

In 2002 the candidate from CARDOSO’s party tried to play, once again, the fear card. External conditions were in his favor: the world economy was still reeling from September 11 and the end of the “new technologies” bubble, Argentina was deep into its debt crisis and war was imminent in the Gulf. In institutions where LULA electors were few, the fear game became operational: foreign investment dried up, the Real devalued, and current and estimated inflation shot up6. A clear signal was given to the candidate and his team. The response was prompt, if ambiguous: in mid 2002, in a widely publicized statement (Letter to the Brazilians) LULA, while reiterating the need to “change the model”, committed his future government to “honour the contracts”. This was amplified by a commitment to keep the agreement established by the CARDOSO Government with the IMF. Albeit with less publicity he also put out bridges to the “market” institutions, such as the powerful Banks Federation (FEBRABAN). The Government Program of the coalition of parties supporting his candidacy, also issued in mid 2002, dropped the slogan of “rupture of the model” in favor of a “lucid transition”.

All cards worked only partially. On the one hand, market indicators continued to deteriorate sharply during the second semester of 2002. On the other the population, besieged by low growth, high unemployment and, to cap it, by an energy crisis7, elected LULA. As he put it: “hope won over fear”.

Therefore, on the first of January 2003, in Brazil, the hopes for renewal were tinged with considerable uncertainty about the future. Among economists some points were consensual: the need to resume growth and employment and to go back to price stability, and the constraints on both objectives born out of foreign exchange scarcity and infrastructure (especially energy and transports) availability. Consensus stopped there: there was a wide array of dissent, from whether the focus should lie on the productive structure (as in developmental times) or on market-friendly institutions (as argued by neo-liberals), to the relative roles State and market should play. Some specific solutions to the problems of stability and growth, such as reforming the Social Security System, formal independence of the Central Bank, control of financial foreign capital, and the need for industrial policy, were especially divisive. A clear indication of the course the new adminis- tration intended to take was urgently needed.

2. Development Projects Galore

On January first 2003 President LULA made two Inauguration speeches: one to the festive huge crowd assembled in front the Planalto Palace and another, longer and more formal, at the Congress8.

Addressing the Congress, LULA reiterated that “change was the key-word”, that the previous model was defunct. Nonetheless, change had to be gradual, pursued with patience and perseverance. To do so, he stressed, a national development project was necessary, and so was a strategic planning.

Such project should be directed primarily towards the needs of the underprivileged – it should focus on providing education and health and, above, all, on eradicating hunger.

As means to such objectives he stated the need for macroeconomic stability and, specifically, a responsible management of public finances. Growth would be a result of an increase in savings and investments, including human capital. The focus would be on the domestic market, especially on small and medium-size enterprises, on infrastructure and on technological capability. A wide range of institutional reforms were mentioned concerning social security and, labor legislation, as well as fiscal, agrarian, and political reforms. To carry out such an ambitious program, he pleaded for a “social pact” uniting labor and capital, in order to generate a “solidarity energy”.

On the international front he intended to introduce changes too. Regionally, top priority should go to South America. Tradewise, he wished to reduce protectionism in the more industrialized countries and to increase the technological content of Brazilian exports. Foreign direct investment was welcome but its role was not emphasized – a substantial change as regards the CARDOSO government, when foreign investment was seen as the demiurge of development.

Silence is as eloquent as speech. Financial capital, be it foreign or local, is not even mentioned. Political parties are given short shrift too. What is stressed is a direct family-type relationship between LULA and the “people”, in which he sees himself as embodying the “dreams of generations”.

Designed to build consensus, the Inauguration speeches left plenty of scope for different interpretations, as shown by two important ensuing documents, published in early 2003.

The Finance Ministry (Ministério da Fazenda, 2003) toed the line by stating that the “social inclusion” was the central axis of a “new development cycle” but made the point that the level of social expenditures by the Brazilian State was already high – the problem was that such expenditures (notably transfers associated with social security) had “non-poor” as beneficiaries. In other words, social policy in Brazil was inefficient. To remedy that, policies directed towards social inclusion should focus on the “poor” only, as opposed to the traditional PT view that social policies should be “republican and universal”.

As expected, the Finance Ministry reiterated that inflation control was essential and put emphasis on fiscal policy in order to stabilize prices. Moreover, priority should be given to institutional reforms with the “importance of institutional and legal development for the appropriate working of markets and public policies” as their “unifying theme”. The neo-classical variety of New Institutional Economics, in which institutions which guarantee property rights, reduce transaction costs and enhance technical progress are the key to development (NORTH, 1992) was a clear inspiration to the Finance Ministry team. The Ministry had four priority reforms: two were directly geared to fiscal problems: social security and fiscal reform itself ; the other two to the financial system: the legal autonomy of the Central Bank and the reinforcement of creditors’rights, assuming that the latter would then reduce interest rates.

Almost simultaneously, the Planning Ministry published the “Directives” for the new 2003-2007 Investment Plan of the Federal Government (Ministério do Planejamento, 2003), which closely reflects the proposals of the coalition of parties who had backed up LULA’s candidacy. The social objectives of the Government would be achieved by a virtuous circle between the demand of workers’households for consumer goods, and investment, leading to productivity increase, lower prices and more exports. The virtuous circle required increasing the real wage of workers’families. However, given the scarcity of jobs and market failures which reduced the transfer of productivity growth to wages, policies were required to compensate for such failures. As a consequence, the “social” objectives of inclusion and reduction of inequality would converge with the “economic” operation of the virtuous circle.

The reading of KEYNES by FURTADO, who strenuously and repeatedly9 warned that the Keynesian virtuous circle between consumption and investment would not arise spontaneously under the conditions of underdevelopment, lies behind the Plan.

Differences with the Finance Ministry document go further. The State, here, is given a stronger role as “leader of social and regional development and inducer of economic development”. As regards institutional reform, while sharing the consensus on the need for reforms of the fiscal and social security systems, the Plan ascribes little importance to the improvement of creditors’rights and does not even mention autonomy of the Central Bank.

Later on, the two Ministries would agree on the institutional solution for the problem of investment in infrastructure through public/private partnerships (PPP), whereby the state would guarantee a minimum rate of return to private investors. Widely touted by a consulting firm, such institutional device elicited little enthusiasm among private investors10.

Once again, silence is eloquent. The concern with efficiency (Finance Ministry) and with the role of the State (Planning Ministry) did not lead to a proposal of State reform, to deal with the thorny problems of policy coordination, monitoring and evaluation. The Government implemented the “social pact” idea in the most traditional way: multiplying the number of councils and fora, bringing entrepreneurs, workers and State officials together. The latter are usually de officio members but the former two are normally co-opted on the basis of their personal prestige or are indicated by institutions. Notwithstanding their rhetorical role, such councils have little efficiency value.

Finally, still in 2003, the Government announced its Directives for a policy which embraced industrial and technological development and foreign trade – a novelty in itself (Ministério da Indústria e Comércio, 2003). The policy (PITCE11), predicated on innovation and the reduction of trade deficits. The two were linked by the difference in technology intensiveness of Brazilian foreign trade and by the related income elasticity. Since Brazilian exports have a lower technology intensiveness than imports and because it was assumed that income elasticity is correlated with technology intensiveness, the conclusion was that the foreign trade structure had a built-in deficit, since the growth rate of imports would tend to be higher than the growth rate of exports – a view which harks back to the famous PREBISCH-SINGER thesis, updated by a neo-Schumpeterian approach.

This diagnosis of a foreign trade constraint was not highly contentious. Even less contentious was the emphasis on innovation – a meeting ground for economists of all persuasions. In fact, increasing the GNP share of national expenditures for science and technology has been a stated objective of all Brazilian governments since the eighties.

Where PITCE caused a stir, was in its sector selectiveness – by choosing four sectors as priorities it harked back to the Developmental State, where sector policies were paramount12. The selected sectors were technology intensive and carried large trade deficits: software, electronic components, capital goods and pharmaceuticals, to which were added two pervasive technologies, dubbed “future carriers”: nanotechnologies and biotechnologies. Later on, biomass was added to the list. Although pharmaceuticals could be justified in terms of their social importance, the rationale of PITCE was not dependent on its direct impact on “social inclusion”.

Therefore, during the first year of the LULA administration we had at least three different interpretations of his call for a “development project”. Such abundance of proposals is self-defeating for the purposes of uncertainty reduction and agent coordination, and precluded the “strategic planning” he argued for. The macroeconomic policies later described compounded the difficulties.

Four years later, reelected but with no festive crowd in front of the Palace, he made a new Inauguration speech at the Congress. The underprivileged continued to be the priority, but “change”, now, should be “fast”. The “strategic vision of development” and the “social pact” were to be based on the twin pillars of public and private investment, directed mainly towards a Program to Accelerate Growth (PAC – Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento). The latter is essentially a large program (more than R$ 500 billion, i.e. US$ 290 billion) of investments in infrastructure, of which about 55% would go to energy projects, a third to urban infrastructure and the rest to logistics.

If successful, such a Program would reestablish the old developmental pact, in which coalesced the whole chain of supply of construction goods and services, suppliers of capital goods and workers (mostly with low educational requirements).

The Plan assumed that macroeconomic conditions would be stable over the next mandate (2007-2010): GNP would grow steadily, at 4.5% in 2007 and at 5% p.a. the next years. Inflation would be 4.1% in the first year and then stabilize at 4.5% for the rest of the period. The nominal basic interest rate would slowly decline, from 12.2% in 2007 to 10.1% in 2010 and the primary fiscal surplus would remain stable at 4.25% of GNP throughout the period.

3. The Compromise: Macroeconomic and Social Policies

In practice, the LULA administration implemented bits and pieces of all the projects outlined above. We shall first comment on the 2003 projects, leaving the comments on the 2007 project until after a description of the macroeconomic policy.

Given the role played by the foreign exchange constraint on Brazilian growth and on the initial development projects, it is convenient to begin with the evolution of external conditions.

LULA’s external policy was partially consistent with the outlines presented in his Inauguration speech. The Brazilian Government has kept a high profile on issues such as world hunger reduction and peace-keeping (e.g. in Haiti) and strenuously fought for a seat in the U.N. Security Council. South American integration was sought by political, trade and investment cooperation13, while negotiations with the USA over the continental free trade zone and the UE-Mercosul talks stalled. As regards trade, it has fought for a reduction in protectionism from the more developed countries, especially as regards primary products, and actively strengthened trade with other developing countries. Much less emphasis was put on increasing the technology content of exports. In fact, Brazilian trade policy has been directed more to expanding markets for products already exported rather than to diversifying the range of exports (PINHEIRO and BONELLI, 2007).

Although it amounts to a change as regards the CARDOSO governments (VIGEVANI and CEPALUNI, 2007), the policy renews, under different global conditions, the striving for greater national autonomy, one of the traditional stands of Brazilian foreign policy.

Table 1 – Brazilian Trade Flow by Region, total value (US$ billion) and percentage, 2003 and 2007

Source: Banco Central

Table 1 shows that the total Brazilian trade flow (exports + imports) not only more than doubled between 2003 and 2007, but also that it shifted towards the South: especially to Latin America, and diversified beyond Mercosul, and Asia.

However, since the share of developing countries in world trade has increased too14, the efficacy of the new external policy is not clear.

Disaggregating the trade flows we find that the value of Brazilian exports more than doubled (220%) between 2003 and 2007, increasing their share in the world total from 0.96% in 2003 to 1,15% in 200615. However, imports rose faster (250%), so that in 2007 the trade surplus was 10% lower than two years earlier. Given such trend, it is estimated that the trade surplus may disappear by the end of 2009, if not sooner.

By 2007 manufactured products still accounted for more than half (52.2%) of Brazilian exports, but this share has declined since 2003, when it was 54.4% (FUNCEX data). As shown by FILGUEIRAS and GONÇALVES (2007), products of low technology intensiveness accounted for 47.4% of manufactured exports over the period 2003-2006, while highly technology-intensive products (mainly airplanes and cell phones) accounted for 8.5% of such exports. Semi-manufactured products lost ground too – from 14.8% of exports in 2003 to 13.6% in 2007. The winners were primary products, which increased their share of exports from 28.9% to 32.4% (FUNCEX). Natural resources-intensive products make up the bulk of semi-manufactured exports, as well as a substantial share of the scale intensive manufactured exports16. Revenues from primary exports are highly dependent on the price increase of such products: between 2003 and 2007 the FUNCEX quantum index of such exports increased by 144%, while the price index grew by 170%.

The rise in price of commodities has also taken a toll on the import side: despite the growth of Brazilian oil production, fuels have increased their share of imports between 2003 and 2007, from 13.4% to 17%. Production goods (capital goods and intermediate products which enter the production process) have lost ground, from 77% to 72% of imports, while consumer goods have gained in import share, from 9.3% to 10.7% (FUNCEX).

Exports have played a major role in the growth of the Brazilian economy and imports of production goods have been hailed as an important tool in order to increase productive capacity and, hence, prevent demand inflationary pressures. Nonetheless, the evolution of the structure of exports makes it very sensitive to the commodity cycle. Moreover, given the divergent rates of growth of imports and exports, the lifting of the foreign exchange constraint by means of trade seems to be bound to end quite soon.

Given the policy of maintaining the foreign exchange free to fluctuate, the trade surplus coalesced with the huge inflows of capital attracted by the very high interest rates (see below) and led to substantial appreciation of the Brazilian currency, as shown in Graph 1.

Graph 1 – Real exchange rate: R$/US$, 2003-2007

Note: Monthly nominal exchange rates deflated by the General Price Index (IGP). Source: IPEAdata

Such appreciation leads to a decline in the profitability of exports17, providing negative incentives to such activities, but primary producers are less affected than manufacturers. Moreover, exporters of primary products are not threatened in the domestic market by a foreign competition enhanced by an over-valued exchange rate, as are most manufacture exporters, as well as the other non – exporting industrial enterprises18. Hence the imbalance between primary and industrial production incentives. In other words, Brazil may have been prey to the Dutch disease, which BRESSER-PEREIRA (2008) has cogently pointed as a major threat to development.

Importers and debtors of foreign credits are the most obvious beneficiaries of the exchange rate appreciation, but enterprises (and individuals) which have to send money abroad also benefit from it – to pay for profits, dividends, and interests, and for foreign investments (which averaged US$ 9.6 billion per year over the 2003-2007 period, performed by large enterprises producing primary goods, such as minerals or semi-manufactured products such as steel slabs). As a consequence, the overvalued exchange rate weds powerful economic interests.

Dutch disease analyses tend to focus on the trade balance, but in the Brazilian case the main source of foreign exchange rate appreciation seems to lay on the capital account. Table 2 presents the basic data for this account for the years 2003 and 2007.

Table 2 – The capital account of the Brazilian Balance of Payments by type of capital, foreign debt (total and net) and foreign exchange reserves in US$ billion, 2003 and 2007

Note: (1) Mainly supplier credits and other types of credit. Source: Banco Central

The changes reported in Table 2 are the result of three convergent phenomena: the liquidity of the international market, low prime rates prevailing in developed countries and, as a consequence of the monetary policy described below, very high interest rates earned in Brazil and the related expansion of the securities and equity markets19 – notice the weight of portfolio investment. Such inflows of capital have as a counterpart the remittances of interests, profits and dividends, which increased from US$ 18.6 billion in 2003 to US$ 28.6 billion in 2007. In 2003 the total current account (trade balance and factor and non-factor services) was in a surplus position for the first time since the Real stabilization plan – US$ 4.2 billion, equivalent to 0.75% of the GNP. Fuelled by the trade balance, this surplus peaked at US$ 14 billion (1.58% of GNP) in 2005 but has since declined – to US$ 3.3 billion (0.26% of GNP) in 2007 (Banco Central). Should the trade balance soon become negative, the role of the capital account in maintaining the foreign balance of payments in order will increase. This, in turn, locks in the monetary policy in its high interest stance, which, if successful, in turn locks in the foreign exchange rate evolution, with perverse effects upon productive investment, more fully discussed below.

Analysts of the Dutch disease tend to focus on its effects upon the productive sector, but it may have institutional consequences too. PITCE is a good example. Budget allocations, fiscal and credit incentives for innovation and aimed at strengthening the relationship between enterprises, universities, and research centers increased20. However, the priority attached to the technology-intensive sectors was substantially dampened. This may be attributed to the temporary lifting of the foreign exchange constraint and to the positive evaluation of the upsurge in technology-intensive imports.

In other words, the role of PITCE as a vector of change in the productive structure has been reduced and its instrumentality turned to a more canonical “horizontal” lineage. In development theory terms, the emphasis shifted from a developmental neo-Schumpeterian approach to an endogenous-cum-natural- comparative-advantage growth. However, the declining trade surplus revived the interest in industrial policy and, by the end of 2007, a new policy was in the making at BNDES, directed towards manufacture exports and innovation.

As regards the institutional reforms put forward by the Finance Ministry, fiscal and social security regulations were changed in order to provide incentives to private investment and to reduce retirement and pension expenditures. Foreign investment in public debt securities also got fiscal incentives.

The financial system got the increased protection of creditor’s rights and, at least as important, the right to lend money to private individuals with the payment of the debt being deducted from their monthly wages (i.e. a payroll-backed low-risk credit). Although the Central Bank did not get its legal independence as ambitioned, its President was awarded Ministerial status and the Bank retained full operational independence.

However, the way I read it, the main thrust of the LULA administration is to be found in the compromise between social policies, designed to achieve its economic and political objectives of improving the lot of the underprivileged, and orthodox macro-economic policies which benefit the financial coalition. In the Government view, the connection between the two is established by the fact that high inflation hits harder the poorest segments of society.

Social policies had two main strands. The first is providing basic services, such as electric power (Programa Luz para Todos) and primary education (FUNDEB – Fundo de Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica). Nonetheless, the quality of health and education services remains very low.

The second, and more relevant, is the transfer of income to economically destitute households (Bolsa Família), and the increase of the minimum wage.

Bolsa Família (Family Grant) brought together several programs devised under the previous administration for distinct purposes (allowances for schooling, food and gas) and greatly expanded their scope, coverage and visibility. It is targeted at families with a monthly per capita income below R$ 120 (US$ 66.6), and provides between R$ 18 and R$ 112 (US$ 10 and US$ 64) per month, depending on family conditions. In return children must attend school and get vaccinated, while pregnant women must undergo pre-natal care.

Bolsa Família is conceived according to the “targeted universe” canon of international agencies such as the World Bank, endorsed by the Finance Ministry in its 2003 document. But, given the unequal income distribution and the size of the population, its universe is huge: in 2007 it benefited around 11 million families (about 46 million people). About half of the beneficiaries are located in the Northeastern region and it is estimated that Bolsa Família increases their revenue by close to 60% (Globo OnLine, 26/12/2007) – a testimony to the poverty of that population.

The program is often criticized for not addressing the structural causes of poverty such as assets distribution, and for not offering an “exit door” to those benefiting from it, i.e. for being merely palliative and perpetuating poverty conditions. Nonetheless it is certainly a step towards relieving the extreme poverty prevailing in Brazil and has the undoubted merit of bringing such poverty to the fore, an important change in the political agenda of the Nation.

Minimum wage, defined yearly, was raised by the Government by an average of 8,1% in real terms over the period 2003-2006 and by 4,4% in 2007. Its impact goes way beyond employees, since most social security benefits are indexed to the minimum wage (GIAMBIAGI, 2007).

The populations benefiting from Bolsa Família and the rise of minimum wage are not the same. Looking at the country’s income distribution deciles, the beneficiaries are concentrated in the first (poorest) tenth while minimum wage earners are concentrated on the second and, especially, third tenths (SABÓIA, 2007).

As a consequence, the macroeconomic impact of the two policies are distinct. As regards consumption, Bolsa Família increases mainly the sales of wage goods – it is no accident that supermarket sales have increased most in the Northeast. The increase in the minimum wage, coupled to an increase in employment and to credit expansion (see below) has fuelled a boom in sales of durable goods.

Their fiscal impact is also very distinct. Together with older transfer programs, Bolsa Familia accounted for less than 1% of GNP in 200621 while the increase in the minimum wage affects the social security bill and wages paid by the public sector (GIAMBIAGI, 2007).

Finally, the two policies have complementary political effects – it is not surprising that in the 2006 election the regions which benefited most from the social policies provided the bulk of the votes which led to LULA’s victory.

Let us now look at macro-economic policies. At the beginning of LULA’s first mandate, there was no doubt that a firm stance on macroeconomic policies was required in order to bring financial and foreign exchange markets back to normality, after they had erupted in the second half of 2002. The government complied with such expectations with textbook orthodoxy: the National Monetary Council set severe fiscal and inflation targets and let the foreign exchange fluctuate, with no capital or import controls.

The rationale of this policy is well-known: price stability is a condition for sustainable growth. Stability creates an environment in which relative prices play their allocation role efficiently, fiscal and private accounting systems are trustworthy and long term contracts and funding can be signed in confidence. In other words, the objectives of stability and growth are complementary. No questions are asked about the distributive consequences of relative prices or about the distribution of assets. It is a view shared by the Brazilian Central Bank together with its counterparts all over the world22.

Uncertainty remained: would this tough and orthodox policy simply be a transition to more heterodox policies, such as those advocated in LULA’s election program, or would it be permanent? Those who bet on the second alternative won.

An explanation of some of its institutional traits might be useful if one is to understand Brazilian macro-policy. Policy is discussed in many various councils, but decisions are made by the National Monetary Council. The latter is made up of the Ministers of Finance and Planning and the President of the Central Bank. Of the two Ministers, the former is incomparably the most powerful23.

In mid-year, the Monetary Council sets fiscal and monetary targets24 for the calendar year two years ahead. Nonetheless, under special circumstances the Central Bank may modify the inflation target25. Fiscal objectives are set in terms of primary surplus. This target limits public investment but leaves a wide space for monetary policies since it does not include interest payments. Monetary targets are expressed by a wide consumer-price index26. The full index is used, in spite of the weight (about 30% of the index) of prices which are pegged to other indexes, such as the price of utilities27. The exchange rate fluctuates, but the Central Bank may intervene.

The Central Bank has a considerable say in the setting of the inflation target, and enjoys full autonomy to set interest rates at a level it deems necessary in order to achieve the target – the decision is taken by a Committee (COPOM) made up of Central Bank executives.

As explained by three of its members: “COPOM guides its policy decisions by its own forecasts for inflation in the relevant time horizon and the respective balance of risks. Market expectations of inflation are important inputs in the BCB’s forecasting models… Expectations, in turn, have been influenced by past inflation behavior, the inflation targets, exchange rate and commodity price developments, economic activity and the stance of monetary policy” (BEVILAQUA et al., 2007, p. 5). They believe that the “backward-looking component of market expectations has been ceding ground to the inflation target, evidence that the IT system is gaining credibility”. However “credibility has not been perfect, so oftentimes inflation expectations seem to have over-reacted to current developments, in particular to upward inflation surprises. Thus the BC often had to act so as to prevent negative short-term developments from contaminating the medium-term outlook. In this sense the process of disinflation has been, and still is, a process of taming inflation expectations” (ibid, emphasis added).

The authors stress the importance of inflation expectations held by the financial sector but do not seem to worry about the possibility that the forecasts may be influenced by the higher returns such institutions earn when the Central Bank raises its rates.

If the Central Bank fails to reach the target, its President has to write a public letter to the Finance Minister explaining why. Minutes of COPOM meetings are available at the site of the Central Bank (bancocentral.gov.br) but such transparency does not apply to the Monetary Council.

Let us now take a look at the actual policies. As regards fiscal policy, the primary surplus targets were achieved: over 2003-2007 when primary surplus was, on average, 4.1% of GNP, the highest average for a government since the mid-eighties, albeit at the cost of increasing the tax burden from 32 to 35% of GNP (GIAMBIAGI, 2007). In 2007 the Monetary Council excluded some public investments related to the PAC (amounting to 0.5% of GNP) from the primary surplus target.

As for inflation targets, they were also met, except in 2003. Moreover, in 2006 the rate of inflation was lower than the center target, a result repeated, less brilliantly, in 2007. Table 3 compares the targets with the actual inflation rates over the period 2003-2007 and shows the declining trend of inflation, which testifies to the success of the macro-economic policy (in its own terms).

Table 3 – Inflation targets and inflation rates, 2003-2007

Source: Central Bank and IPEAdata

Monetary policy was the main instrument used to control inflation. The real basic interest rate (Selic) was, on average, 11,3% per year over the 2003-2006 period. Even after its decline in 2007, it still averaged 7.6% in real terms (GIAMBIAGI, 2007), one of the highest in the world. Private financial investors get rates similar to Selic from the banks, but the latter charge borrowers a multiple of this rate – according to the Central Bank, at the end of 2007 the average interest rates charged to private enterprises were twice the value of Selic, and about four times higher for private individuals (Banco Central, 2007). Given such spread, it is not surprising that banks are the most profitable business in Brazil. Such high lending rates have, in turn, led many enterprises to look for alternative sources of funding abroad or in Brazil, either issuing bonds or stock, leading to a boom in both markets.

Not all borrowers pay the high interest rates mentioned above. Loans for investments and exports granted by the National Development Bank (BNDES), to rural producers (mainly cooperatives and small farms) and for housing enjoy lower interest rates, set by the Monetary Council. Such earmarked credits amounted to around 10% of GNP in 2007. BNDES accounts for about 60% of this total, agriculture for 23% and housing 16%. “Free” credit (in Central Bank parlance) granted by the private financial sector increased from 18% to 24% of GNP from 2003 to 2007, especially for personal credit (Banco Central, 2007).

BNDES is practically the sole internal source of long-term credit for investment. Its budget of about US$ 33 billion makes it one of the largest development banks in the world. It operates directly and, mostly, via private financial institutions, which earn a del credere in such loans and enjoy the indirect benefits of a banker-client relationship with the borrowers. The Monetary Council set the nominal basic rate for BNDES at 11% per year for 2003, cut it down to 9.75% during the two following years and, from 2006, gradually reduced it to the current 6,25% p. a in order to foster private investment,. Two other public banks play major roles in the earmarked credit for agriculture (Banco do Brasil) and housing (Caixa Econômica Federal).

The Central Bank would like to transfer all earmarked resources to the “free” market, under the rationale of increasing the credit availability and thus, supposedly, lowering interest rates. The financial system, a closely knit and well-oiled oligopoly, would like to get such funds too, but without any obligation to fulfill the roles played by public banks. Since these are irreplaceable, the Government has resisted the pressures from the Central Bank and the financial system.

As shown in Graph 2 below, the Central Bank has conducted its monetary policy in a see-saw pattern, raising and cutting down the basic rate. At the beginning of 2003, it increased the rate to offset the inflation upsurge of the second 2002 semester and kept it at high levels until the middle of the year, when lower inflation expectations led to a period of reduction, which lasted until September 2004.

As explained by three COPOM members, in the middle of 2004, there was “heightened uncertainty regarding the external scenario thanks to the looming Fed tightening… and current and expected Real depreciation”28 and “as of mid 2004 the economy was growing by about 5% pa, after two quarters expanding 7% pa, signaling that the output gap was probably closing. Moreover, indices of capacity utilization in manufacturing were above average values, in some sectors actually reaching unprecedented levels. Clearly, these signs suggested… an economy where firms faced favorable conditions to increase their prices” (BEVILAQUA et al., 2007 p.9). A rise in the basic rate was duly implemented which lasted for a year. Accordingly, GNP growth rate fell from 5.7% in 2004 to 3.2% in 2005.

In September 2005 another period of reduction got under way, which lasted until the last quarter of 2007, when the sub-prime crisis led the Bank to halt it, setting the rate at 11.25% per year.

Graph 2 – Nominal Selic Interest Rate (% per year), December 2002-December 2007

Source: Banco Central

Monetary policy found a complement in the foreign exchange rate evolution previously described, which puts a damper on prices of tradable goods.

4. The Doubtful Path of Growth

Table 4 shows the rates of growth of Brazilian GDP and of its demand components over the period 2003-2006 and Central Bank’s estimates for 2007 and 200829. Its standard interpretation is that it sums up the two phases of the period as regards growth leaders: from 2003 to 2005 growth was export-led and in the two following years (as well as in the current year) leadership shifted to domestic demand. As argued below, such a view underestimates the role exports continue to play.

Table 4 – Brazilian GDP and its Demand Components, Yearly growth rates 2003-2007 and forecast for 2008 (in%)

Source: Banco Central (2007)

4.1. Consumer demand

Household demand depends on three factors: employment, earnings and credit. Table 5 shows the evolution of employment, average real earnings of employed persons, total wage earnings and the real minimum wage for the period 2002-2006.

Table 5 – Employment, Real average earning of employed persons, total earning of persons employed, real minimum wage (1), 2002-2006 index numbers

Note: Average yearly minimum wage deflated by the restricted consumer price index – INPC.

Between 2003 and 2006 the number of persons employed increased by 9.1 million, mostly in the manufacturing industry (1.6 million) and in trade (1.5 million). Moreover, formal employment increased – from 50% to 55% of total. Since about two-thirds of the new jobs created in the period covered by the Table 5 were paid between one and two minimum wages (IEDI, 2008), the expansion of consumer demand in 2005 and 2006 (see Table 4) seems strongly associated with the large increases in the minimum wage paid in these years, especially in 2006. In 2007 the real minimum wage rose by 4.7%, and although the PNAD results are not yet available, the information from the monthly surveys of six metropolitan areas carried out by IBGE indicate that employment kept rising, supporting the growth in consumer demand.

The rise in the minimum wage has been guided mostly by political considerations. Entrepreneurs had long complained that labor legislation multiplies wages, introducing rigidities in the labor market – hence the need for reform, endorsed by the Finance Ministry in its 2003 document. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Central Bank worries about the possible inflationary effects of wage increases. By the end of 2007, it assessed (Banco Central, 2007) that “inflation pressures coming from the (industrial) labor market have not emerged yet” (p. 124) (emphasis added) but also that aggregate costs of labor may be more inflationary, since the industrial market is disciplined by international competition, as opposed to services. From this year onwards, the rise in the minimum wage is pegged to the GNP increase.

It is worthwhile to put such growth of earnings in a longer term perspective. As shown by SABÓIA (2007) the real minimum wage has gone back to its former levels during the “Miracle” period, but it is still a third below its peak at the end of the fifties. As regards personal earnings, there are no such extended time series, but Table 6 shows that the recovery imparted by LULA’s government has but put back such earnings to a more “normal” level – a recovery from the 2003 crisis, but still below the 1996 peak.

Table 6 – Average monthly earnings of employed persons, 1996-2006 index numbers

Note: PNAD was not performed in 2000. Source: DIEESE/PNAD

Expansion of consumer demand has also been fuelled by credit. As shown, the Central Bank reduced its basic rate from September 2005 to the last quarter of 2007. The private financial system reacted by cutting down interest rates for loans to private individuals (“free” credit) but by much less than the Selic reduction30. As a consequence, lending to consumers became relatively more profitable than lending to the Government. At about 45% per year, with inflation a tenth of that value, loans to individuals increased their share of total credit from 31% at the end of 2005 to 34.3% two years later (Banco Central, 2007). To further stimulate borrowing, banks extended the duration of loans31. Moreover, the regulation of payroll-backed loans opened a huge market to the banks, with an increase of 35% in 2007 (Folha On Line, 08/01/2008). Although they are charged lower interest rates (a paltry 29% per year), such loans hold a very small risk to the lenders.

The typical behavior of Brazilian consumers is to check if the monthly installments they have to pay for a loan to buy a durable consumer good “fits” into their monthly disposable income, not bothering with the interest rate they are charged. Consumer debt is higher in the group earning from one to three minimum wages, which has benefited most from the increase in the minimum wage. The level of non-compliance of overall consumer debt increased substantially in 2005 and 2006 but stabilized in 200732. On the other hand, retail chains which sell durable and semi-durable consumer goods, auto dealers and realtors are loath to sell for cash, since they have long-established relationships with the financial system and earn considerable profits from financing.

This debt-driven consumer expansion is not new to Brazil – it fits the observed historical pattern of consumer behavior and it is strongly reminiscent of the “Miracle” years. Given the level of disposable income in most households, it is a rather frail base to support sustained growth.

The policies described above broaden the social basis of support for the Government by including the middle stratum of income which is included neither in the fiscal transfers of the Bolsa Família nor in the rentier group, but it is important to stress the fact that such gains do not derive from the “workers’ struggles” formerly praised by LULA, but are in the nature of a paternalistic “gift” of a good-willing father to the members of his family, the type of relationship stressed in the President’s rhetoric. The weakening of organized social movements, which dates back from the beginning of the liberal period (STEDILE, 2006), has not been reverted during LULA’s mandates – quite the contrary (ibid). In this sense too, it is an essentially conservative strategy.

4.2. Investment

Let us now turn to investment. As shown in Table 4 above, capital expenditures are the fastest growing demand component over the last two years. Once again, it is convenient to put this into perspective. Investment share of GNP in Brazil fell from 20.7% in 1994 to a low 15% by the middle of 2003. Its recent growth puts it back to around 18% of GNP33 – a substantial increase but which still leaves the capital stock growing at merely 2.5% per year34, i. e. not enough to sustain rapid GNP expansion.

The low investment rates observed over the recent past cannot be dissociated from the macro-economic policies of high interest rates which prevailed during its long period of decline. Such policies led private investors to portfolios where the hurdle rate of projects is heightened, since financial investments provide high alternative rates of profit while the financial costs of fixed and working capital increase. Moreover, the short-term horizon and the remarkable fluctuations of the basic interest rate creates a bias in the investment portfolio towards projects with a short pay-off period. The appreciation of the exchange rate, Siamese brother of the monetary policy, reduces the incentive to invest in activities geared to exports or import-substitution. To compensate for such negative incentives, the Government has granted fiscal incentives and reduced the interest rate charged by BNDES for investment.

Squeezed in between interest payments and inflexible current expenditures, and facing a stiff primary surplus target, State investments have languished – over the period 2003-2006 the Federal government invested no more than 0.6% of GNP. The two other public authorities (states and cities) invested another 1.4% of GNP, i. e. less than what was invested during the liberal period (1990-2002). It is estimated that in 2007 there would be a slight increase in those paltry figures – 0.2% of GNP for the federal government and 0.1% for State and city governments (GIAMBIAGI, 2007). Since the tax burden seems to have reached its political limit, the Finance Ministry decided to exclude some investments (0.5% of GNP) from the primary surplus target in order to get the above mentioned infra-structure plan (PAC) under way.

Who invests under such circumstances? Table 7 presents a breakdown of Brazilian capital formation in 2005, by sector.

Table 7 – Gross capital formation in Brazil by sectors, 2005 (in%)

Notes: (1) Government excludes infrastructure. (2) Others include agriculture and non-infrastructure services. Source: BNDES

A comparison of investment components in Brazil and OECD countries (PUGA and NASCIMENTO, 2007) shows that the main difference between the two lays in the construction share (housing and non-housing). The housing deficit in Brazil is estimated at 8 million units and it is concentrated on families earning less than three minimum wages. Infrastructure limitations are evident in the appalling conditions of the transport and warehousing systems, in the chaotic conditions of airports and, last but not least, in a possible forthcoming energy shortage.

As regards housing, in 2007 circa 200 thousand units were financed but credit versus income remains a major stumbling block. LULA’s government set new regulations strengthening creditors’rights and increased the budget of the Federal bank in charge of housing. Nevertheless, total credit for housing is still very limited – less than 2% of GNP, much lower than in similar countries, such as Mexico and Chile, and its cost is out of reach for low-income customers (TORRES FILHO and PUGA, 2007).

The Government responded in the beginning of the new mandate with the PAC. The Program estimates that 86.5% of scheduled investments are to be evenly shared between State-owned enterprises (mainly Petrobras and Eletrobras) and private companies, with the balance going to the Federal government. As shown below, Petrobras is pursuing an ambitious energy investment program and Eletrobras has substantial resources of its own, investing about 0.2% of GNP (GIAMBIAGI, 2007). In order to elicit private investments the Government set up a special fund for infra-structure with para-fiscal resources and BNDES reduced the interests charged for such projects.

At the end of 2007 the Government assessed that most projects were running according to schedule, an evaluation strongly denied by the press, which pointed out that many important projects were in fact far behind schedule and that under 30% of expenditures planned by the Federal Government had been actually performed. Such mishap seems to be due mainly to institutional difficulties, such as conflicts over the environmental impact of the projects, and coordination between Government and regulatory agencies.

Underneath such governance difficulties lay deeper and unresolved questions regarding the role of the State in Brazil and the weight to be attached to objectives and timing.

As for the first, the LULA administration inherited an incomplete transition from a State which was principal, and agent to a State which delegated regulation to specialized agencies. During the LULA years, privatization was halted and the relationship between Executive and regulatory agencies has been strained (Central Bank excepted) but political and legal considerations have prevented a reversal of the process. The stalemate continues and its cost is paid in terms of poor governance and slower growth.

As for the second, there are strong conflicts within the Government and within society about the relative priorities to be attached to different objectives, such as rapid capital accumulation and ensuing growth, on the one hand, and protection of the natural environment and international reputation on the other. Again: although the first objective has tended to predominate, this is not followed by the necessary institutional changes, leading to a process in which both objectives get thwarted, leading to slower and lessened growth, and limited environment protection.

In other words, the project of growth through investment in infrastructure is hampered by political and institutional ambiguities, which, in turn, relate to the absence of a development convention. These difficulties coalesce with the constraints imposed by macroeconomic policies.

Investment in agriculture, as indicated by the production of capital goods for this sector35 followed the international market, mediated by the exchange rate – it increased in 2003 and 2004, took a deep dive in 2005 and 2006 with the exchange rate valorization, but came back in 2007, led by favorable crop conditions.

As for industry and mining, Table 8 shows estimates of investments over the 2003-2006 and 2008-2011 periods, covering the sectors accounting for 70% of total industrial investments (PUGA and BORÇA Jr., 2007).

Table 8 – Investments in Brazil by sectors, 2003-2006 and 2008-2011 (in R$ billions)

Note: sum may not total 100.00 because of rounding up. Source: BNDES

Investments over 2003-2006 concentrated within five sectors: oil and gas (50.6%)36, mining (15.2%), steel (7%), pulp and paper (4.4%) and petrochemicals (2.2%). The same sectors will increase their share to 83% of the total during 2008-2011 Those are scale and natural resources-intensive sectors, where projects are highly capital-intensive37, performed by large enterprises with access to foreign supplier credits, which tend to import a substantial part of their equipment, thus reducing their links to locally established machinery suppliers. Such investments are geared to import-substitution-cum-exports (oil and gas and petrochemicals) and to building scale-competitive plants in order to maintain market share in a growing world market (mining, steel and pulp and paper).

Therefore these data suggest that investment is still being led by the external sector. The exchange rate appreciation provides a negative incentive which, so far, was compensated by high prices and by intense competition, compelling participants to invest in order to remain competitive and to maintain their market share.

According to the same study, investments in durable consumer goods (automobile and electronics) accounted for 13% of the total for the period 2003-2006, and are expected to contribute 10% of the total increase in investments for 2008-2011. Since the capacity utilization of manufacturing industry has increased, reaching a record 83% in October 200738, it is possible that those sectors geared towards the domestic market will boost their investments, in spite of increased import competition deriving form the overvalued exchange rate. However, available data do not point to a virtuous circle of consumer – induced investment growth.

Two other indicators strengthen such conclusions. The fastest growing capital goods sectors are those which supply equipment for the energy sector and for construction ; labor productivity in the manufacturing industry is increasing at under 2% per year and such growth slackened during 2007 (Banco Central, 2007).

The virtuous circle is further weakened by the incentives handed out by macro economic policies encouraging the use of external sources of financial supply and equipment, via high interest rates and overvalued exchange rates. Imports of capital goods and intermediary products warm the heart of the Central Bank: they ease the inflationary pressures by rapidly increasing production capacity and total factor productivity. Nonetheless, reliance on imports to supply production goods fits better in the virtuous circle of an export-driven growth39 than in the virtuosity of consumer-investment growth. In fact, as shown above, the bulk of industrial investment is related to the external sector.

4.3. Big Brother is watching

The preceding analysis has highlighted the limitations macroeconomic policies led by the Central Bank impose on the growth regime now envisaged by the

Government – consumer-led expansion and autonomous infrastructure investment. Moreover, this policy reduces the incentive to invest in sectors geared to exports and/or import substitution, despite the fact that the former are the main investors in Brazil. Not all difficulties stem from this policy, but the latter plays a significant role, directly as well as indirectly, as discussed below.

The power of the Central Bank in the Brazilian context goes further – it can break an expansionary cycle, as shown by the 2004 episode, and it may repeat its feat in the near future.

The previous long quote of COPOM members is pertinent since the conditions which led to the rise in the basic rate in 2004 are very similar to those prevailing now. In fact, some are more worrisome. The international scenario is certainly much worse. It is not a tightening of the Fed policy which is at stake but a major crisis, with the US economy at its epicenter. The foreign exchange rate and the rise in imports help keep inflation down and the trade surplus is dwindling. Nonetheless, other external indicators have improved (see Table 2): international reserves have trebled since 2003 and are now equivalent to 18 months of imports, as compared to 12 months in 2003 ; the net foreign debt is below 7% of GNP ; the ratio of net debt over exports fell to 0.56 ; and Brazil represents a much smaller risk for investors than it did in 2004.

As regards internal inflation pressures, the degree of capacity utilization is now higher than it was in mid 2004. It is true that investments have recently increased, more than they had in 2003-2004, but consumer demand has also expanded more. As a consequence the Bank is becoming more edgy about capacity utilization, threatening to increase the interest rate, as shown by the COPOM minutes.

It is unlikely that such threats will accelerate investment decisions, since the latter are taken in firm-specific contexts – a classical problem of collective action. Moreover, the threat increases the uncertainty about the evolution of demand and induces “wait and see” behaviors as regards investments directed to the domestic market, which will reinforce COPOM’s fears in the future, producing a vicious circle for growth.

In other words, to the uncertainty stemming from the international situation is added the uncertainty deriving from the power of the Central Bank. But where from does this power come from?

The traumatic experience of inflation during the period from the failure of the 1986 heterodox Cruzado stabilization Plan to 1994, when the Real Plan finally achieved price stability, certainly plays an important role in providing legitimacy to the Central Bank, which presents itself as the “guardian of stability”. The popularity of the government during the Cruzado era and in the aftermath of the Real Plan has been heeded40. Thus the Central Bank finds important allies within the Government, starting with the Finance Ministry, whose fiscal policy plays a major role in the monetary policy. This alliance is institutionalized in the National Monetary Council.

It is often argued that price stability is of the same nature as a public good, in the sense that nobody can be excluded from its benefits, but the policy summarized above creates some very specific losers and winners. Among the former, borrowers come top of the list. The main borrower is the State41, which paid out a yearly average of 7.3% of GNP over the 2003-2006 period on account of interests (GIAMBIAGI, 2007). The amount spent for Bolsa Familia pales in comparison: it is less than a tenth of interests. By keeping the primary surplus high and thus freeing funds for interest payments, the Finance Ministry plays a major role in this process of resource distribution.

On the other side of the coin, the winners’ side, stand the lenders. Among them, the financial system is primum inter pares: the consolidated balance of Brazilian banks shows that over the 2003-2007 period the volume of net profits of the system trebled, and their profit rates increased from 14.8% in 2003 to 22.9% in 2007 (Valor Econômico, “Lucro dos bancos triplica no governo LULA, 2008). As shown above (Table 2) the international financial system is an important participant among the winners. Nonetheless, the financial system does not stand alone. Institutional investors, such as pension funds, insurance companies, cash-rich enterprises42 also benefit, as do households of the upper tenth of the income distribution who receive about 45% of the national income, and especially those belonging to the upper 1%, who get a hefty 13% of the national income43. BRUNO’s (2007) figures for the rentier share of national income show that non-financial enterprises and individuals received, on average, 81% of the total rentier share over the 1995-2005 period.

As mentioned above, the exchange rate appreciation is the Siamese brother of the monetary policy and the beneficiaries of the two policies overlap, with the exception of exporters. Among the latter, the large enterprises exporting raw materials and semi-manufactured products are pacified by the combination of high external prices, financial earnings from their huge cash balances, and favorable conditions for investments abroad.

This distribution of losses and gains is not a new phenomenon, since very high real interests have been in force since the debt crisis of the early eighties. My assumption is that over this long period a coalition of interests was formed, structured by the public debt and the high interests earned on such debt. This coalition operates under a tacit agreement that the Brazilian State has to pay high interests and so must do other debtors. In other words, there is a convention firmly grounded on powerful interests, historically consolidated, about the payment of interest rates – a good example of how a path-dependent process unfolds.

Original sin arguments, such as the external debt moratorium of 1987, are often offered as justification, which, in turn, make the award of “investment grade” rank by risk evaluation agencies equivalent to redemption. Such facts as the role of the U.S. Fed in the foreign debt crisis, or the lower rates now paid in countries which started world-wide crises, such as Mexico and Russia, are conveniently forgotten. Notwithstanding the substantial fiscal surplus achieved since the end of the nineties, the State current expenditures are also brought forward to justify the interest rates the State has to pay. More recently, high interest rates have been justified by institutional “failures” such as the limited protection given to creditors and the earmarked credit. As shown above, the LULA administration hastened to remedy the former but its consequences in terms of interest rates reduction remain to be seen. As for the latter, its maintenance shows the limits of the power of the financial coalition.

Such a coalition of private interests holds powerful instruments to convey its messages. The most explicit lay in the hands of the financial system, as exemplified by the crisis of the second semester of 2002 which so effectively tamed the incoming government. But there are other instruments, not so explicit, such as the financing of political campaigns44 and the connections to Congress members. The waning of the prestige of the Executive since the debacle of the developmental State in the eighties certainly helps.

The Central Bank is a necessary member of this coalition – it is the institution which conceives and implements monetary policy and the financial sector is its agent. Notwithstanding the growth of government bonds held by foreign investors, their local currency denomination tends to strengthen the links between the Finance Ministry, the Central Bank and the local financial system.

The Bank’s participation in the coalition does not imply a “capture” in public choice fashion – it suffices that the Central Bank and the private members of the coalition derive joint benefits from the same policy. For instance, it is plausible to suppose that the recent reluctance of the Central Bank to increase the basic rate may be influenced by the high profits the financial system is earning with the present credit boom, which, in turn, increase the “soundness” of the system.

Power is a very strong driver and after the Real Plan the Central Bank has enjoyed enormous power. During the first CARDOSO government (1995-1998) it imposed its quasi-fixed over-valued exchange rate policy, in spite of the opposition of very powerful interests (e.g. exporters, local industry besieged by import competition), even within the Government itself45. Its power was increased under the inflation-targeting system adopted during the second CARDOSO mandate (1999-2002), after the predicted foreign exchange crisis came true. Within LULA’s government this power is even greater. A technocratic pride in performing a role which is seen as pedagogic and therapeutic, no matter how much the medicine hurts, is evident in the Bank’s rhetoric.

The cohesion of this coalition is strengthened by a conservative bias: private interests want to preserve the highly profitable status quo, the Central Bank wants to preserve the price system. Both oppose structural changes which would alter wealth and income distribution and relative prices, increasing the risk of inflation. As a consequence the coalition uses its power not only to foster policies for its own benefit, but also to veto policies which may alter the status quo. “Development projects” which may lead to structural changes are therefore excluded.

The cohesion is further strengthened by how monetary policies are implemented. The Central Bank has to keep close and continuous contacts with the agents it regulates, as does every regulatory agency. These contacts are formal and informal and play a part in shaping shared beliefs and expectations. The use of inflation expectations by the financial institutions to calibrate the Central Bank’s own expectations is but a codified example of this process.

Shared belief is strengthened by keeping the policy horizon short. Inflation targets are set a year and a half ahead and COPOM meetings, where the policy may be changed, are held every forty days. The meetings are preceded by innumerable statements by members of the financial community about their expectations about the COPOM decision.

As already pointed out, this produces substantial uncertainty over the long and even the short run. Such uncertainty and the short horizon are antithetical to the formation of a long-term development convention.

Finally, the cohesion of the coalition is strengthened by a shared belief in the legitimacy of the “market” as the main institution in charge of organizing and driving the economy and the society. This belief legitimates the use of their power to veto projects and policies which may reduce the power of the market in favor of other institutions. As such, the range of feasible development projects is severely restricted.

In this respect, the unresolved crisis of the State plays into the hands of the coalition. The developmental State led the country for thirty years, up to the end of the seventies, and agonized during the eighties, losing legitimacy as growth petered out and inflation soared. The neo-liberal years, from 1990 to 2002, introduced some important changes, such as privatization of most State-owned enterprises, but baulked at the prospect of introducing major political and administrative reforms which would make the State more politically representative and capable of a better governance.

Congress holds considerable power in Brazil. The government is in the minority at the Senate and its majority in the lower chamber is shaky. Constrained politically in the Congress as it was economically by the above mentioned coalition, LULA’s Government opted for an equally conservative strategy as regards the State. The relationship between the Executive and Legislative powers remained the same, civil society participation was translated into co-optation, a tradition going back to the thirties, and the reform of the political party system has been as cautious as can be. Although lack of space precludes a fuller discussion on such issues, it seems fair to conclude that the political strategy of the Government has reinforced the financial coalition, further undermining Government efforts to launch a long term development project.

To sum it up, the preceding analysis argued that LULA’s government put forward several development projects but has only implemented such projects partially, in an awkward combination of elements of the developmentalist and liberal heritages. Actually, the Government positive agenda has focused on keeping inflation under control by a very orthodox macroeconomic policy, reducing the foreign exchange constraint by stimulating primary exports and capital inflows, increasing international autonomy and improving the lot of the underprivileged by fiscal transfers and by increasing the minimum wage. Although it was recently hoped that growth would come from investing in infrastructure and from a virtuous circle between household consumption (fuelled by credit) and private investments, growth remains highly dependent on the evolution of the international economy.

The inclusion of poverty as a top priority problem is the single most important change introduced by LULA’s government in the national agenda, even if the solution given to such problem via fiscal transfers is subject to many criticisms of a structural nature. The national autonomy sought by the foreign policy and industrial policies targeting specific sectors are a change compared to preceding governments, but they are part of a long standing Brazilian tradition. Otherwise, it is essentially an agenda of incremental change, in scope and practice. Its success is enhanced by the failure of the liberal model, in as much as some of the positive results (e.g. personal earnings, employment) are a move towards past levels. Macroeconomic policies followed by the Government imply that earnings for the “very rich” are maintained, limit all the long term development projects, and show a built-in conservative bias against structural change.

I suggest that a political economy approach can help understand such phenomena. More specifically, I suggest that a powerful coalition between private interests and the Central Bank developed over the last quarter of a century, which reinforced after the mid-nineties, and that this coalition has the power to impose policies for its own benefit and to veto alternative policies. The weakness of social movements and the deadlock about the reform of the State has strengthened this coalition. Path-dependency and cumulativeness are strong factors in this process.

International conditions prevailing from the beginning of LULA’s government until the last quarter of 2007 favored the macroeconomic policies it adopted. Their change to the worse following the sub-prime crisis will reinforce the restrictive aspects of such policies.

The analysis is centered on the Brazilian case. Although this case presents some extreme features, such as the high interest rates charged and the inequality of income distribution, it is but one of a kind. Similar macroeconomic policies are practiced in most developed countries, Central Banks have adopted inflationtargeting as their best practice and the consequences are the same. In countries where there was a strong tradition of State intervention, such as France, the stalemate about the roles of the market and State seem to be very similar to the Brazilian one.

Let us conclude with a comment on development theory. We all know KEYNES’ remark about “practical men” being guided by long-dead economists. Theory, as history, matters. I have equated above a “development project” to a “development convention” and theory plays an important role in providing some coherence to the several components of the convention and in guiding decision-makers.

The days in which FUKUYAMA proclaimed the “end of History” and WILLIAMSON dubbed the Washington Consensus the “Universal Consensus” which “summarized the common core of wisdom embraced by all serious economists” are long past46. They have been superseded by the international crises of the nineties, the failure of show-cases such as Argentina, and the success of heterodox development paths as followed by China, India and Vietnam, among others. Gone also are the laundry-lists of institutional reforms to be applied urbi et orbi to promote “good governance” and thus to transform Zambia into Sweden overnight. “Big bangs” lost their gilt. Given its results, the demise of such a convention should be commemorated.

Diversity, a hallmark of old developmentalism, has made a comeback: countries follow different trajectories. Institutions change gradually, the polity plays an important role in institutional change, institutions may be formally identical and operate differently depending on their context. Political economy is back, “history matters”, path-dependency and cumulativeness are important. Even “industrial policies”, those bad word, have had a reprieve by none less than the World Bank (2007).

However, behind the recognition of diversity and the caution about general recipes, lies, unabated, the belief in the need for “sound fundamentals”. This is a set phrase with strong rhetorical power (as was “rational” expectations) because nobody is in favor of “unsound” fundamentals. The problem lies in how one defines “soundness”.

The canonical answer now is fiscal equilibrium, low inflation and flexible exchange rate. Given soundness and a well working price mechanism, growth will follow suit. If it doesn’t it is either because some institutions are not working properly (each case is now different) or/and because path dependency leads the agents to hold bad expectations about inflation. To remedy the former, introduce institutional reform (bearing in mind the context). As for the latter, stick to your guns and keep firing until expectations change and a new trajectory is established. It takes time but, as one humorist has put it, “in the end all will be well, and if it is not well yet it is because it has not ended”. The Central Banks have become the high-priests of this canon and to fulfill their role they must be free and independent.

Such definition partakes in the faith on the market with the neo-liberal convention, but it is much more sanguine about macro-economic policies, as it takes a firmer stand on monetary and foreign exchange policies. Moreover, as argued above, their scope are more limited and the horizon shorter than the ones put forward by the neo-liberal convention.

Nonetheless, we have a “sound” convention, with all its attributes. But, is it a development convention? In so far as development is interpreted as implying structural changes and a long term prospective, the answer is negative. The developmental convention focused on changes in the productive structure, the neo-liberal convention on the institutional structure. Both had a long term horizon. The “sound” fundamentalists focus on stability and their convention looks, at best, at the near future only. It is, in this sense, essentially conservative, especially where the interests it serves are being well-cared for. The Brazilian case illustrates how well it works.

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Desenvolvimento Industrial e Tecnológico...

Este artigo desdobra-se em cinco seções. As três primeiras são essencialmente analíticas. Na primeira, buscamos, de forma esquemática, caracterizar um "padrão de desenvolvimento" nacional, a partir das teses da "escola de regulação" e dos autores neoschumpeterianos1. Na segunda seção,...

lnnovation and the Development Convention in Brazil

Fabio S. Erber, Revista Brasileira de Inovação, Volume 3, Número 1, Janeiro / Junho 2004 – Paper written for the workshop “Tendências e Fronteiras do Desenvolvimento: Inovação e Políticas Tecnológicas”, IE/UFRJ, Centre for Research on Innovation and Competition – The Universty of Manchester, FINEP and British Council (RJ). Rio de Janeiro, September 2002.

From the beginning of the nineties the Brazilian economy was ruled by a specific view of the process of economic development, which emphasized the role of technical progress as a means to achieving fast and stable economic growth. Nonetheless, the degree of endogenous technical innovation in Brazil remains very low. This paper explores the conjecture that the latter result is a consequence of the hegemonic view of development. The first section presents some quantitative and qualitative data to support our assertion about the innovativeness of the Brazilian economy. The second section argues that the “view of development” may be profitably treated as a “convention”, a set of beliefs shared by decision-makers and used to identify the main issues which a development strategy has to tackle and the appropriate means to address such issues. A development convention contains also a “negative” agenda — issues and solutions which should be avoided. The same section then analyses the development convention which was hegemonic from the nineties to the date of the paper (2002) and the implications of its positive and negative agendas for technological development, assuming such convention had worked as its supporters supposed it would. It argues that the theoretical results are consistent with the facts described in the first section. The last section comments the actual working of the development convention, arguing that it stressed the main technological features present in the “pure form” of the convention and concludes with a brief discussion of the role of innovation in a new development convention which seemed to be arising at that time.

1. lntroduction

From the beginning of the nineties to the present the Brazilian economy was ruled by a specific view of the process of economic development, which emphasized the role of technical progress as a means to achieving fast and stable economic growth. Nonetheless, the degree of endogenous technical innovation in Brazil remains very low. This paper explores the conjecture that the latter result is a consequence of the hegemonic view of development.

The next section presents some quantitative and qualitative data to support our assertion about the innovativeness of the Brazilian economy. The third section argues that the “view of development” may be profitably treated as a “convention”, a set of beliefs shared by decision-makers and used to identify the main issues which a development strategy has to tackle and the appropriate means to address such issues. As discussed in more detail below, a development convention contains also a “negative” agenda — issues and solutions which should be avoided. The same section then analyses the development convention which was hegemonic from the nineties to date and the implications of its positive and negative agendas for technological development, assuming such convention had worked as its supporters supposed it would, it argues that the theoretical results are consistent with the facts described in the previous section. The last section comments the actual working of the development convention, arguing that it stressed the main technological features present in the “pure form” of the convention and concludes with a brief discussion of the role of innovation in a new development convention which seems to be arising.

2. The innovativeness of the Brazilian economy

Economists of every persuasion share now a consensus: technical innovation is one of the main drivers of development. The Brazilian economy is one of the largest in the world and faces enormous social and economic problems which place a large premium on growth and development. Therefore, technical innovation should be a strong priority in the country’s development strategy.

It is arguable that Brazil has some good conditions to attain a high level of innovativeness. For instance, its education system churns out a fairly high number of PhDs in science and engineering — higher, in fact, than those which graduate in South Korea, a country which can be used for the purposes of benchmarking in terms of technical innovation. The quality of such manpower is borne out by the number of indexed science and technology publications — again, comparable to the South Korean level, as shown in the first two lines of Table 1.

Maintaining and expanding the system of graduate education takes up a hefty share of Brazilian R&D expenditures (over 40%).1 Government funds also most scientific and technical research. Business accounts for only 36% of total R&D expenditures2 (0.33% of GDP), a share which is roughly half of the OECD average. The contrast with South Korea is strong, especially as regards business expenditures: in Korea, BERD´s share of GDP is five times greater than in Brazil. Since in the two countries Government invests a similar share of GDP in R&D (0.57% in Brazil and 0.7% in South Korea), business expenditures account for the great difference in the intensity of R&D expenditures between the two countries: 0.9% in Brazil and 2.5% in South Korea (see Table 1). The same difference is observed in terms of results: as shown in Table 1, during the period 1998/2000 the USPO registered an average of 3,500 South Korean patents per year, in contrast with a yearly average of 100 Brazilian patents.

Table 1: lnnovation in Brazil and South Korea at the End of The Nineties

Notes: (1) 1997; (2) 2000; (3) Brazil: 1999; South Korea: 1998;
(4) Average 1998/2000
Source: MCT (2001).

Qualitative information about R&D and other technological activities confirm this pattern of limited innovation. Patenting in Brazil is dominated by foreign holders, mostly affiliates of transnational firms (about 80% of patents). In their study of innovation in the State of São Paulo, Quadros et al. (1999) concluded that firms which are totally or partially foreign-controlled show a stronger propensity to introduce new products and processes as well as to employ more scientists and engineers for R&D activities than locally-owned firms. Similarly, SOBEET (2000) argues that foreign firms have a greater R&D intensity than local firms.

But, which type of R&D is conducted by these leading-edge innovators? Quadros et al. (1999) explain that “technologically new products and processes are originated in the industrialized countries, where transnational companies locate their major R&D centers. They transfer such innovations to the South American market by adapting new products and processes to the local market needs or to the technical constraints to the supply of materials and components” (p.7). SOBEET (2000), a study of TNC’s technological activities, confirms that “research on new products or processes are performed almost totally in the headquarters laboratories… Support activities and quality control are the [technological] activities most often performed in Brazil” (p.15). [my translation] Major adaptations are performed only when local idiosyncrasies come into play, such as the need to strengthen the suspension of cars because of the poor state of Brazilian roads.

Among locally-owned firms State enterprises used to rank highest in terms of R&D intensity (Erber & Amaral, 1995). The privatization process of the nineties led to substantial reductions of R&D in some sectors (petrochemicals, telecoms, electric power) although in other sectors (steel and airplanes) competition maintained the former trajectory of investment in R&D. Petrobras, the State energy company, is probably the enterprise with the highest R&D budget of the country, geared to its deep-water oil exploitation.

The limited R&D investment of enterprises located in Brazil finds its counterpart in technology imports, used for the introduction of new products and processes. Such imports, as it is well known, lead to added production capabilities but do not increase the capability to innovate. This process of uneven transfer of capabilities, well studied since the seventies,3 is borne out by the more recent evidence. As shown by the evolution of labor productivity (Carvalho, 2000) and by the qualitative analysis of Castro and Proença (2001), the Brazilian industry went through a process of modernization of production processes but, according to the latter authors, still sorely lags behind in innovation capability.

3. The development convention4

Conventions are sets of beliefs shared by a community for, among other purposes, problem-setting and problem-solving. They are a heuristic device for dealing with uncertainty. Conventions may stem from different sources: religion, myths, scientific theories, etc. Since the Enlightenment the prestige of science as a source of conventions has increased, albeit at the cost of dressing up other sources (such as myths) in the guise of scientific theories.

In order to perform their roles in terms of problem-setting and problem- solving, conventions must be discriminating: “anything goes” is not a helpful convention. Therefore, conventions embody a set of criteria which specify a “positive agenda”, the set of problems which should be tackled and a set of solutions which should be used to solve such problems. The criteria also specify a “negative agenda”, problems which are not relevant and solutions to (relevant) problems which should be avoided. The importance of clear- cut criteria increases in the measure of the complexity of the set of problems to be solved.

The strength of conventions depends on the adhesion of decision-makers and we may speak of hegemonic conventions in specific societies during some periods of time, as in the cases of absolute monarchy in XVIIIth Century France and of neo-liberalism during the nineties in Latin America. Nonetheless, complex problems may evoke different conventions to solve them, as shown by the persistence of upholders of monarchy. Moreover, disagreement about important criteria which structure the convention (e.g. ethical criteria) may lead to incompatible conventions which compete to gain the adherence of decision-makers.

Conventions evolve. By their nature of problem-solving, conventions are submitted to empirical tests — people may become disenchanted with an erstwhile strongly upheld convention if it does not solve the problems it intended to: witness the case of socialism in Eastern Europe. Alternatively, the criteria which structure the convention may loose legitimacy, as in the case of the divine right of monarchs.

Given those (possibly trite) comments on conventions in general, to be used later on, let us turn to “economic development of the less-developed countries”. As it is well known, the deliberate pursuit of this objective became an issue after the Second World War, in the course of the Cold War. Since then “development” has been distinguished from “growth” by the occurrence of structural change. Development was not simply a matter of having “more of the same”, it was about changing the composition of what we had.

Simplifying the debate and keeping the focus on Brazilian history, we may say that the convention about development which held the hegemony from the end of the War to the mid-eighties considered that the structural change that mattered was the change of the productive structure — industrialization, in short. The transformation of the productive structure would be achieved by institutional means: by the action of the State on the market.

This convention ascribed great importance to technical progress, putting the differences between center and periphery as regards the pace and appropriation of the results of technical progress at the heart of its justification of industrialization. Nonetheless, in its early stages this convention did not include in its positive agenda the development of a local innovation capability, relying on the imports of technology to bring about the desired technical progress, via direct foreign investment, technology licensing or embodied in capital goods. The positive agenda focused on the mastering of production capabilities.

However, in later stages, especially during the second half of the seventies, the innovation capability was included in the positive agenda, widening the concept of “local productive forces”. This was especially significant in the “high- tech” sectors, such as informatics, telecoms, aerospace and nuclear energy, where State intervention aimed not only at developing local innovation capability but also at establishing such capability in firms under national control.

During the early eighties the “productive structure” development convention begun to crumble as a consequence of the changes in the international credit market on which it had come to rely on. Such decay was compounded during the second half of the decade by its inability to deal with the issues of stability5 and the expectations arising from the end of the military regime. Such disrepute opened the gates for a new development convention.

At the time, the “neo-liberal convention” was already in full swing in the rest of the developing world, except for East Asia. The new convention rested not only on a well-developed critique of the failures of the preceding convention but also on a coherent set of principles and prescriptions which were capped by a teleological view of the world.

The theoretical underpinning of the reformers of the early nineties rested upon three pillars — the “rational expectations” neo-classical economics, the political science of public choice and coalitions theories and the historical approach of the “new institutional economics”. All three converged to praise the market and berate the State. The assumption that national societies tended to converge towards the same pattern — market-driven liberal democracies — provided a long-term perspective. Paving the way for such prospect, the Decalogue of the Washington Consensus (Structural Adjustment Programs in Africa) explained what should be done: open the economy in terms of trade, finance, direct investment and rights of property and reform the State by reducing regulation, privatization of State enterprises, fiscal equilibrium and efficient expenditures.

In our previous terms, the new convention provided a clear positive agen- da to the decision-makers.

The new development convention turned the old convention upside down, in at least four fundamental aspects. First, policy-makers intended to transform what was seen as an “organic” (corporative) fabric of relationships into a more individualistic society — a truly liberal intention.6 Second, by defining structural reform in institutional terms only. If the institutional structure was duly reformed, development would follow. Third, by defining that the market was the institution that mattered. More specifically, the international market. Fourth, institutional uniformity across nations was a desired goal. Given sound and efficient institutions and natural comparative advantages the productive structure would follow suit and become efficient too.

As a consequence of this change, everything which was identified with the old development convention became part of the new negative agenda.

In the view of policy-makers, the institutional reforms would lead to two entwined virtuous circles, from which economic development would result.7 The first circle was related to the process of globalization, defined as the growth of trade and investment above the growth of production and the elimination of distinctions between foreign and national capitals. Trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) would introduce competitive pressure into the erstwhile protected markets and bring in more modern machinery and inputs, increasing productivity. Trade and FDI are closely related: FDI requires freedom to import but, at the same time, has a greater propensity to export. In the long run such investment would lead to increases in productivity and hence to greater exports. It did not matter that a considerable part of FDI was directed to purchasing local (private and State-owned) firms, since this was a prelude to increases in productivity and greater exports. Therefore, the large deficit in the transactions account of the balance of payments was a temporary phenomenon as was the reliance on short-term international finance to fill in the foreign exchange gap. By the same token the very high interest rates required to attract financial capital would be short-lived.

The second virtuous circle was related to the internal market. Here, trade liberalization would lead to a progressive income distribution by acting as a brake on price increases by domestic producers and regional integration would enhance the domestic market further. Price stability would provide entrepreneurs with long term horizons. Privatization and de-regulation would coalesce with imports and FDI to increase competition. Wider markets, positive expectations and greater competition would lead to new investments and trade liberalization would allow the imports of new vintages of machinery and inputs and therefore to increases in productivity, exports and growth. Fiscal reform would support the decline of interest rates and more “flexible” labor legislation would reduce costs and increase international competitiveness. The adoption of an over-valued exchange rate strengthened the mechanisms of the two circles, linking further the stabilization and growth components of the strategy, but was not a necessary condition for their success.

Let us forget the failures of the market and suppose that the model had worked and high and sustained growth had been achieved in order to examine its consequences for scientific and technological activities (S&TA) of enterprises, since the latter were, by definition, the main actor of the model. To do this it is useful to take a “portfolio” approach, whereby the firm is seen as a bundle of assets organized by routines and conventions which distributes its expenditures on new assets according to their expected costs, revenues and uncertainties over time. According to such view, technological assets are just one of the many assets in which a firm may invest.8 Moreover, technology assets are a portfolio in themselves, with different expected costs, revenues, uncertainties and timing. The structure of the latter portfolio defines the “technological strategy” of the firm.

The amount a firm’ of investment in technological assets is conditioned by the technological opportunities and by the type of competition and user-producer relationships it faces in the sectors in which it operates, as well as by growth prospects, determined be macroeconomic conditions such as the rate of growth of the economy, the degree of international openness and income distribution. A crucial determinant of such investments is the national market for credit and capital, not only because it defines the availability of finance for technological assets but also because it defines the opportunity cost of technology investment (a feature normally overlooked in evolutionary analysis because it does not operate in the context of a “monetary economy” in the Keynesian sense).9 Obviously, the level of investment in technological assets is conditioned not only by macro and mesoeconomic factors: micro factors, such as the previous accumulation of technological assets by the firm and the routines and conventions attached to such history play an important role, as does the ownership and size of the firm and its financial capability to increase debt and/or run risks.

It is assumed here that, on the one hand, a firm has to maintain a minimal level of expenditures on technological assets to remain in business (e.g. for quality control and for minor product and process improvements). Such minimal level of expenditures is largely a consequence of the macro and mesoeconomic factors outlined above, such as the growth of the economy and the degree and type of competition prevailing in the market in which the firm operates. On the other hand, the increase in technological assets has limits too, given by a combination of meso and micro factors (e.g. the technological opportunities of the sector, the indebtedness capacity of the firm). In other words, firms invest in technology according to a floor and ceiling pattern.

Then, following the portfolio approach outlined above, what would have happened to the investment in technological assets had the reform development strategy performed according to plan? A higher and sustainable rate of growth combined with an increase in competition stemming from trade and investment liberalization and de-regulation would probably lead to higher investments in technology, reinforced by longer time horizons, lower interest rates and lower wage costs. The floor of the investment level in ST&A would probably be shifted upwards.

At the same time, trade liberalization would increase the competitive pressure on firms to use international process technologies and to supply products according to international standards. Globalization would also increase the time pressure to conform with international standards. Therefore imports of technology (embodied and disembodied) would become the most valuable asset in the technology portfolio. Although such imported assets require complementary local assets to be properly used (e.g. production engineering and detailed design skills) so as to adapt processes and products to local conditions, such local assets (many of which were already available in Brazil as a consequence of the previous period of industrialization) do not require a large deployment of resources and time to develop. Investment in non-incremental innovations locally developed, which would involve higher uncertainty and require longer time-horizons (i.e. lower time-discount rates) would be discouraged. Therefore the ceiling of the investment level would tend to be low.

Financial globalization, through the liberalization of the capital foreign exchange account imparted a further twist to the pattern outlined above. As mentioned, it was expected that finance capital would be needed to balance the expected current account deficit, filling in the gap left by FDI. In order to attract finance capital high internal interest rates would be necessary. However, high interest rates tend to shift the composition of the overall investment portfolio of firms towards financial assets, reducing the share of technological assets in the total portfolio. Moreover, high interest rates tend to shift the structure of the technology portfolio towards investments in assets with relatively short periods of maturity, such as local ST&A directed to changes in management organization and adaptations of products and processes. In this context, firms having access to international sources of finance (i.e. with lower interest rates and longer maturity) were better placed to invest in local ST&A.

Given the macroeconomic strategy outlined above, the role of FDI in the definition of investments in technology is critical. First, international firms are supposed to set the pace at which the economy is growing and, therefore, the intensity of technological efforts. Second, more directly, by their size and connections international firms are better placed to carry out more ambitious technological programs (if they are likely to carry them out is an issue discussed below). Third, they exert an important influence on the ST&A investments of their suppliers and customers, as well as of their local competitors. Fourth, FDI has transferred to foreign ownership some of the local firms which had developed significant technological assets, in the private sector (e.g. the leading auto parts producers) and privatized public companies (e.g. telecom). Finally, FDI dominates the sectors which are more technology- intensive within the productive structure of the country (especially in durable consumer goods and capital goods production).

It seems unlikely that firms which have easy access to technological assets already developed elsewhere (i.e. which are sunk costs from the point of view of the group as whole) will replicate such investment under conditions where there are less economies of scale and scope and less externalities deriving from a long-established national system of innovation. Under such circumstances, R&D facilities set up by the companies FDI purchased could easily become redundant.

It is nothing but rational behavior for subsidiaries of transnational companies to concentrate technology investments mainly on adaptations of products and processes developed elsewhere to specific local conditions, such as raw materials or income distribution. Such new products and processes will probably require innovations in production engineering in the plants of the TNCs subsidiaries and, via linkages of production and use, in their suppliers and customers. As a consequence the floor of S&T expenditures would be raised, but the effect on their ceiling would be very limited — the local chains of production dominated by TNCs subsidiaries would become efficient producers, efficient users of innovations developed elsewhere.

The establishment and operation of the two virtuous circles was fully entrusted to market mechanisms enhanced by State reform. If the latter had conformed to the intentions, fiscal constraints would be reduced and expenditures could be increased eventually. Here, however, the positive and negative agendas interacted strongly.

In the past, there was an apparently straightforward answer: the State should intervene where there were market failures in order to restore Pareto-efficiency. A complication arose when several market failures co-existed. If it is impossible to remove all failures simultaneously, welfare economics says that there is no a priori Paretian criterion to select which imperfection to remove first and no guarantee that an imperfect situation is better than another (Nath, 1969). Under such circumstances external criteria, deriving from other economic and political sources, must be used to select priorities, as Lall (1994) argues was done in Southeast Asia. Dealing with market failures through State intervention was further complicated by the introduction of State failures, in the aftermath of the neo-liberal revolution. In fact, for the reformers of the nineties, the problems caused by State intervention tended to outweigh the negative results of market failures and State intervention was placed at the top of their negative agenda. Given the analytical problems involved in comparing two imperfect situations, this was an a priori judgment, based on anti-State and pro-market biases. Possibly for such reasons decision-makers in Brazil remained divided about the relevance of market failures for State action.

The discussion of market and State failures was very important for the development of innovation capabilities, since it is generally recognized that the market fails considerably in areas such as human resources development, basic research and development projects which have more uncertain, long-term results, especially in contexts where the credit and capital markets are very incomplete and operate poorly.

Since the development convention offered mixed answers and opinions of the decision-makers diverged, a compromise solution was found: the existing State mechanisms for human resources development were maintained, but Federal funding of S&T did not increase and university research was geared as much as possible to the needs of enterprises. More recently, when the neo- liberal development convention was already showing strong signs of failure, the Ministry of Science and Technology was able to garner para-fiscal resources to increase its budget.

Human resources and educational and scientific institutions are necessary but not sufficient conditions for innovation. Enterprises provide the necessary complement, especially in a world where comparative advantages are constructed and managed by the cooperation between Government and private enterprises and where international trade grows faster in the more technology-intensive products. In other words: if S&T is to be efficacious to promote development, it must be integrated to industrial policy.

To the symbolic question “is there an intrinsic difference between potato chips and computer chips?” the neo-liberal convention answered categorically “no!”. If a country had given comparative advantages in potato chips, it should stick to them. Sector policies were the emblem of the abhorred past and occupied the highest rank in the negative agenda. Industrial policies with a strong local technological content having the objective of achieving greater autonomy of decisions were the worst of all.

The negative reply to the chips question implies that the issue of the productive structure is irrelevant. Therefore it misses a crucial aspect of development: sectors play different roles in the process of generation and diffusion of innovations. Since the First Industrial Revolution, a few sectors, science-based, have acted as engines of innovations, which are then absorbed by sectors which supply production goods to the rest of the economic system. The strength of the sectors which act as engines and transmitters of innovations within a productive structure go a long way to explain the dynamics of such structure by virtue of the creation and diffusion of innovations, economies of proximity, scope economies, transaction costs and international competitiveness. In short, the negative answer is wrong.

But chassez le naturel et il revient au galop: as shown in Table 2, the production and exports of manufactures in Brazil are concentrated on products of low and medium intensity of technology while imports are concentrated on products of high and medium intensity. As a consequence, imports tend to have a higher income elasticity than exports and trade deficits are a structural feature, raising Prebisch’s specter from his grave. In fact, high-tech products such as electronics, chemicals and the more complex capital goods account for the bulk of Brazil’s trade deficit. Exports of highly technology-intensive products consist mainly of products of the airplane industry, established, ironically, under the deprecated ancien régime.

Table 2: Structure of Brazilian lndustrial Production (Y); Exports (X) and lmports (M) According to Technology Level of Products as a Percentage of Total Value – 1998

Source: Moreira (1999). [my estimates]
Source: Moreira (1999). [my estimates]

The observation of the structural difference between imports and exports and of its implications for the foreign exchange constraint is not new. It goes back to the eighties, when the late Fernando Fajnzylber from ECLAC warned us about it. It is true that for a neo-liberal, ECLAC could be seen as a suspect source, but the warning was repeated in the early nineties by economists above suspicion, which became members of the Government, such as Baptista and Fritsch (1993). Nonetheless, the economic policy remained deaf to the need to change the productive structure — a testimony to the force of the negative agenda. The policies eventually directed to specific sectors had essentially a defensive nature, designed to compete with Argentina for foreign investment (e.g. automobiles) or to fight unfair foreign competition (e.g. shoes). Coherently with the neglect of the structural dimension, they did not encompass any view of the desired sector structure nor any specific incentives to foster local innovation. The Government put some incentives (mainly credit and fiscal) on its window-shop and enterprises came to get them, driven by the market. A far distance from the policies followed in China and in Southeast Asia.

The chapter on the “evils of picking the winners” of the negative agenda probably played another role: preventing negotiations with TNCs. Nothing was asked of such companies in exchange for the incentives they received (e.g. setting up facilities for technological development, fostering local suppliers, etc.). As shown by the recent Chinese experience, the greatest recipient of FDI, such negotiations are part of the market and can be profitably used by the recipient country to develop its technical resources.

To sum it up: the neo-liberal development convention through its two agendas, positive and negative, implied a modernization of the existing productive capacity, at the level of enterprises and of the economic structure, but it did not lead to an increase in the innovation capability of the economy, either at the micro level or at the level of the economy as a whole. Such results are consistent with the facts pointed out in the preceding section.

4. Conclusions

The record of neo-liberal convention is mixed. It did produce a great institutional change, increasing the role markets play in social and economic life and reducing the roles of the State. More specifically, it helped to consolidate a convention of stability, building upon the rejection of inflation which spread during the last stages of decay of the “developmental State”. Those are not mean achievements.

Nonetheless, its development record is poor. As a consequence of its two agendas, positive and negative, the virtuous circles became vicious circles. The positive agenda rested on macro and micro assumptions which were dubious at the time they were made and which were falsified empirically. This is the case of assumption that the financial market would continue to provide funds to “emerging markets”, which was maintained even after the Mexican and Asian crises had shown otherwise. It is also the case of the assumption that FDI would lead to great exports, notwithstanding the fact that a great part of such investment was directed to non-tradables and, in the case of tradables, to the internal market.10 The negative agenda prevented the inclusion of the change of the productive structure as an issue to be tackled.

The viciousness of the circles is shown by low and unstable rates of growth, very high rates of unemployment, rise of urban violence and by the present macro-economic trap. The latter has welded the foreign exchange and fiscal constraints via a monetary policy which maintains the highest interest rates of the world in order to attract an increasingly reticent foreign finance capital so as to close the current transactions deficit. It does so at the cost of increasing exponentially the public debt, which is increasingly foreign exchange-indexed. As a result of such dismal record, the neo-liberal convention has lost its  hold and now is challenged openly by the four candidates in the coming Presidential election. Although a new convention has not yet emerged, there is at least a consensus: all candidates agree on one point, the need to expand exports and to limit imports in order to reduce the current account deficit and thus the reliance on foreign finance, dismantling the vicious circle above described. Industrial policy is now part of the positive agenda again. But will it be a policy which emphasizes innovation?

I have argued in the two previous sections that the type of technological capability found in Brazilian industry is consistent with the results expected from the good working of the neo-liberal convention. The failure of the convention strengthened the features of the expected technological capabilities, augmenting the bias in favor of financial investment in the general portfolio of the firms and the bias in favor of projects with low uncertainty, short maturation period and few sunken costs within the technology portfolio. Innovation projects tended to fare worse in the actual working of the neo- liberal convention than in its theory.

Given the high elasticity of imports, a trade surplus can always be obtained by keeping growth rates curbed, as in the present. However, since resuming growth is one of the main objectives of all candidates, achieving a trade surplus can be obtained only by expanding exports substantially and by substituting local production for imports.

My conjecture, based on the arguments of the preceding section, is that such double movement can be achieved only if the composition of tradable goods is shifted towards more technology-intensive products. This implies two complementary strategies: increasing the technology content of the chains of production already existent and changing the structure of industry by the inclusion of the sectors which are the engines and transmitters of innovation, especially electronics and capital goods. Such strategies would lead to a substantial increase in the innovation capability of the Brazilian economy, making such capability an integral part of the positive agenda of the new development convention.

Referências Bibliográficas

Batista, J.; Fritsch, W. (1993) Dinâmica Recente das Exportações Brasileiras (1979-90), in Velloso. J.; Fritsch, W. (orgs.), A Nova Inserção Internacional do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora

Carvalho, P. (2000) As Causas do Aumento da Produtividade da Indústria Brasileira nos anos 90, PhD thesis, Rio de Janeiro: IE/UFRJ

Castro, A. (1993) Renegade Development: Rise and Demise of State-Led Development in Brazil, in Smith, W.; Acuña, C.; Gamarra, E. (eds.), Democracy, Markets and Structural Reform in Latin America, Transactions Publishers

__________; Proença, A. (2001) Novas Estratégias Industriais: Sobrevida ou Inflexão?, mimeo, Rio de Janeiro: Fórum Nacional

Erber, F. (1981) Science and Technology Policy in Brazil: a Review of the Literature, in Latin American Research Review, v.16, n.1, 1981

__________; Amaral, L. (1995) Os Centros de Pesquisa das Empresas Estatais: um Estudo de Três Casos, in Schwartzman, S. (org.), Política Industrial, Mercado de Trabalho e Instituições de Apoio, Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas

__________ (1999) O Sistema de Inovações em uma Economia Monetária: uma Agenda de Pesquisas, in Cassiolato, J. E.; Lastres, H. (orgs.), Globalização & Inovação Localizada — Experiências de Sistemas Locais no Mercosul , Brasília: IBICT/MCT

Franco, G. (1998) Inserção Externa e Desenvolvimento, in Revista de Economia Política, v.18, n.3

Lall, S. (1994) The East Asian Miracle: does the bell toll for industrial strategy?, in World Development, v.22, n.4

Lakatos, I. (1970) Falsification and Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, in Lakatos, I.; Musgrave, A. (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, London: CUP

Laplane, M.; Sarti, F. (1998) Novo Ciclo de Investimentos e Especialização Produtiva, in Reis Velloso, J.P. (org.), O Brasil e o Mundo no Limiar do Novo Século, Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora

MCT — Ministério da Ciência e Tecnologia (2001) Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação: Desafio para a Sociedade Brasileira, Brasília: Livro Verde

Moreira, M. (1999) A Indústria Brasileira nos Anos 90: o Que Já se Pode Dizer?, Giambiagi, F.; Moreira, M. (orgs.), A Economia Brasileira nos Anos 90, Rio de Janeiro: BNDES

Nath, S. (1969) A Reappraisal of Welfare Economics, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul

Quadros, R.; Furtado, A.; Bernardes, R.; Franco, E. (1999) Technological Innovation in Brazilian Industry: an Assessment Based on the São Paulo Innovation Survey, Austin: Interna- tional Conference on Technology Policy and Innovation, mimeo

Schön, D. (1993) Generative metaphor: A Perspective on Problem-Setting in Social Policy, in Ortony, A. (ed.), Metaphor and Thought, Cambridge University Press

SOBEET — Sociedade Brasileira para o Estudo de Empresas Transnacionais (2000) Comportamento Tecnológico das Empresas Transnacionais em Operação no Brasil, in Conjuntura Econômica, março

Sabóia, J.; Carvalho, P. (1997) Produtividade na Indústria Brasileira: Questões Metodológicas e Análise Empírica, in Texto para Discussão 504, Rio de Janeiro: IPEA

The Political Economy of Technological Development:...

1. The BIP: a capsule chronology

Historical periodization of a policy necessarily involves a degree of arbitrariness because of the cumulative nature of the processes underlying the policy. As an example, it may be claimed that the origins of BIP lay in...

Technological dependence and learning revisited

Fabio S. Erber, In Estratégias de Desenvolvimento, Política Industrial e Inovação: ensaios em memória de Fabio Erber (Org: Dulce Monteiro Filha, Luiz Carlos Delorme Prado, Helena M.M. Lastres – Rio de Janeiro: BNDES, 2014)

The article compares two contrasting views on technological development of Least Developed Countries (LDCs): the "dependence" studies, which stress the limitations of international technology transfer and indigenous technological capability and the "incremental indigenous learning" works, which emphasize the achievements of LDCs. After a brief description of their intellectual background and institutional setting, the similarities and differences of their treatment of technological development in LDCs are discussed. It is argued that despite substantial complementarities, which contribute to a better understanding of the phenomenon, important differences remain, especially as regards the consequences of LDCs technological development for industrialization and the international division of labor, concluding that the disregard of cyclical factors mislead the two "schools" in this respect.

1. Introduction

Over the last fifteen years a considerable body of research on the technological development of LDCs has come to light. The ideas of what can be loosely called the “school of dependence” had an important influence on shaping some of the questions posed by this research and the answers it provided. More recently the theses of technological dependence have come under severe criticism [Soete (1981)] and, at the same time, a spate of new articles and books [e.g. Katz (1978); Lall (1982a; 1982b); Dahlman and Westphal (1982)] have suggested what seems to be an alternative view of the technological development of the LDCs. The purpose of this article is to reassess the two views and draw out implications for the present industrialization debate.

We begin with a brief presentation of what, in our reading, are the main characteristics of the two bodies of literature, including the intellectual interlocutors and the institutional setting of elaboration of such theories, since both have a bearing here, as in any social science production. Then, in the two following sections, we analyze in more depth the similarities and the differences between them as regards the technological efforts of LDCs and their implications for government policies and for the international division of labor.

2. The Background of the Two “Schools”

2.1. Technological dependence

It is beyond the purpose of this article to try to review the many contributions (often contradictory), which make up what has been called the “dependence school,”1 but it is important to recall the main issues at stake. To begin with, it is important to note that dependence theories were arguing against the “stages of development” theories (with their functional sociology underpinning and their emphasis on the “modernizing” role of foreign investment), which promised industrialization would come to the periphery as a “natural” result, similar to the industrialization of the “early comers.” At the same time, they went against the orthodox Marxist view that imperialism was opposed to industrialization of the periphery, although they sought their own theoretical roots in the Marxist paradigm. A third interlocutor of dependence theorists, with which they held a much more complex relationship,2 were the ideas developed by Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) on defense of the industrialization of Latin America during the fifties and early sixties. ECLA argued that products led to an uneven development of the world system (with the primary production economies) and to an uneven internal development of the Latin American countries, incapable of solving their problems of capital accumulation and employment. By the time dependence theory came to be developed, the warnings of ECLA3 that also spontaneous import-substituting industrialization would not be the answer to the problems of the Latin-American economies had been vindicated. In fact, dependence theory can be viewed as an afterthought of the battle for industrialization, which, by the mid-sixties, had come to seem more and more a Pyrrhic victory, in terms of internal economic, social and political equality and regards independence from external determination.

Dependence theorists asked two main questions, implicitly or explicitly: “Is capitalist development feasible in the periphery?” and “Which is its specificity vis-à-vis the pattern of development of central countries?”

Although there was agreement among the authors of the “dependence school” about the specificity of the development of the peripheral countries, when compared to the central economies, there was sharp disagreement about the growth possibilities of the former economies. Some authors [e.g. Frank (1969)] argued that such economies had a built-in tendency to the “development of underdevelopment,” while others [e.g. Cardoso and Faletto (1979)] argued that, in some countries, the pattern of “associated development” offered scope for continuing the process of capital accumulation, albeit at a very high social and political cost.

The analyses of pattern of development which emerged from the phase of import – substituting industrialization argued that import of technology constituted now one of the main links of the chain of relationship which kept the economy of the Latin-American countries subordinated to advanced economies. The importance of technological link was greater for those countries which had industrialized more (e.g. Brazil, Mexico), and together with imports of capital goods, foreign finance and the industrial role of multinational corporations (MNCs), composed the web of the “new pattern of dependence.”

In an early formulation [Cardoso (1973)], the underdevelopment of local capital goods industry and reliance on imported technology was seen as limiting the process of capitalist development of the periphery, since the Department I of such economies (the sector producing means of production) was said to be virtually non-existent there, preventing a productive complementarity required by capital accumulation and draining the dynamic stimuli to the central economies. Further research showed this to be an over-simplification: in many countries, an internal technical capability and the production of capital goods developed with the process of industrialization.

Nevertheless, the question posed by original dependence argument – the specificity of the industrial development of the periphery – and the answer provided – the difference in the industrial structure, especially the limited size and role played by the local supply of technology and means of production, remained nor only valid but influenced the considerable research on technological development performed by Government and academic substitutions. It is in this sense that we include this research in the “dependence school.”

In trying to highlight the main concerns of these latter studies, we shall rely mainly on the results of the Brazilian research for several reasons. One, obviously, is convenience, but more important are features of the Brazilian economy: Brazil is one of the most industrialized of the LDCs, combining a large internal market with an aggressive export policy. Its capital goods industry is the largest among the LDCs (China excluded) and it is also one of the main LDCs in terms of investment in higher education, science and technological development. Nonetheless, there is a consensus that such investment so far has not seriously dented the industry’s reliance on imported technology. Finally, since the early seventies, an extensive body of literature on technological development and science and technology policy developed in Brazil.4

Some of the issues dealt with in this literature are closely related to our present discussion:

  • The sources of technology used by private (foreign and local) and State enterprises: local – intra and extramural – development (especially the use of universities and research institutes) and import of technology. Such research involved not only opening up the “black box” of technology so as to understand what capabilities were, or not, locally developed and absorbed but also the rationale of the use of such sources by the enterprises. Such studies were usually conducted at the sector level, and were complemented by studies of the “scientific and technological system,” especially case studies of the research institute and their relationship to the enterprises.
  • The study of the role of the State. Initially motivated by the analysis of the enterprises rationale and the role of State policies in such rationale, it then developed into an analysis of the relationship between the explicit science and technology policy and the more general industrial policies, and to the study of conflicts of interest within the State and their relationship to the general pattern of development of the country.
  • The implications of technological dependence in terms of foreign exchange costs, of the pattern of competition within industrial sectors and the foreign dominance of such sectors, among others.

Studies in other Latin-American countries developed along similar lines, developing a substantial body of knowledge about technological development of the region. It is thus somewhat perplexing to find authors (from outside the dependence school) saying that the literature

concerned with the transfer of technology has treated developing countries as passive recipients of technology from the advanced countries and concentrated on the imperfections of the technology market that raises the costs of buying technology to hapless developing countries [Lall (1982a, p. 6)].

Although inspired by the issues of dependence, such analyses drifted away from the Marxist moorings of the original writers of dependence into the safer waters of mainstream economics. To some extent, the movement was a consequence of the inadequacies of Marxist theory, especially as regards enterprise behavior in an oligopolistic system. However, the institutional influence cannot be discarded, since a considerable part of such studies was either commissioned or directly conducted by Government institutions, where Marxist vocabulary and categories would be rather unwelcome (to put it mildly).

In fact, during the seventies, in several countries of Latin America [Segasti (1978)], science and technology policy gained a new status. New government institutions were established and old ones modernized, to promote local scientific and technological development, adopting measures which often went against the grain of the more general policies of the government. Although the issues of internal domination and class conflicts posed by the original dependence literature were outside the pail in such institutions, another part of the issues of dependence – the relationship between foreign and local capitals – was not. In fact, such research provided them with ammunition for justifying their existence and growth, and, at the same time, they gave the research a sometimes fruitful action-directs push. Nonetheless, this literature retained a “political economy approach,” especially in the studies related to the State influence on technological development.

2.2. The “Incremental Indigenous Learning (IIL) School”

The writings of this group of authors are well known to the English-speaking readers, so we may be excused if we proceed at a greater speed. What probably are their most distinguishing traits are: (i) their view of technical change as an incremental process, and opposed to what Lall calls the “Schumpeter syndrome” (the emphasis on discontinuity and technological breakthroughs, based on research and development); (ii) they present a rich body of evidence concerning the LDCs mastery of manufacturing technology and the capability of introducing adaptations in products and processes developed abroad, based upon incremental, learning process; and (iii) they argue that such learning underlies the successes of some LDCs in exporting technology, sometimes disembodied, but, most often, embodied in relatively complex products and services and even in turnkey plants. From this latter evidence, they suggest that a new international division of labor may be emerging with the economies which have developed such technical capability finding a new relationship to the others LDCs and to the older industrialized countries, based upon their technological capability.

The evidence upon which such theories rest consists mainly of a collection of detailed case studies of enterprises carried out in several countries in Latin America, especially in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, summarized in Katz (1978), and the studies of exports of technology by Latin-American countries [Katz and Ablin (1978)], India [Lall (1982a)] and Korea [Westphal et al. (1980); Dahlman and Westphal (1982)]. Such research was usually sponsored by international institutions, notably the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and ECLA.5

Although Marx was a keen observer of the phenomena of learning and stressed their importance for industrial development,6 the parentage and the interlocutors of the “IIL School” are predominantly neo-classical. This can be more clearly observed in the surveys they make of the literature [Katz (1978); Lall (1981, 1982a and b); Dahlman and Westphal (1982)] – e.g. the emphasis they put on the literature on “choice of technology.” What is somewhat surprising is the ignorance they display of the contemporary literature on dependence, which had already shown in considerable detail the existence of local technological development in LDCs (a point developed further below). Whether this can be attributed to language barriers, to a paradigmatic parochialism or to other reason, is a moot question. It is certainly unfortunate, since this literature strengthens a part of their argument, even if it reduces some of its novelty. Moreover, it deprives the IIL literature of relevant interlocutors, which may contribute to question and to enrich their own conclusions, a purpose to which this article is but a modest step.

3. Local Technological Development in LDCs

As mentioned above, the IIL School emphasizes the development of a technological capability in LDCs through an incremental process, described by Dahlman and Westphal (1982, p. 126) as follows:

Firms in developing countries acquire increased technological mastery by engaging in a purposive technological effort to assimilate and adapt technology, an effort which typically takes place in relation to experience gained in production engineering and project execution.7

This conclusion is fully consistent with the findings of the “dependence” literature. In fact, from the earliest studies [e.g. Biato et al. (1971), for Brazil], it had been shown that local firms had developed design (basic and detailed) and manufacturing capabilities, especially for simple products, such as universal machine tools and agricultural equipment, based mainly on “reverse engineering.”

The research on sectors where this mastery had been developed [e.g. Erber et al. (1974), for the capital good industry] showed that the local firms there tended to rely progressively more on imported technology via licensing, in the measure in which they diversified and increased the technical complexity of their production; a behavior confirmed by more recent studies [e.g. Erber (1982), for the same sector]. Although non-technical factors played an important role (e.g. preference of customers for foreign technology), the studies left no doubt there was also a discontinuity in technical capabilities behind such shift in sources of technology. In new industries, foreign technology was often used from the outset, either via licensing or foreign investment [sometimes as a joint venture, as described for petrochemicals by Araujo Jr. and Dick (1974); Silva Filho (1978); Teixeira (1982)]. In such cases a local technical capability was clearly lacking, especially where continuous flow processes were involved, requiring a complex set of capabilities, from the basic engineering of the process and the basic design of the plant, to the specification and procurement of capital goods.

Nonetheless, the dependence literature has shown that the import of technology does entail the development of a local technological capability – in fact, it argues that such capability is inherent in the dependent relationship. On the other hand, it also shows that such learning is limited, so as to preserve the dependent relationship. This should be no cause of surprise if one considers the rationale of the exporter of technology. Let us take the example of a licensor of technology of a product.

Exporters of technology have a deep-seated interest in ensuring that their customers possess some technological capability, since their earnings are usually pegged to the latter sales and because the responsibilities of licensor and licensee are very difficult to apportion in cases of failure, breakages etc., which may jeopardize the licensor’s international reputation. Thus, the importer of technology must be at least able to manufacture the goods and/or operate the processes according to the specification, failing which the licensor must teach the licensee how to do it.

Moreover, in order that a product can be manufactured, all its parts and components must be specified to minute detail, and such specification must conform to the available supply of materials, parts and components, as well as to the specific production conditions of the local manufacturer. Therefore, the stage of detailed design8 is better performed locally, where the product is to be manufactured, than abroad, where the licensor is located. For all parties, then, it is desirable that the licensee should know how to produce detailed designs.

Although manufacturing know-how and detailed design skills are a necessary condition for introducing innovations (as well as for production), they are not sufficient for purposes of innovation: basic design skills are necessary for innovation. Moreover, the mastery of the first two skills does not lead necessarily to a basic design capability: although in some products, especially mechanical products, it is often possible to progress from one to the other; in others, notably in products which perform atomic or molecular transformation, there is a discontinuity of knowledge between basic design on the one hand and detailed and manufacturing technology on the other.

Since basic design skills are not necessary for producing the goods, the exports of technology have no interest in closing such gap; quite the contrary, the teaching of such skills could foreclose a future source of revenues and even nurture a future competitor, especially in sectors (like the capital goods) where technical progress is incremental and engineering-based. The same applies to the skills for the feasibility stage of design. For sectors where innovation is not only design – intensive but also science-based, such as electronics, the transfer of technology is much more limited. The same reasoning applies to the licensing of process.

Thus, licensing does provide for learning but it is partial learning – a type of learning which, at the same time, ensures the licensor’s revenues and the continuation of the relationship over time. Such technical control in strengthened by legal provisions: as it is well known, technology is not sold, but leased – the owner of the technology does not forsake the property of the technology, only allows the licensee to use it for a limited duration of time, under certain conditions, some of which may by quite restrictive (export prohibitions, tied-in imports etc.). Such legal control applies even in the absence of patents, although the latter strengthens it.

The same pattern of limited learning (or permanence of dependence) was observed in the case of foreign subsidiaries, where the patent company had to transfer a manufacturing and detailed design capability but not the others. The Latin-American literature suggests that this strategy was not only due to scale-economies in the production of technology, but also to the extraordinary profits they reaped through “technology-related” intra-firm transactions [Vaitsos (1974); Fajnzylber and Tarragó (1976)].Thus, the literature on dependence argued that the transfer of technology between center and periphery was structurally limited on the side of the supplier of technology. Moreover, it was structurally limited on the side of the importer too. In fact, one of the main questions posed by this literature9 was: since the local entrepreneurs were aware of such limitations (as shown by the research) and of the costs they entailed (tied-in imports, export prohibitions, threats of being ousted from the market by a subsidiary after the licensee had tested market, or having to pay for the technology in equity; at least, relinquishing the control of some important decisions), why did they not invest more in their own technology, walking, so to speak, “on two legs”?

The answer showed that many factors were at work, among which, six ranked especially high:

  • The competition of foreign technology, which, being easily imported, put a high risk on attempting to develop local technology, especially where lead times were longer and costs higher, as for R&D-derived capabilities. Government policies related to foreign investment, imports of capital goods (where project financing played a crucial role) and import of disembodied technology were important determinants of such competition.
  • The pressure of clients, which often made the use of imported technology a conditio sine qua non, barring thus the possibility of developing local technology. This was observed not only for consumer but also for capital goods and engineering services, inclusive for State enterprises purchases.
  • The structures of the markets where such enterprises operated, which not only placed a premium on the monopoly, but also allowed them to pass on to the customers the cost of the technology imported.
  • The size of the local market, relative to the expenditures necessary to develop local technology and the lack of protection of such technology.
  • The short-term horizon with which local enterprises operated, in many cases due to the lack of planning by the State.
  • The political outlook of local entrepreneurs, who were more afraid of being controlled by the State than by foreign firms.

Thus, at one level of analysis, the answer was that the dynamics of economic and political forces was such that there was no incentive to the local entrepreneurs (and even less to subsidiaries of foreign firms) to develop a technological capability beyond that provided by technological transfer. This conclusion could be used to justify State intervention to foster such further development – and it often was. However, at another level of analysis, it showed that the original definition of dependence as a structural characteristic of the peripheral economy was not incorrect – technological dependence was just a facet of a specific type of capitalist development. The peripheral development, if in some cases allowed for an expanded capital accumulation, nonetheless contained such accumulation in a relationship of subordination.

The conclusion that technological dependence is just part of a specific pattern of development is also important to avoid some pitfalls of technological determinism – it is not simply by changing the degree of technological self-reliance that this pattern of development will be radically transformed – a “naïve optimistic” approach [borrowing the apt expression from Cooper (1973)] often found in the literature. The determinants of technological dependence have to be sought nor only at the level of the lack of technical and scientific skills in LDCs (although they may be a powerful constraint in some cases), but especially at the level of the economic and political considerations which guide the action of the enterprises and of the State as regard the development of local technical capabilities. This view also lead to a reassessment of the role explicit science and technology policies may have in changing the technological dependence. When such policies not converge with the other policies (e.g. policies related to foreign investment) their efficacy is severely limited since they, alone, cannot change the pressures and inducements (some of which were mentioned above) which lead the enterprises to rely mainly on imported technology.

It is worth stressing that neither the more general interpretations of dependence nor the more policy-oriented research argued against import of technology and in favor of autarky, either at the level of the sector (or firm) or at the macro level, as it seems to be implied by some recent appraisals of technological dependence, e.g. Soete (1981). Their main concern was with the balance between imported and local technology in a dynamic setting, which, they argued, led to a structural unbalance.10

There are substantial similarities but also some important differences between the dependence literature and IIL studies, as regards the study of technological effort in LDCs.

Both have followed the same analytical steps: opening up the “black box” of technology and looking at the determinants of firm behavior as regards the different types of capabilities which lay in the box. Both agree that there is a discontinuity in the skills required to master such technologies. Moreover, both agree that although there is some complementarity between imported and local technology, the former may have a deeply inhibiting effect upon the development of the latter, although the dependence studies have developed more fully the relationship between imported and local technology.

There is also a substantial degree of complementarity between the two analyses since the IIL very detailed case studies have carried the knowledge of learning beyond that reached by dependence analysts, and have pointed out a process of learning unknown in that literature – learning through exporting, which reverses the more usual view that learning is a condition to export [Westphal et al. (1980); Dahlman and Westphal (1982), for Korea]. Furthermore, the careful review by Bell (1982) of cases of learning has raised interesting hypotheses about the determinants of firm – behavior and international differences in learning. His analysis of the behavior of firms in terms of pressures and inducements to developed local technology converges with the analysis of the dependence studies. Moreover, his development of the “infant industry” argument (which space precludes discussing in the detail it deserves) has contributed to the analysis of the rationale and feasibility of science and technology policies in LDCs.

On the other hand, the analysis, at the sector level, of the dependence studies put more in focus the relationships between local technological efforts and the characteristics of demand and the patterns of competition, as well as the role played by specific State policies (e.g. the purchase policies of State enterprises in the case of the capital goods industries). The sectorial approach also highlights the differences between sectors, pointing out the different role technology (local and imported) plays in the development of different industries and, conversely, the different role played by sectors in the technological development of the economy – a point to which we return in the next section. Within each sector, these studies show the interdependence of actions of the institutions involved foreign and national enterprises, government agencies and universities and research institutes, whereby, for instance, the entry of a foreign enterprises from commissioning studies to the detriment of local accumulation of the necessary experience.11 This interdependence may generate important synergistic effects intensifying the use of either local or imported technology (the latter being more frequent). Thus, the studies of dependence argue for a science and technology policy (explicit and implicit) which is disaggregated at the level of sectors but, at the same time, retains an integrated approach, encompassing all the relevant institutions involved in the technological development of the sector. It is possible that the limited success of the explicit science and technology policies of Latin-American countries to foster a substantially higher degree of technological self-reliance [Segasti (1978)] may be due not only to the contradictions between the explicit and implicit technology policies, already mentioned, but also to the way in which such policies were implemented, acting only at the enterprises level, without a sectorial approach. The case of the Brazilian computer industry studied in detail by Tigre (1982) is an exception, both in terms of success of technological developments and in terms of a sectorial policy where implicit and explicit policies converge, which seems to confirm the rule.

Here we also find some agreement between the two groups of studies. For instance, they agree that the behavior of the firms has to be partly explained in terms of the policies pursued by governments (not only the science and technology policy but also more general policy) and that government protection is necessary to support the “infant” local technological effort. Both IIL [especially Lall (1982a; 1982b)] and dependence analyses agree that such protection, to be effective, must go beyond technological activities and include the products which result from such activities. Nonetheless, the dependence studies seem to have advanced more in this field of enterprises/sector/economy relationships, possibly because they were, at the outset, conceived as sectorial studies.

Therefore, combining the two groups of studies, perhaps we can be bolder than Dahlman and Westphal (1982, p. 115) when they assert that “as yet too few case studies exist for it to be possible to generalize about what determines the extent and the direction of technological effort by individual firms.”

Nonetheless, there are important differences between the two bodies of research, which stem from their respective original paradigms and their institutional insertion. Such as the treatment of government policies, but are crystallized in what, at first sight, seems to be simply a matter of emphasis: while the IIL research stresses the development of technological capability in LDCs, the dependence studies lean on the limited nature of such development. That this is not a simple question of relative emphasis becomes clear when we look at how the two groups interpret the phenomenon in terms of the role played by LDCs in the international division of labor and their growth possibilities therein.

4. A New International Economic Order?

Dependence theory stressed, as we have shown, the trend to perpetuate the reliance on imported technology, as part and parcel of the peripheral condition of LDCs. Such imports, it was shown, involved high foreign exchange costs, both in terms of explicit and hidden payment and in terms of export restrictions. Moreover, the pioneer study by Fajnzylber (1971) of Brazilian manufactured exports showed that the sectors which had a higher intensity of imported technology contributed little to the export of manufactures, while those sectors with higher than average exports did not import technology intensively. Thus, it concluded

the majority of the industrial exports of the country rests upon the utilization of diffused technical knowledge. This supposes a fragile competitive position in a market, such as the one for manufactured products, characterized by the speed of innovations in products and processes (p. 196).

Therefore, the dependence argument ran, the peripheral countries cannot count on their spontaneous technological development to change their position in the international division of labor, where, by virtue of the technological dependence, their growth is partially limited. Furthermore, the dynamic of the international system and of their own economic and political structures are such that the peripheral condition of the LDCs is perpetuated.

What is probably the most original and provocative contribution of IIL studies is their suggestion that, contrary to the argument above, the technological development achieved by LDCs through minor innovations is an indicator of their dynamic comparative advantages and that a new international division of labor is emerging, in which

the comparative advantage of developed versus developing countries will be determined not so much by skill requirements in general, but by skill inputs based on specific learning processes which cannot be replicated in developing countries [Lall (1982b, p. 174, original emphasis)].

In this view, LDCs,

whose size, level of industrialization, education system and policy towards technology imports permit an independent assimilation of technology, should be able to gain a comparative advantage in various forms of high-skill activity where: (a) major innovations have been made abroad and are in the process of diffusion in advanced countries; (b) the necessary skills are acquired through engineering expertise gained through design and implementation of production processes and capital goods, rather than through large-scale scientific activity on the frontiers of technology; (c) the activity is not aimed at meeting changing needs of high-income, brand-conscious consumers; and (d) the technology involves large inputs of detailed design and adaptation to suit each application [Lall (1982b, p. 173)].

In such new international division of labor, the dividing line does not fall by industry but by particular technologies within each industry. This will lead to a change in the specializations of developed and developing countries: rather than concentrating on different types of industries as they tended to do till now, they will specialize in different processes within the same industries. Developed-developing country trade will, in other words, come more and more to resemble inter-developed country trade (Ibid, p. 174, original emphasis).

Furthermore, LDCs “which have built up a strong technological capability will reveal different sorts of comparative advantages in their exports to other developing countries as opposed to more developed ones.”While such LDCs will export to the latter countries complementary technology services and simpler engineering products than those locally produced, they would export to the other developing countries “older, simpler or smaller-scale equipment,” as well as turnkey plants, consulting services and licensing (Ibid, p. 175).

The evidence presented by the IIL studies on technology exports of LDCs12 indicate that the dependence school certainly under-rated the niches which the past expansion of world trade and growth opened up for the more industrialized LDCs, using their limited technological mastery; nonetheless, it is important to note that the IIL studies show that the mastery achieved was not simply the spontaneous result of market forces but was greatly aided by specific State policies.

Should we then draw the conclusions that those countries which have already reached such level of technological development should rest content with it? And should the other LDCs aim simply at achieving such levels of technological mastery and gear their policies simply to that purpose?

In essence, the IIL studies suggest a positive answer to such questions.13 Thus, Dahlman and Westphal (1982, p. 129,130) argue that

Korea’s experience further demonstrates that a high level of technological mastery in all aspects of the uses of technological knowledge is not required for sustained industrial development […] Korea has become a significant industrial power mainly as a result of its proficiency in production.

And Lall (1982b, p. 169), led by the formers’ results, makes a more general suggestion that “it may be argued that for poor countries just embarking on industrial development the acquisition of know-how rather than investments in building up know why is the most appropriate policy.”14

Notwithstanding the past successes of the newly industrialized countries (NICs) in technology exports, the answer provided by the IIL studies fall in a static trap, apparently led by their theoretical paradigm. In fact, the anti-Schumpeterian approach which characterizes the IIL view of technological development seems to lead them to disregard the cyclical nature of international economic development and to overlook the “primary” technological changes which are under way and which will deeply affect the international division of labor.

The rather optimistic picture the IIL studies drew of the future international division of labor rests upon at least two important ceteris paribus clauses. First, that investment and world trade will continue to grow, possibly at even higher rates than they did in the post-war period, in order to create more niches to accommodate not only the present LDCs which export technology, but also the others which follow on their path. Second, that there is no major technical change which will erode the comparative advantage given by the technological development of LDCs.

Now, the two conditions outlined above are sharply contradicted by recent events. International trade and investment have plunged, as the world economy has got into a crisis which finds a parallel only with the thirties depression. In such cyclical downswing, the NICs which followed an “outward-looking” development strategy have emerged as prime casualties as the “miracles” became horror stories. A Schumpeterian approach to development strategies could lead to the inclusion of consideration of a “cycle-elasticity of patterns of development” in recommendations of policies to LDCs. Thus, it may well be that a more inward-looking strategy, although it has the cost of profiting less of the expansionary phase of the cycle, may have the benefit of suffering less during the downswing. In this context of speculation, perhaps it would be useful to look again at the old thesis of Prebisch (1949) (formulated for the evolution of terms of trade) that, in the present international division of labor, the LDCs stand to lose more in the downswing of the cycle than they gain in the upswing.

Although the way out of the present cycle is not in sight, it is clear that it will be associated with a deep change in the technical basis of the world economy, of which some aspects are already visible in the development of electronics and biotechnology.

Those two new technologies are, as is well known, based upon “largescale scientific activity on the frontiers of technology” and their activities are to a considerable extent (aimed at meeting changing needs of high-income, brand-conscious consumers, i.e. they are exactly the opposite activities in which, according to the IIL school, the LDCs have comparative advantages. The resources used for innovation in these industries are highly concentrated in the advanced countries and the theory and experience of diffusion of innovations strongly suggest that the rate of diffusion of such innovations will be much faster in the centre than in the periphery, widening their gap; not only in research and development (R&D) but also in manufacturing technology.

Moreover, the diffusion of electronics will affect many of the activities in which the NICs could have comparative advantages as regards both more and LDCs than them. This applies, for instance for the simpler (non-electronic) machine-tools and the labor-intensive detailed design services they would sell to the advanced countries [Lall (1982a)], which are likely to be replaced by numerically-controlled machine tools and computer-aided design,15 produced more efficiently in the central countries. The latter may also prove to be strong competitors in the markets of the LDCs (markets not to be overlooked in the present crisis), since electronics will reduce the costs of adaptation of designs and of scaling-down of processes and equipment to suit the specific need of such countries.16

Another cycle-related factor which may reduce the technology exports of LDCs is their capacity to finance them. Although the IIL studies tend to overlook the role played by finance, to concentrate on technology, it is well known that in such markets the former plays a role at least as important as the latter. The present balance of payment problems faced by countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Korea will probably undermine further their technology export capability by reducing their capacity to finance such exports in conditions similar to those provided by the more advanced countries.

Finally, the present phase of the cycle may lead to reduction of the technological capability of the LDCs, not only in relative terms (the widening gap argument outlined above), but also in absolute terms, by two mechanisms. The first is the closure of local firms, unable to resist the international crisis and the restrictive policies local governments have put in practice to control inflation and balance the external account (at least in Latin America). The sectors producing the goods and services composing the technology exports are likely to be especially affected, given the role of the demand from local public enterprises for their survival. The drastic cut-down in public investment in such countries finds no compensation from increased exports, since protectionist and/or contractions policies are spreading, with feedback effects.17 In fact, Cruz, one of Katz collaborators, has repeatedly warned that, the closured of such enterprises means the liquidation of a technical capability which will take long to reconstruct, even when the new upswing comes [Cruz (1982)].

The second mechanism is the shift of manufacturing from LDCs to the central countries by multinational companies. Stimulated by the new possibilities of automation opened up by electronics and by an increased weight attached to product-quality in competition, this seems to be already happening in electronics semiconductor production [Rada (1982)]. Kaplinsky’s contribution to this volume explores this phenomenon in some more detail, suggesting that the new technologies abode bad for the manufacturing technology capability of the LDC.

Thus, the present phase of the cycle does not seem to support the optimism and the policy implications of the IIL authors. By way of finalizing, we can point to another similarity between them and dependence authors: if the latter suffered from not assessing properly the opportunities opened up by the boom phase of the cycle, the former did not seem to have fully appreciated the implications of the present decline phase. All in all, old Schumpeter (and Marx) may still have a lot to teach all of us.

5. A Final Note

Economists seem to hold a peculiar relationship to technology. Having recently discovered they had neglected the theme since the days of Schumpeter, the profession now seems to display symptoms of serious guilt-inspired behavior – on the one hand, it proclaims the overriding importance of technology, on the other, they beat the breast about their ignorance on the subject. Such ritual is rendered easier by disregarding the work done outside one’s own parochy.

The two bodies of literature discussed in this article argue against the behavior described above. They show that over the past decade and a half we have accumulated a substantial body of knowledge about an important phenomenon in the process of technological development in LDCs and how it relates to the technological development in DCs. Moreover, we have also advanced our knowledge about the relationship between technological development and other features of the development of the LDCs (e.g. industrial structure, role of foreign capital, the roles played by the State and so on).

The preceding sections also argue against technological “naïve optimism.” No matter how important technology is – and we have argued it is important –, it cannot by itself change the pattern of development of LDCs or the international division of labor. Not there are grounds to believe that technological development necessarily leads to general progress and greater equality. Contrary to the Victorian hopes we still entertain, technological development may be associated to “perverse” patterns of development – one more reason to study it and try to orient it.

However, we should also avoid the pitfalls of narcissism. Our areas of ignorance in this field (as in so many more of development) are vast, as shown, for example, by the difficulty of explaining the phenomenon of non-learning. Therefore the tradition of pleading for further research deserves to be honored once more. To finalize, this article enters a further plea – for more communication between researchers working on similar subjects. It doesn’t cost much and it may help a lot.

Referências Bibliográficas

ARAUJO JR., J. T.; DICK, V. (1974) Governo, empresas multinacionais e empresas nacionais: o caso da indústria petroquímica, Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico, vol. 4, n. 3, Rio de Janeiro

ARAUJO JR., J. T. et al. (1976) Difusão de inovações na indústria brasileira: três estudos de casos, Rio de Janeiro: Finep-Ipea. (Serie Monográfica, n. 24)

__________ (1983) Exportação de manufaturados, concorrência e mudança tecnológica: um estudo da experiência brasileira dos anos 70, Relatório de pesquisa do Instituto de Economia Industrial. Rio de Janeiro: Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro

ASIMOW, M. (1962) An introduction to design, New Jersey: Prentice Hall

BELL, M. (1982) Technical changes in infant industries: a review of empirical evidence, Brighton: Science Policy Research Unit. University of Sussex (mimeo)

BIATO, F. et al. (1971) Potencial de pesquisa tecnológica no Brasil, Relatório de Pesquisa no 5. Brasília: Ipea/Iplan

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Desenvolvimento Industrial e Tecnológico na década de 90: Uma Nova Política para um Novo Padrão de Desenvolvimento

Fabio S. Erber, Ensaios FEE vol. 13, nº 1 (1992)

This paper has fíve sections. The begining threes are esentialy analitical. In the first one it is schematicaly tried the carcterízation of a national "standard of development" starting form the "regulation approach" thesis and neoschumpeterian contribuitions. In the second one, a definition of "pattern of industrialization" is deepened by means of sectorial dinamics and industrial complex and technical evolution. In the next section, a taxonomy of industrial policy is presented from this standpoint. The last two sectins deals with brazilian case, starting from an interpretation of its industrialization and ending with proposals for industrial policy in the light of a new standard of development.

Este artigo desdobra-se em cinco seções. As três primeiras são essencialmente analíticas. Na primeira, buscamos, de forma esquemática, caracterizar um “padrão de desenvolvimento” nacional, a partir das teses da “escola de regulação” e dos autores neoschumpeterianos1. Na segunda seção, aprofundamos a caracterização de um “padrão de industrialização” pela ótica da dinâmica setorial e de complexos industriais e do progresso técnico. Na seção seguinte, apresentamos uma taxionomia das políticas industriais, seguindo essa mesma ótica. As duas últimas seções são dedicadas ao caso brasileiro, iniciando com uma interpretação da sua industrialização e, finalmente, propostas quanto às características que a política industrial deveria assumir visando a um novo padrão de desenvolvimento.

1. Padrão de desenvolvimento e padrão de Industrialização 

Por “padrão de desenvolvimento” de uma dada formação capitalista entendemos o conjunto de relações entre os agentes econômicos e sociais que garante, ao longo de um período de tempo, a manutenção dos processos de acumulação de capital e de preservação do poder político. Dentre essas relações, destacamos, no plano econômico: 

– normas de acumulação, dadas pelas relações intersetoriais e intra-setoriais de compras, progresso técnico e preços (notadamente as relações entre os setores produtores de bens de consumo e produção), pelo padrão de concorrência, pelas relações de produção, pela introdução de progresso técnico e pela criação de novos setores ou mercados; 

-normas de produção, dadas pelo grau de automação e escalas mínimas de produção, padronização dos produtos, relação produtividade/salário, formas mais ou menos hierarquizadas e rígidas de controle de processo de trabalho, fragmentação das atividades de concepção e execução, caráter coletivo ou individual do contrato de trabalho; 

– normas de consumo, composição da cesta básica dos consumidores e formas de suprimento dessa cesta básica (auto-suprimento, via agentes privados, pelo Estado); 

– normas de financiamento dos setores privado e público, relações entre autofinanciamento, crédito interno, transferências involuntárias (por exemplo, via inflação), taxação e recursos externos, relações de propriedade e de preços entre o sistema financeiro e os demais setores; 

– normas de inovação e difusão do progresso técnico, relações entre progresso técnico e desenvolvimento científico, tipos de conhecimentos científicos e tecnológicos (inclusive organizacionais), participação dos vários agentes (empresas. Estado, universidades, trabalhadores) na introdução e na difusão de conhecimentos, diferenças setoriais nesses processos, ritmo de introdução e difusão; 

– normas de intervenção do Estado, atuação do Estado como agente de resolução de conflitos políticos e de manutenção da estrutura do poder, como regulador da atividade ao nível macroeconômico, como regulador, fomentador ou estruturador de atividades, setores ou empresas específicas e como supridor direto de bens e serviços; 

– normas de inserção internacional, participação nos fluxos internacionais de comércio, financiamento, investimento e tecnologia; participação de empresas e instituições estrangeiras nas demais relações estruturais do padrão de desenvolvimento. 

Essas relações constituem-se, historicamente, em cada formação nacional. No entanto estão sujeitas a limites dados pela lógica do sistema como um todo e pela prevalência, em nível internacional, de tima dada formação hegemônica, política e economicamente, tendendo a assumir traços comuns em todos os países. 

Assim, as relações estruturais de um padrão de desenvolvimento movem-se, em nível nacional, dentro de certos limites estabelecidos em nível internacional, articulando a história nacional com a do sistema. 

Dentro desses limites, as relações são elas mesmas seletivas — elas definem um elenco de “problemas” a serem tratados e as formas de solucioná-los, assumindo um caráter cumulativo. Daí, na tradição kuhniana, as chamarmos de normas ou paradigmas. 

Um padrão de desenvolvimento é caracterizado pela solidariedade entre as diversas normas — são a complementaridade e o mútuo apoio entre as normas que garantem a estabilidade, ao longo do tempo, do padrão de desenvolvimento. 

No entanto a própria dinâmica do sistema contém, além das forças cumulativas de continuidade, elementos de transformação das normas. Alguns desses elementos, como o progresso técnico que gera novos setores que vão modificar a norma da acumulação, são endógenos ao sistema econômico. Outros, no entanto, como o progresso científico, que alimenta a inovação tecnológica, ou a resistência dos trabalhadores às normas de produção ou, ainda, projetos nacionais de poder militar e econômico, são relativamente autônomos. 

A evolução em ritmos diferenciados das várias normas faz com que a eventual estabilidade do padrão de desenvolvimento esteja sempre sujeita a crises. A crise de uma das normas (por exemplo, a redução no ritmo de acumulação devido a reduções nos aumentos de produtividade) pode ser compensada pela ação de outras normas (por exemplo, a busca de inovações que aumentem a produtividade). 

Entretanto podem surgir situações em que tais movimentos compensatórios não são possíveis e onde várias normas entram em crise de forma mais ou menos simultânea, configurando uma crise do padrão de desenvolvimento como um todo. 

É a indústria de transformação que define a dinâmica de acumulação do padrão de desenvolvimento capitalista, notadamente através dos seus encadeamentos intra e intersetoriais e pela criação de novos espaços econômicos de acumulação. Da indústria origina-se também o progresso técnico, que dinamiza os demais setores. Finalmente, o processo de trabalho industrial, que separa os produtores diretos dos meios de produção, subordinando os primeiros aos segundos e tornando o processo coletivo, serve de paradigma aos processos de trabalho dos demais setores e dá ao capitalismo sua base técnica adequada. Assim, não é de se estranhar que “padrão de desenvolvimento” e “padrão de industrialização” sejam, freqüentemente, usados como sinônimos. Não obstante, parece conveniente reservar a última expressão para as relações estruturais acima elencadas, pertinentes à indústria de transformação, dando ao padrão de processo de transformação um caráter fortemente endógeno. 

O processo de transformação industrial pelo progresso técnico é feito pelo agrupamento (“clustering”) de inovações e pela constituição de novas indústrias, que têm em comum, no mínimo, certas características tecnológicas — o que estabelece interdependências na sua dinâmica, que, assim, tem efeitos de sinergia. 

A problemática da interdependência dinâmica entre indústrias, que faz com que a resultante dos processos interativos seja distinta da soma das partes, coloca a necessidade de conduzir a análise a um nível de agregação intermediária entre o setor industrial e a macroeconomia. 

No entanto, apesar de interdependentes, as indústrias não têm o mesmo dinamismo e desempenham papéis distintos nos encadeamentos interindustriais e na mobilização de investimento, consumo e outras categorias macroeconômicas; ou seja, do ponto de vista da dinâmica industrial e da sua política, há, no sistema industrial, uma heterogeneidade e uma hierarquia, e o peso que os setores mais dinâmicos têm numa estrutura industrial serve de parâmetro para as possibilidades de desenvolvimento econômico. 

É à luz dessa constatação que deve ser interpretada a importância atribuída na literatura do desenvolvimento à falia de uma indústria de bens de capital nos países subdesenvolvidos como fator que tanto definia a especificidade do seu padrão de desenvolvimento, em comparação com os países já industrializados, como explicava um processo de acumulação de capital menos dinâmico e mais dependente do Exterior. 

Como resposta a esses fatos, desenvolveu-se, recentemente, o conceito de “complexo industrial”— um grupo de indústrias que se movem articuladamente, embora com ritmos diferenciados, sob a liderança de uma indústria motriz, que organiza o complexo. 

Na maior parte dos casos, os complexos industriais têm sido tratados pelo ângulo das relações de compra e venda inter-industriais, tanto por razões analíticas como pela facilidade que matrizes de insumo-produto oferecem para delimitar empiricamente os diversos complexos. Estes são, em regra, definidos pelo mercado — por exemplo, automotriz, onde a indústria montadora de veículos atua como organizadora e indústria hegemônica do complexo. 

Porém existem grupos de setores industriais, orientados para mercados distintos, em que a interdependência é estabelecida por uma base técnica comum, dinamizada pelo fluxo intersetorial de inovações, cujo melhor exemplo é dado pelas indústrias que compõem o complexo eletrônico, que atendem a mercados tão distintos como os de entretenimento (áudio e TV) e profissional (telecomunicações e informática), mas têm uma dinâmica interdependente. 

Nesse segundo tipo de complexo, a hegemonia é mais difusa, tendendo, porém, a recair na indústria que tenha uma alta taxa de inovações, utilizáveis pelas demais indústrias que compartilham sua base técnica. 

A Figura 1 ilustra a morfologia dos dois tipos de complexos industriais—enquanto o primeiro grupo de complexos tem a forma de uma espinha de peixe, estruturada pela hegemonia da indústria motriz, no segundo tipo, a forma é de um leque, dotado de um centro tecnológico para o qual convergem várias indústrias que atendem a diversos mercados. No caso do complexo eletrônico, a convergência tecnológica tende a reagrupar os mercados, como na telemática, processo indicado na Figura 1-B. É previsível que fenômenos análogos venham a ocorrer nas indústrias farmacêuticas e de alimentos pela introdução de processos baseados na biotecnologia. 

A forma dos dois tipos de complexo guarda relação estreita com as características dos produtos e do padrão de competição; enquanto no primeiro tipo de complexo tendem a predominar os produtos padronizados e a competição baseada em economias de escala estática, no segundo tendem a prevalecer a diversificação, baseada no progresso técnico, e as economias de escopo e aprendizado. 

A cooperação entre empresas também tende a ser distinta nos dois tipos de complexos. No primeiro, predominam acordos referentes a preços e quantidades, enquanto, no segundo tipo, ganham importância acordos de cooperação técnica (seja na fase de pesquisa pré-competitiva, seja no licenciamento de patentes e “know-how”) e “joint ventures” de produção entre firmas potencialmente competidoras e relações de cooperação técnica entre fornecedores e usuários ao longo da cadeia produtiva. 

Em decorrência dessas características, o primeiro tipo de complexo tende a ser mais rígido e estável que o segundo, tanto em termos de produtos como de empresas que dele participam. 

Araújo Júnior (1985) segue que os complexos passam, inicialmente, por uma fase formativa, em que as estratégias das firmas líderes privilegiam a exploração de uma inovação primária e o desenvolvimento de inovações secundárias, transformando seu comportamento usual. Nessa fase, a distribuição do poder dentro do complexo estaria fortemente concentrada na indústria produtora de inovações, cuja estrutura tenderia à concentração e a altas barreiras à entrada, ao passo que as demais indústrias do complexo teriam luna estrutura facilmente contestável pela indústria motriz. Ao mesmo tempo, as relações interindustriais dentro do complexo apresentariam um grau relativamente alto de indefinição. 

FIGURA 1 – A MORFOLOGIA DOS COMPLEXOS INDUSTRIAIS 

FIGURA 1 A – COMPLEXO DO TIPO INSUMO PRODUTO (INDÚSTRIAS SUPRIDORAS)

FIGURA 1 B – COMPLEXO DO TIPO TECNOLÓGICO 

Assim, articulando nossa análise com a de Araújo Júnior (1985) e às teses de ciclo de produto, na fase inicial, o complexo industrial teria a forma de leque, vista na Figura 1-B, e, na sua dinâmica, predominariam as economias de escopo e aprendizado, com as firmas líderes do complexo seguindo estratégias de diversificação e integração (horizontal e vertical) dentro do próprio complexo, com o objetivo de captar as economias proporcionadas pela base técnica. O complexo eletrônico exemplifica esse processo. 

Se não ocorrerem outras inovações primárias, o complexo tenderá à maturidade, evidenciada pela padronização de produtos, pela consolidação das relações inter-industriais, pela redução de contestabilidade dos mercados pela indústria motriz, bem como por uma redução relativa da hegemonia desta. 

Nessa fase, passam a predominar as economias de escala estática, e o complexo tende a assumir a forma de espinha de peixe. 

Araújo Júnior (1985) diz que, ao chegar à maturidade, as firmas líderes do complexo podem tanto optar por uma estratégia de diversificação de investimentos para fora do complexo, como tentar revitalizá-lo através da busca de uma nova inovação primária. No primeiro caso, o dinamismo do complexo tenderá a reduzir se, e provavelmente ocorrerão transformações substanciais na sua estrutura, ao passo que, no segundo, o ciclo pode reiniciar-se pelo “rejuvenescimento” do complexo. 

A siderurgia nos países centrais exemplifica o primeiro caso, enquanto o comportamento das grandes firmas do complexo químico em relação à biotecnologia ilustra o segundo. 

Se, no presente, as inovações têm por base a pesquisa científica, a observação dessa fronteira toma-se um fator importante na estratégia das firmas líderes dos complexos maduros. Nesse sentido, o comportamento de várias grandes firmas do complexo químico, que adquirem participações acionárias de pequenas empresas de origem acadêmica para ter conhecimento do que ocorre na área de engenharia genética, parece exemplar. 

Nessa perspectiva, de uma dinâmica industrial induzida por inovações tecnológicas, é importante destacar a heterogeneidade dos setores quanto ao seu potencial de inovação e as relações intersetoriais que se estabelecem em decorrência dessa diferenciação de papéis na geração e difusão do progresso técnico. 

A evidência empírica2, quanto aos fluxos interindustriais de inovações, mostra que os setores industriais podem ser agrupados em três grupos: 

– setores motores da inovação, aqueles que, além de gerarem o grosso das inovações que usam, são os principais supridores de inovações para o resto do sistema. De forma mais indireta, através do exemplo de seu processo de produção e controle de qualidade (por exemplo, “grau de pureza ambiental eletrônica”), definem padrões de produção e margens de tolerância para o resto da economia. No presente, esses são setores intensivos em ciência, que atuam na “ponta” da tecnologia, desenvolvendo as novas trajetórias tecnológicas para o sistema econômico — a eletrônica, novos materiais e a nova biotecnologia, neles incluídos os serviços conexos como “software”; 

– setores receptores de inovações, aqueles cuja demanda por inovações é atendida principalmente pela oferta de outros setores. Esse grupo é composto, principalmente, pelas indústrias produtoras de bens de consumo não duráveis e pelos demais setores da economia; 

– setores intermediários, aqueles cuja demanda por inovações é suprida, em parte, por esforços internos (principalmente inovações incrementais) e, em parte (as inovações mais radicais), por inovações geradas nos setores motores, eventualmente aperfeiçoadas internamente. Esses setores atuam também como supridores importantes de inovações entre si e para o segundo grupo. Compõem este último grupo os setores produtores de bens de capital, intermediários e de consumo duráveis, entre os quais se destaca, pelo papel especial na absorção e difusão do progresso técnico, a indústria de bens de capital. 

As inovações geradas no primeiro conjunto de setores tendem a ter múltiplos setores usuários, estabelecendo relações intersetoriais que, inicialmente, são tecnológicas e, a seguir, de insumo-produto e investimento. 

Os setores motores têm, porém, em comum a base científica e técnica do seu paradigma e a mesma trajetória tecnológica, que faz com que sua dinâmica seja interdependente, mesmo que forneçam a distintos mercados. Dessa forma, um novo paradigma tecnológico expressa-se no plano produtivo por um novo complexo industrial articulado pela base técnica, em forma de leque. 

Na medida em que um paradigma tecnológico, gerado no primeiro grupo de indústrias, demonstra ser superior para resolver certos problemas técnicos, econômicos e sociais, ele tende a ser adotado pelas indústrias dos outros grupos, provocando uma “destruição criadora” na base técnica destas. 

Em conseqüência, forjam-se novos vínculos intersetoriais, provocando uma transformação da estrutura industrial pela articulação entre o complexo industrial que gera o novo paradigma e os complexos industriais cuja base técnica está sendo modificada por esse paradigma. As relações em curso entre os complexos automobilístico e eletrônico são um bom exemplo desse processo. 

Na nova estrutura industrial dele decorrente, a dimensão relativa do complexo industrial vetor do novo paradigma no aparato produtivo e a sua dinâmica de expansão — isto é, os novos espaços econômicos que cria, por meio de novos produtos e processos, e os espaços de antigos complexos que ocupa, substituindo-os — dão (ou não) ao novo paradigma um caráter de inovação primária (ou não). 

O impacto do novo paradigma será maior se seus principais setores usuários forem os setores intermediários (conforme a taxionomia acima), devido ao peso que estes têm na estrutura industrial e, principalmente, pelo seu poder de encadeamento nos fluxos tecnológicos e de insumo-produto. 

Os estudos de ciclo de produto e de difusão de inovações mostram que a proximidade física, econômica e cultural entre geradores e usuários de inovações é essencial à eficiência do processo. Ao mesmo tempo, a literatura sobre transferência de tecnologia mostra que as normas que a regem não conduzem à constituição de uma capacidade de inovação nas empresas receptoras, a menos que estas realizem investimentos autônomos com esse fim.3

Em conseqüência, para que um sistema industrial seja dinâmico e competitivo em termos internacionais é necessário que conte, internalizados, com os complexos motores da inovação. 

No entanto, para que as relações intersetoriais acima discutidas possam se dar de forma eficaz e eficiente, a indústria necessita possuir sistemas de apoio adequados. No passado, concentrava-se a atenção sobre a infra-estrutura de serviços econômicos, como transporte, energia e comunicações. Mais recentemente, como reflexo das características dos setores motores e dos requisitos dos demais setores para absorverem as inovações que estes geram, incorporou-se como prioritário o conjunto das instituições tecnológicas, científicas e educacionais, que produzem os conhecimentos, e as pessoas necessárias para que as inovações surjam e se difundam pelo sistema industrial propriamente dito e pelos demais setores da economia, fornecendo-lhes indispensáveis economias externas. 

A operação conjunta do setor industrial e desses “sistemas de apoio” tem efeitos de aprendizado e sinergia, configurando uma capacidade “sistêmica” de transformação endógena. 

Essa capacidade sistêmica requer, porém, padrões de financiamento adequados aos prazos de maturação e aos riscos envolvidos nas várias atividades que compõem o sistema, articulando a norma de financiamento às normas de investimento, inovação, produção e consumo, de forma a constituir a plena capacidade sistêmica de uma economia nacional. 

2. Política industrial: uma taxionomia 

Em seção anterior, foram brevemente enumeradas as várias facetas da intervenção do Estado num sistema capitalista contemporâneo. Tanto a intervenção regulatória de natureza macroeconômica como a atuação do Estado para a reprodução da força de trabalho têm repercussões sobre a atividade industrial. No entanto esta não constitui o objetivo precípuo das referidas políticas, o que sugere ser conveniente excluí-las da política industrial em sentido estrito, reservando este último termo para aquelas medidas de política destinadas a alterar o comportamento da indústria de transformação. 

Entretanto essa distinção é apenas parcial, pois a política industrial apresenta várias relações de interdependência com as demais políticas. Assim, o comportamento das empresas industriais é afetado, por exemplo, pelas políticas monetária e fiscal, embora estas sejam desenhadas para outros fins. Em conseqüência, pode-se falar de uma política industrial “implícita” nas demais políticas econômicas. No sentido inverso, o resultado dessas políticas é influenciado pelo comportamento das empresas industriais decorrente da política industrial.

A interdependência entre as políticas acima referidas requer um marco analítico apropriado, para o qual a noção de padrão de desenvolvimento aqui esboçada parece um ponto de partida útil. 

Assim, pode-se caracterizar um padrão de desenvolvimento como “industrializante”, na medida em que as várias “normas” que definem esse padrão convergem para tomar prioritários a constituição e o desenvolvimento da indústria. Nesse contexto, verifica-se também a convergência entre políticas industriais explícitas e implícitas. 

Conforme será visto com mais detalhes na próxima seção, essa parece ser uma caracterização adequada para o padrão de desenvolvimento brasileiro no período que vai do Segundo Pós-Guerra até os anos 80. A partir dessa década, as políticas implícitas e explícitas tomam-se contraditórias, e as primeiras, de natureza recessiva, tomam-se hegemônicas. 

Tanto as políticas explícitas como as implícitas precisam dar conta da heterogeneidade que caracteriza o sistema industrial e que, em conseqüência, afeta seus resultados. Convém, pois, analisar os principais “cortes” no sistema produtivo utilizados para organizar a política industrial. 

Uma das mais tradicionais formas de estabelecer distinções em política industrial consiste em segmentá-la segundo o tamanho das empresas. Argumenta-se que devem ser estabelecidas políticas de apoio a pequenas e médias empresas, coadjuvadas por medidas de proteção contra grandes firmas, com os propósitos de fomentar a competição e, por esse meio, a eficiência do sistema econômico; estimular a inovação, no suposto de que essas firmas sejam relativamente mais inovativas, e aumentar a eqüidade econômica pela ampliação das oportunidades empresariais e pela criação de empregos, supondo-se que essas empresas tendem a utilizar mão-de-obra mais intensamente que as grandes. 

No entanto existem situações em que, dadas certas economias de escala estáticas e economias de escopo significativas, a eficiência econômica recomenda o apoio a grandes firmas. O mesmo vale para situações em que os patamares mínimos de gastos em pesquisa e desenvolvimento são elevados. Da mesma forma, observa-se com freqüência que as firmas maiores tendem a ter níveis salariais mais elevados, seja por razões de estabilidade de relações trabalhistas, seja pelo baixo peso da mão-de-obra no custo total, contribuindo, assim, para elevar a taxa média de salário. 

Essas situações contrastantes, que levam a políticas diametralmente opostas, são definidas em função de características setoriais, tanto técnicas como econômicas. Nesse sentido, é significativo que não exista qualquer indicador simples de tamanho (por exemplo, número de empregados, capital investido, etc.) que sirva para todos os setores industriais. 

O mesmo se aplica a outro critério clássico de política industrial, que estabelece distinções entre empresas de acordo com sua propriedade. 

Considerações de soberania e segurança nacional e diferenças de comportamento entre firmas nacionais e multinacionais em relação a aspectos estratégicos do desenvolvimento industrial justificam a diferenciação de políticas segundo a propriedade do capital, seja nacional, seja estrangeira, independentemente de qualquer xenofobia. 

Porém a conveniência e a oportunidade dessa diferenciação são fortemente afetadas pela inserção setorial das empresas e pelo papel que esses setores desempenham no padrão de desenvolvimento nacional. Assim, em padrões primário-exportadores, o foco das políticas que diferenciam empresas segundo o controle de suas decisões tende a recair sobre os setores produtores de matérias-primas, ao passo que, em sistemas mais complexos industrialmente, as políticas tendem a concentrar-se nos setores motores da dinâmica industrial. Nestes últimos países, toma-se, inclusive, necessário redefinir os conceitos de firma nacional e estrangeira, utilizando critérios mais complexos que o simples controle de capital, como o domínio da capacidade de inovação. 

As mesmas razões de segurança e soberania nacional, associadas à incapacidade ou à falta de vontade de capitais privados nacionais para realizar investimentos ou à decisão de subsidiar determinados tipos de consumidores, podem levar o Estado a assumir a responsabilidade de supridor direto de bens e serviços, constituindo empresas industriais sob seu controle total ou parcial, que serão objeto de políticas específicas.

 Da mesma forma, a conveniência e a oportunidade desse tipo de diferenciação dependem, fundamentalmente, das características do setor em que essas empresas serão estabelecidas, sejam características técnico-econômicas, como a escala mínima e o prazo de maturação dos investimentos, sejam as relações que existem entre o setor e os demais. 

Em síntese, embora as empresas sejam o objeto último da política industrial, o setor em que se inserem constitui o principal elemento organizador do seu comportamento e, em consequência, da política industrial. 

Em sistemas em que a malha de relações interindustriais se encontra bastante constituída, como é o caso brasileiro, as interdependências setoriais apontam a conveniência de tratar a política industrial também ao nível de complexos industriais, que expressam a articulação dinâmica dos setores. 

É importante notar que a política por complexos não prescinde de políticas setoriais dirigidas para as indústrias componentes do complexo, tampouco consiste em uma superposição de políticas setoriais. Seu enfoque difere destas últimas, complementando-o, por concentrar-se nos vínculos entre os setores e, conseqüentemente, nos desequilíbrios existentes nas relações intersetoriais, seja no nível da produção, seja no dos fluxos de investimento e tecnologia. 

Atuando no marco setorial ou de complexo, a política industrial torna-se operacional, incidindo sobre o comportamento das empresas através de instrumentos que tanto estimulam certas ações como impõem sanções a outras. 

Entre os instrumentos de estímulo, convém distinguir aqueles que se destinam a reduzir os custos das empresas dos que têm por finalidade diminuir a incerteza com que estas operam. 

Os instrumentos redutores de custos podem estar orientados tanto para o uso de determinados recursos como para a realização de determinadas atividades. Exemplificando, entre os primeiros encontram-se medidas destinadas a reduzir o custo do uso de insumos e bens de capital importados por meio de taxas de câmbio e tarifas especiais ou medidas de estímulo ao uso de bens de capital nacional via incentivos fiscais e craütícios. Os mesmos instrumentos podem ser dirigidos para atividades que a empresa exerça, como a pesquisa e o desenvolvimento ou o investimento em instalações produtivas. 

A redução da incerteza pode abarcar três dimensões: a incerteza técnica — que a firma seja capaz de produzir bens e serviços dentro de certos critérios técnicos —, a incerteza econômica — que a firma, embora sendo capaz de produzir os bens e serviços tecnicamente adequados, não encontre mercado para eles — e, finalmente, a incerteza financeira — que a firma não disponha de recursos em montante e prazo adequados aos seus fluxos de gastos e rendimentos. 

A primeira dimensão é normalmente tratada por meio de instrumentos que aumentam a competitividade sistêmica, especialmente pela formação de recursos humanos através de instituições especializadas. 

A redução da incerteza econômica centra-se em tomo do mercado. Encontram-se nesse âmbito as políticas que regulam o acesso e a permanência, em mercados específicos, de produtos e fabricantes, por meio de restrições à importação, reservas de mercado para certos tipos de produtores e demais barreiras “à entrada e saída”. De uma forma mais geral, esse nível de incerteza é fortemente afetado pela evolução das atividades econômicas no país e no Exterior. 

Finalmente, a redução da incerteza financeira remete aos critérios e procedimentos operacionais do sistema financeiro e do mercado de capitais, sobre os quais o Estado influi por vários meios, tanto diretamente, através de suas instituições financeiras, como indiretamente, via políticas fiscal e monetária. 

Em contrapartida a essas medidas de estímulo a determinadas atividades empresariais, o Estado só utilizar outros instrumentos que visam coibir comportamentos socialmente indesejáveis, como o abuso do poder econômico, via medidas antitruste, e a poluição do meio ambiente, via multas e outras penalidades. Em regra, esses instrumentos redundam em aumentos de custos para os infratores. Sua eficácia como elemento dissuasor de comportamentos indesejados parece, porém, depender tanto da eficiência do sistema jurídico e, consequentemente, da credibilidade deste, como do valor das penalidades. 

Cabe reiterar dois pontos já discutidos anteriormente. Em primeiro lugar, a articulação entre política industrial e demais políticas. Estas últimas podem inviabilizar a política industrial, por exemplo, aumentando a incerteza econômica e financeira das atividades industriais. 

Em segundo lugar, é importante notar que a importância e a própria aplicabilidade dos vários tipos de instrumentos varia de acordo com as características do setor em que a empresa está inserida. 

Em síntese, pode-se dividir a política industrial, por setores ou complexos, em três grandes tipos, seguindo um critério de abrangência decrescente: 

estruturante, quando o Estado atua diretamente na montagem de um setor ou complexo industrial, criando, simultaneamente, o mercado (por exemplo, via restrições à importação ou políticas de compras) e seus fornecedores, tanto por meio de empresas públicas, como pela definição de regras de participação de empresas privadas (por exemplo, reservas de mercado por nacionalidade ou tamanho de empresa). Nesses casos, combinam-se medidas redutoras de custos e riscos para as empresas, com ênfase nas segundas, e são comuns as distinções quanto à nacionalidade das empresas participantes; 

fomento, quando o Estado define incentivos para certas atividades e condicionalidades para o uso desses incentivos, mas deixa ao mercado a estruturação final do setor. Nesses casos, tendem a predominar as medidas redutoras de custos para as empresas. São também comuns as medidas que diferenciam empresas, embora sejam mais frequentes aquelas que dizem respeito ao tamanho da firma do que a sua nacionalidade; 

normalização, quando o Estado atua no nível de produtos e processos, definindo suas características, por exemplo, segundo critérios de segurança dos consumidores ou de poluição ambiental, basicamente através de medidas redutoras de custos e de imposição de sanções, sem distinções quanto ao tipo de empresas. 

Dependendo da inserção internacional do país e da posição competitiva dos setores industriais nacionais, essas políticas podem ter caráter ofensivo, quando destinadas a conquistar espaços competitivos na arena internacional, ou defensivo, quando visam adequar setores nacionais a novas situações internacionais, tanto pela simples proteção como pela completa reestruturação. 

É importante notar que o formato de espinha de peixe dos complexos industriais facilita a implementação de políticas, especialmente as de caráter estruturante, por permitir centrar a política sobre a indústria hegemônica do complexo. 

No entanto diversas razões fazem com que a ação do Estado privilegie os setores motores da inovação como objeto de política, mesmo que tenham forma de leque: 

– o seu caráter estratégico para o resto do sistema econômico nacional em termos de influência sobre o padrão de industrialização e sobre o padrão de desenvolvimento como um todo; 

– a grande incidência de “imperfeições de mercado” nesses setores, como a incerteza e o tempo de maturação dos investimentos, fortes efeitos de aprendizado, conhecimentos científicos, tecnológicos e produtivos personalizados, dificuldade de apropriação de resultados (mesmo com leis de proteção à propriedade intelectual) e, cumulativamente, a intervenção de outros Estados nacionais; 

– o seu caráter estratégico em termos de comércio internacional, onde seus produtos apresentam as maiores taxas de crescimento; 

– o seu caráter estratégico em termos militares, onde constituem o cerne dos sistemas avançados; 

– a sua alta visibilidade política, que faz com que sejam símbolos de “modernidade” e sucesso do regime; 

– o seu caráter estratégico em termos de manutenção da lei e da ordem pública, inclusive pela força. Nos países centrais, a intervenção do Estado nos setores motores da inovação foi de cunho marcadamente estruturante e ofensivo, através de um conjunto de medidas caracterizado pela abrangência, cobrindo todas as atividades da firma; 

– financiamento a gastos em pesquisa e desenvolvimento em instituições de pesquisa governamentais e acadêmicas; 

– financiamento e incentivos fiscais a gastos em pesquisa e desenvolvimento em empresas; 

– financiamento às linhas de produção das empresas; 

– políticas de compras de instituições governamentais restritas a firmas nacionais e que ensejavam economias de aprendizado, de escopo e de escala; 

– políticas de ordenação de oferta no mercado intemo, por exemplo, via fusões de empresas; 

– políticas de proteção contra importações e/ou entrada de competidores do Exterior; 

– políticas de apoio à exportação. 

A intervenção do Estado foi tão mais estruturante quanto mais novo era o complexo portador do novo paradigma — assim, foi mais estruturante para a eletrônica, onde se constituiu um novo complexo industrial, do que para a biotecnologia, estabelecida a partir de complexos industriais já existentes e em processo de rejuvenescimento. 

Nos setores intermediários no fluxo de inovações, a intervenção foi mais de caráter de fomento, combinando elementos ofensivos, dirigidos especialmente para a absorção do progresso técnico gerado no primeiro bloco (a exemplo dos programas destinados a fomentar o uso de dispositivos microeletrônicos na indústria de máquinas-ferramentas) e defensivos, para a proteção contra a competição externa. 

Por fim, no último grupo de indústrias, aquelas que são essencialmente receptoras do progresso técnico, a intervenção do Estado foi especificamente de caráter normativo e defensivo, cabendo, porém, notar que, em alguns casos, a definição de normas mais estritas para produtos e processos, visando à proteção dos consumidores e do meio-ambiente, obrigou essas indústrias a ampliarem seus esforços de pesquisa e desenvolvimento. 

A Figura 2 sintetiza as relações entre a intervenção estatal, o papel desempenhado pelos setores industriais no progresso técnico e o tipo de medida aplicado às empresas. No eixo vertical, define-se o papel dos setores na geração e difusão de progresso técnico; e, no eixo horizontal, apresenta-se tanto a abrangência da intervenção do Estado como a relação entre medidas redutoras de riscos e redutoras de custos. 

FIGURA 2 – INTERVENÇÃO DO ESTADO, POR SETORES, DE ACORDO COM O PAPEL DESTES NA DINÂMICA TECNOLÓGICA DA INDÚSTRIA 

NOTA: 

  1. As setas indicam os principais fluxos de inovações. 
  2. A representação gráfica adotada simplifica a extensão das medidas. As medidas de política para os setores “motores” e “intermediários” podem envolver uma política “estruturante” para os setores “receptores”. Assim, para os setores “motores” e “intermediários” a sua representação gráfica poderia ser estendida à esquerda. 

3. O padrão de industrialização brasileiro 

O padrão de industrialização brasileiro apresenta conhecidas especificidades que o singularizam no Mundo. Estabelecido sob a dinâmica da substituição de importações, onde as restrições externas constituíam causa e, a seguir, conseqüência da industrialização, renovando a sua dinâmica, levou à montagem, na década de 50, de uma estrutura industrial marcada pelo desequilíbrio entre os setores de bens de consumo (duráveis e não duráveis) e os setores produtores de bens de produção (notadamente bens de capital). 

Tampouco se estabelece no país uma norma de inovação interna, devido, em parte, à gravitação que assumiriam no padrão de industrialização as empresas estrangeiras, cuja lógica é a de utilizar a tecnologia desenvolvida nos países centrais, induzindo fornecedores e competidores locais a comportamento análogo e, complementarmente, o precário desenvolvimento dos sistemas educacional, científico e tecnológico nacionais. 

Nesse período, o Estado brasileiro pratica uma política estruturante para os setores de infra-estrutura e de produtos intermediários, notadamente através de empresas estatais e do BNDE, e uma política de fomento para os setores de bens duráveis e de bens de capital, especialmente através do controle de importações. 

Com a expansão do período 1968-73, liderada pelo setor de bens de consumo duráveis, com base no mercado interno, ao amparo de políticas de fomento industrial e de estruturação financeira, os desequilíbrios acima mencionados não foram eliminados. Completado o “pacote” de investimento de bens duráveis e ressurgindo as restrições externas pelo aumento dos preços do petróleo e das importações de bens de capital, lançou-se o Estado, com o segundo PND, à etapa final da substituição de importações, estruturando a produção local de bens intermediários e de capital através de suas empresas públicas, do BNDES e do endividamento externo. Com essas políticas, alterou-se a estrutura da indústria e suas relações com o Exterior, estabelecendo um padrão mais próximo dos países centrais, embora singularizado por baixos coeficientes de importação. 

Contemporaneamente (e este é um fato curiosamente relegado nas análises do período), tomam-se medidas para estabelecer no País uma norma de inovação interna e setores motores do progresso técnico sob controle nacional — computadores, aeronáutica, equipamentos de telecomunicações, armamentos e energia nuclear. 

A política de inovação desdobra-se em duas frentes: de um lado, o Estado estrutura o setor de pós-graduação e pesquisa científica, dando-lhe nova dimensão, e lança os fundamentos dos serviços de tecnologia básica, de uso generalizado — normalização, metrologia, propriedade intelectual; de outro, faz uma política de fomento às atividades de inovações das empresas nacionais através de crédito subsidiado e faz um ensaio de política estruturante através das empresas estatais, nelas montando centros de pesquisa e procurando combinar a política de compras com financiamentos à pesquisa e à produção para capacitar tecnologicamente os fornecedores dessas empresas. 

As políticas para os setores motores caracterizam-se pelo objetivo de buscar o controle nacional sobre a produção e a capacitação tecnológica, configurando um padrão distinto do observado em outros setores, especialmente no que tange à tecnologia nacional. 

No entanto a ação estruturante do Estado variou bastante de acordo com os setores e obteve resultados bem diferenciados. Onde o setor não era ocupado por firmas estrangeiras, reduzindo, pois, os conflitos internos, a forma do complexo era de espinha de peixe, a política foi consistente ao longo do tempo, e os vários instrumentos (controle de importação, barreiras à entrada de competidores estrangeiros, compras do Estado, financiamento para pesquisa e desenvolvimento e produção, incentivos fiscais para capitalização e exportação, constituição do tecido industrial de fornecedores e do tecido tecnológico de instituições de pesquisa e de formação de recursos humanos) foram utilizados de forma convergente, a exemplo do ocorrido no setor aeronáutico, cujo sucesso, inclusive no mercado externo, foi inequívoco. 

Nas áreas onde já existiam empresas estrangeiras instaladas, a forma do complexo era de leque, e a política estruturante foi parcial, em parte devido às próprias condições iniciais, como na eletrônica, onde os resultados também foram mais limitados. Por outro lado, o caso da energia nuclear parece demonstrar que uma política estruturante de largo espectro não é garantia de sucesso se as escolhas estratégicas iniciais são equivocadas. 

Apesar das limitações, entre as quais se destaca um protecionismo desordenado e casuístico, estabelecido produto a produto, sem dar a devida atenção aos vínculos interindustriais e às condições de aprendizagem futura, o padrão de industrialização que tendia a estabelecer-se no fim dos anos 70 era um padrão moderno — ao mesmo tempo em que se completava verticalmente a estrutura industrial tradicional, constituindo os setores supridores de bens de produção, lançavam-se as bases para os setores motores e para a capacidade de inovação, que permitiriam dinamizar o sistema e dar-lhe competitividade internacional. 

Com efeito, o sucesso exportador brasileiro não está baseado apenas em salários miseráveis e incentivos fiscais, embora estes pesem para certas firmas e setores. Uma parte substancial desse sucesso apóia-se em baixos custos oriundos de instalações produtivas modernas — como em produtos intermediários — e na capacidade de projetar e produzir bens de relativa complexidade, adequados a mercados específicos — como em bens de capital e armamentos. 

Não obstante, o padrão de desenvolvimento associado a esse padrão de industrialização revelava graves desequilíbrios. Embora diversos estudos4 apontem a redução da pobreza no País entre 1970 e 1980 e os bens duráveis se façam cada vez mais presentes na norma de consumo, prefigurando um mercado de massas, a oferta de serviços básicos — saúde, educação, transporte, proteção ao meio-ambiente, etc. — a cargo do Estado, era, no mínimo, precaríssima. Entretanto a crise dos anos 80, que veio frear bruscamente o desenvolvimento da industrialização, não se origina da inadequação da norma de consumo às de produção e acumulação, por mais desigual e iníqua que sejam as distribuições de renda e riqueza no País. Tampouco é uma crise oriunda do esgotamento de um conjunto de inovações primárias e da perda de dinamismo das relações intersetoriais, como ocorre nos países centrais. Diferentemente desses países, no Brasil o padrão de desenvolvimento industrial prefigurado na segunda metade dos anos 70 não chega a amadurecer, e o corte vem pelo lado financeiro. 

A norma de financiamento do padrão de desenvolvimento brasileiro apóia-se num tripé que viria a demonstrar-se frágil — o endividamento externo, a dívida pública e as transferências de renda via inflação. 

Essa norma de financiamento é caracterizada por sua gravitação em tomo do Estado. Este, por meio de recursos fiscais e de um crescente endividamento, interno e externo, vai não só se abastecer de recursos para suas funções desenvolvimentistas e de bem-estar (aquelas privilegiadas em relação às segundas), como vai suprir o setor privado de recursos, especialmente para investimentos de prazo mais longo, via créditos subsidiados, incentivos fiscais e baixos preços dos bens e serviços que produz diretamente. Mais ainda, pelo controle das políticas salarial e dos preços, fornece parâmetros para o autofinanciamento e, pelas políticas monetária e creditícia, define as condições de operação do sistema financeiro privado. 

Fracassada a tentativa dos anos 60 de envolver este último no financiamento e no investimento de longo prazo, cabe ao Estado a responsabilidade única pelo crédito para o processo de acumulação, ficando o setor privado com o financiamento a curto e médio prazos para empresas e consumidores de bens duráveis. Uma das principais características da norma brasileira de financiamento é que nela não se estabelecem as relações de longo prazo entre capitais privados financeiros e industriais, típicos de padrões de desenvolvimento industrial complexos. No Brasil, não ocorrem as relações entre grandes bancos e grupos industriais ao estilo da Alemanha e do Japão, tampouco surgem as relações entre instituições financeiras especializadas (inclusive de “venture” capital) e empresas industriais como nos Estados Unidos. Por sua vez, o mercado de capitais acionário é de dimensão insignificante, concentrado em poucos papéis e sujeito a fortes pressões especulativas. 

Cabe salientar a natureza cumulativa e seletiva dessa norma de financiamento, para a qual convergem: os altos lucros do setor financeiro em operações de curto prazo e baixo risco, desestimulando-o a buscar aplicações alternativas; o caráter crônico da inflação, que permite o repasse de custos aos consumidores; a repressão às reivindicações salariais; a possibilidade do endividamento externo, que permite, por um tempo, evitar transformações internas; e, finalmente, a própria ação do Estado que, como agente transferidor de recursos, referenda e reforça o funcionamento da norma. 

Essa norma de financiamento rompe-se do lado externo, com a brusca subida das taxas de juros, determinada por injunções da política econômica dos Estados Unidos, e com o redirecionamento dos fluxos financeiros internacionais para longe do Hemisfério Sul. No entanto é provável que, mesmo que a ruptura externa não tivesse ocorrido, a norma de financiamento viesse a se tomar inviável pelo lado intemo. As demandas postas ao Estado pela continuidade das suas tarefas desenvolvimentistas e pela necessidade de ampliar suas funções de bem-estar requeriam uma transformação de estrutura de captação e distribuição de recursos e uma modificação do perfil da dívida pública interna. 

Incapacitado, politicamente, de proceder a essas transformações, o Estado viu-se crescentemente presa do padrão de financiamento, por ele controlado e não mais o controlando, processo que se expressa pelo aumento da dívida pública, que passa a se auto-alimentar. 

Perdida a funcionalidade da ação do Estado e rompido o fluxo externo, a norma de financiamento passa a apoiar-se cada vez mais em mecanismos de transferências via preços relativos, que são alimentados pelo próprio colapso do padrão de financiamento do Estado, até que a inflação assuma também um caráter disfuncional para o processo de acumulação. 

Nos anos 80, a crise da norma de financiamento estende-se ao resto do sistema. Os desequilíbrios já existentes na norma de consumo e na sua articulação com as demais normas agravam-se pela deterioração dos serviços básicos e pelo achatamento salarial. Convergentemente, as demais normas passam a funcionar de modo perverso — a acumulação privada torna-se predominantemente financeira, e os investimentos públicos são drasticamente cortados em nome do equilíbrio financeiro. O desenvolvimento da norma de inovação é abortado pela brusca redução de fundos públicos e pelo desestímulo à inovação privada, tendendo a norma de produção a estagnar o seu processo técnico. Finalmente, a face regulatória do Estado entra em conflito com seus lados de bem-estar e desenvolvimentista, impondo sua lógica contracionista, que, à exceção do esforço exportador e do breve período do Plano Cruzado, se torna hegemônica. 

Após quase uma década de crescimento industrial espasmódico, o que era essencialmente uma crise financeira se toma uma crise industrial propriamente dita, em termos da capacidade tecnológica de produção do parque nacional e, conseqüentemente, da sua competitividade internacional, o que se soma à deficiência crônica da capacidade tecnológica de projeto e pesquisa, herdada do período de substituição de importações. 

Nesse contexto, a política industrial, exceto nos textos governamentais, desaparece na prática, embora se sustentem algumas políticas setoriais de maior alcance, como a da informática. 

No fim da década, porém, a política industrial dá alguns sinais de vida através de uma reforma tarifária que racionaliza os níveis de proteção e de reformulação dos incentivos fiscais, que são reorientados principalmente para as indústrias de alta tecnologia e para atividades de inovação tecnológica. Visando maior eficácia e transparência, a política passa a ser concebida em termos de Programas Setoriais Integrados, pelos quais busca-se articular as políticas industrial, tecnológica e educacional ao nível de complexos industriais. 

No entanto, inseridas num contexto macroeconômico recessivo e propostas por um Governo de baixa credibilidade e em fim de mandato, essas medidas têm alcance curto, não chegando a afetar o comportamento do setor empresarial de forma significativa. 

O presente Governo, ao implantar uma política macroeconômica de cunho fortemente recessivo, propõe uma profunda alteração no sentido da política industrial. 

Esta é concebida como uma “pinça”. De um lado, busca-se aumentar a pressão competitiva sobre as firmas estabelecidas no País, combinando pressões internas (leis antitruste e de proteção ao consumidor, privatização de empresas públicas) e externas (liberalização das importações, do investimento estrangeiro e das regras de propriedade intelectual); de outro, pretende-se aumentar a competitividade das empresas, ampliando os gastos federais em ciência e tecnologia e estendendo créditos às empresas para sua capacitação tecnológica. 

As duas partes da “pinça” são desequilibradas em termos de força dos instrumentos e em termos de “timing”. A primeira parte incide diretamente sobre o cerne das atividades empresariais, o mercado, agravando a incerteza econômica gerada pelo contexto macroeconômico, e já tem um cronograma de execução definido, ao passo que a segunda atua apenas sobre uma parte das atividades da empresa (relativas à capacitação tecnológica), e a disponibilidade de recursos públicos para implementá-la é muito incerta. Mesmo ao nível de capacitação tecnológica, é provável que a capacidade de inovação interna seja inibida pela competição externa. 

Em conseqüência, longe de prefigurar um novo padrão de desenvolvimento industrial, é provável que a atual política reforce os aspectos negativos herdados do padrão anterior. 

É importante, finalmente, notar que esse processo se dá num contexto internacional marcado pelos aspectos colocados a seguir. 

  1. a) Aumento da competição entre os países capitalistas centrais, com o aumento do peso relativo comercial e financeiro do Japão e redução da hegemonia americana. Essa competição traduz-se em: 

políticas estruturantes dos setores motores da inovação, que vêm constituindo uma nova revolução tecnológica e industrial; 

políticas defensivas e de fomento dos demais setores, visando absorver o progresso técnico gerado nos setores motores; 

acordo de cooperação intersetorial entre empresas nos setores de ponta, espontâneos e/ou patrocinados pelos Estados, a exemplo dos programas da CEE (ESPRIT, RACE, EUREKA); 

formação de blocos econômicos regionais institucionalizados (CEE, EUA/Canadá) ou não (EUA/México, Japão/NICs do sudeste asiático). 

  1. b) Concentração dos fluxos econômicos (comércio, investimento e tecnologia) no Hemisfério Norte, regulamentados de acordo com seus interesses (propriedade intelectual, serviços, etc). 
  2. c) Emergência dos NICs asiáticos como atores importantes no piano comercial.

Esse contexto internacional contém uma forte tendência concentradora de atividades econômicas no Hemisfério Norte, reduzindo o espaço de acumulação dos países recentemente industrializados como o Brasil, a menos que o Estado, a exemplo de alguns NICs asiáticos, empreenda políticas que, aproveitando o potencial das novas tecnologias, contrabalancem o seu efeito concentrador. 

4. O padrão de desenvolvimento e a política industrial nos anos 90 

4.1. Estabilização e política industrial 

As relações entre processos de industrialização e inflação são complexas. Em períodos de rápida transformação da estrutura industrial, tendem a ocorrer bruscas mudanças de preços relativos nos mercados de produtos e fatores. Ao mesmo tempo em que geram pressões inflacionárias, provocando movimentos defensivos em outros mercados, essas mudanças constituem um dos mecanismos clássicos de financiamento da industrialização, especialmente em contextos onde o sistema financeiro carece de instrumentos e agilidade para cumprir essa função. Em conseqüência, um processo de rápida industrialização frequentemente está associado a um processo de inflação, que lhe é funcional. 

No entanto essa relação não é linear — em altos níveis, a inflação perde o seu caráter funcional para a industrialização, tomando-se, ao contrário, “patológica” para esse processo. Encurtando drasticamente todos os horizontes operacionais das empresas e tomando o investimento financeiro o mais rentável, a alta inflação acaba por tomar-se essencialmente antiindustrial. 

O desenvolvimento brasileiro do Pós-Guerra ilustra bem essas situações — após três décadas e meia de compatibilidade entre industrialização e inflação, no último decênio a relação tomou-se contraditória, gerando um consenso quanto à necessidade de estabelecer-se uma mínima estabilidade de preços como condição de retomada do processo de desenvolvimento industrial. 

O presente Governo vem buscando obter essa estabilidade através de uma política monetária ativa, que tem mantido as taxas de juros em níveis muito elevados, e de uma política fiscal de redução do déficit público mediante cortes nos gastos de pessoal e investimentos e nas transferências vinculadas à dívida mobiliária federal. 

Essas medidas de natureza geral vêm sendo coadjuvadas pelo uso de instrumentos antitruste e pela ameaça da liberalização das importações, dirigidas contra empresas que apresentem elevações de preços julgadas “abusivas” pelo Governo. 

Dessa fonna, o Governo parece buscar a estabilidade de preços, principalmente através de políticas que impõem sanções às empresas que elevem seus preços, seja deprimindo o nível de demanda agregada, seja penalizando diretamente comportamentos “abusivos”. 

Em contrapartida, o Governo prometeu conceder, a partir do corrente ano, estímulos creditícios e fiscais às empresas que realizem gastos de modernização e capacitação tecnológica. 

O sucesso obtido até o momento na política de estabilização é muito parcial e à custa de uma severa contração nos níveis de produção industrial. Inexistindo uma política de rendas, sendo fracos os estímulos concedidos ao desenvolvimento industrial e dado um contexto internacional pouco favorável (conforme a seção anterior), é previsível que, mantida a atual política, a recessão venha a aprofundar-se. 

Estudos sobre a recessão do início dos anos 80 (Almeida e Ortega, 1987, e Almeida, 1988) sugerem que as firmas de grande porte, notadamente as de propriedade estrangeira, têm melhores condições para atuar nesse contexto, enquanto as empresas estatais, devido ao setor em que atuam e à sua estrutura financeira, onerada por preços administrados, são as mais prejudicadas. 

A retração de atividades decorrentes do encarecimento do capital de giro e da queda de demanda final tende a afetar mais diretamente os fornecedores de insumos industriais. Finalmente, o achatamento dos níveis salariais, combinado com o alto custo do crédito ao consumidor, tende a deprimir a demanda por bens duráveis, especialmente os de maior valor unitário. 

Assim, em síntese, a atual política macroeconômica vai na direção de reduzir a capacidade produtiva e tecnológica da indústria brasileira, mas seus efeitos recessivos tendem a ser diferenciados segundo os setores, propriedade e tamanho das empresas. Provavelmente, os mais afetados serão os setores motores e intermediários do progresso técnico, ou seja, o núcleo dinâmico do processo de desenvolvimento industrial. Dentro desses setores, as empresas nacionais, especialmente as privadas de pequeno e médio portes e as estatais, serão as mais afetadas, acentuando a heterogeneidade estrutural da indústria. 

A presente política macroeconômica não é a única viável. Há combinações de medidas alternativas à atual, cujos efeitos industriais são mais positivos. No entanto não só foge ao escopo deste artigo detalhá-las, como delas não parece cogitar o Governo. Realisticamente, pois, resta trabalhar com a conjectura de que a atual política será mantida e torcer para que o objetivo de estabilização seja atingido no prazo mais curto possível e, portanto, com os menores danos. 

4.2. A reconstrução da capacidade industrial: as novas normas de produção, acumulação e inovação 

Recompor a capacidade industrial do País, a partir da herança dos processos de substituição de importações e de estabilização, num contexto internacional distinto, constituirá a principal tarefa da futura política industrial. 

Capacidade é utilizada aqui no seu sentido sistêmico, abrangendo as atividades da indústria de transformação e a infra-estrutura que lhe dá apoio. 

4.2.1. Infra-estrutura econômica, social e tecnológica 

A infra-estrutura econômica (energia, transportes, comunicações) brasileira sofreu, ao longo dos últimos anos, um grave processo de deterioração intimamente ligado aos investimentos públicos, que é necessário reverter. Embora sobre essa necessidade não pairem dúvidas, o modelo institucional que será utilizado ainda está por ser definido. O presente Governo, por razões financeiras e ideológicas, anunciou a intenção de estender o processo de privatização também a essas áreas, tradicionalmente de responsabilidade do Estado. 

Para este autor parece improvável que essa transferência de responsabilidades venha a dar-se de forma ampla, dadas as escalas de investimento que se fazem necessárias, os prazos de maturação envolvidos e a pressão generalizada dos usuários sobre os preços desses serviços, limitando, pela própria natureza estrutural das atividades, as possibilidades de valorização dos capitais investidos. Porém não é improvável que segmentos dessas atividades, menos sujeitos às restrições acima expostas, venham a ser privatizados (por exemplo, comunicações internacionais). 

Nesta última hipótese, é possível que, no longo prazo, esgotado o resultado da transferência de patrimônio, a manutenção e a expansão dos segmentos menos comercialmente rentáveis venham a onerar financeiramente o Estado mais ainda que no presente. 

A intensidade e as características do progresso técnico recente conferiram aos serviços de infra-estrutura social (educação, saúde, transporte de massas, etc.) uma importância industrial que antes não tinham, especialmente no Brasil, onde a formação de recursos humanos sempre foi relegada a um plano ultra-secundário e esses serviços são precaríssimos. 

Dadas as características de execução e apropriação de resultados desse tipo de investimento, a responsabilidade pela sua implementação cabe, inequivocamente, ao Estado, conforme mesmo o atual Governo reconhece. 

Finalmente, a infra-estrutura industrial é completada pelas atividades de base do sistema nacional de inovação, que fornecem recursos humanos, conhecimentos científicos e tecnológicos, etc, que são utilizados por todos os partícipes do sistema, inclusive as empresas industriais. 

Essa infra-estrutura científica e tecnológica, constituída por universidades, sistemas de informação e normas técnicas, metrologia, etc, está implantada no País de forma muito precária, cabendo ao Estado, pelas mesmas razões acima vistas, a responsabilidade principal pelo seu estabelecimento. 

Em síntese, para recompor a capacidade industrial do País, será necessário um grande esforço, institucional e financeiro, por parte do Estado para constituir os principais segmentos da infra-estrutura que garantem uma competitividade sistêmica às atividades industriais e articulam a política industrial a outros âmbitos. 

4.2.2. Estrutura industrial 

O processo de substituição de importações legou ao País uma complexa estrutura industrial, que, provavelmente, sobreviverá ao período de estabilização. 

A densidade da malha de relações interindustriais sugere a conveniência, por razões antes discutidas, de conceber-se a política industrial ao nível de complexos industriais. Tendo, porém, em vista a precariedade da infra-estrutura industrial, seria igualmente produtivo agregar aos complexos propriamente ditos seus requisitos infra-estruturais, dando à competitividade sistêmica o tratamento integrado que lhe é pertinente. 

No Brasil, essa abordagem foi prefigurada na política industrial definida no Decreto-Lei nº 2.433/88, que nunca chegou a ser implementada, cabendo, numa futura política industrial, resgatar o conceito, aperfeiçoando seus instrumentos de execução. 

Entretanto, conforme foi visto anteriormente, os setores e complexos industriais cumprem papéis diferenciados no processo de desenvolvimento e encontram-se em estágios distintos de amadurecimento no Brasil, demandando, pois, políticas diferenciadas. 

4.2.2.1. O estabelecimento dos setores motores 

Do ponto de vista estrutural, é prioritário dar prosseguimento ao processo de implantação dos setores motores de inovação, tanto pelo papel que estes representam na dinâmica industrial moderna como pela sua precariedade no País. 

Dadas as características da economia brasileira, abrem-se nesses setores grandes espaços de acumulação. No entanto esses espaços permanecerão virtuais, mesmo em condições de estabilidade de preços, se não se efetivarem alguns outros requisitos. 

Em primeiro lugar, dada a natureza “infante” desses setores, é necessário adotar medidas redutoras de riscos. Parece pouco provável que, dado o seu estágio de amadurecimento, esses setores possam contar, no curto prazo, com o acesso ao mercado internacional de forma substancial. Assim, durante um certo tempo, o mercado intemo será seu principal sustento, e a ele deverão ser destinadas as principais medidas de redução do risco econômico. 

Essas medidas envolvem, de um lado, a proteção contra importações e, de outro, o fomento ao uso intemo dos bens e serviços gerados por esses setores. 

A proteção contra importações não pode assumir o caráter indiscriminado e perpétuo do período de substituição de importações, seja por razões econômicas, seja por falta de legitimidade política. Assim, deveria centrar-se em “famílias de produtos”, em que existissem economias de escopo e aprendizado, sujeitas a acordos entre Governo e empresas quanto a objetivos de preços/qualidade a serem alcançados em horizontes de tempo previamente pactados. 

Embora a tarifa seja o instrumento clássico de proteção, as características dos bens e serviços produzidos pelos setores motores, que são definidos por uma multiplicidade de atributos, prestam-se ao uso de instrumentos não tarifários, que não deveriam ser descartados. 

O uso interno desses bens e serviços fabricados localmente pode ser fomentado mediante um conjunto de medidas dirigidas aos seus consumidores, visando reduzir sejam os riscos desse uso, seja seu custo. No primeiro grupo, destacam-se políticas que fortaleçam a capacidade dos fornecedores de prestar, direta ou indiretamente, serviços de assistência técnica, bem como políticas de difusão de conhecimentos a respeito dos bens e serviços. No segundo grupo, encontram-se as medidas clássicas de redução de custo, como crédito e incentivos fiscais, aplicáveis de forma geral à aquisição desses bens. Finalmente, o Estado dispõe, através do seu poder de compra direto, de um poderoso instrumento de redução do risco econômico, cuja eficácia é comprovada, sujeita, no entanto, às mesmas qualificações pertinentes à proteção contra as importações. 

Pelas próprias características dos setores motores antes discutidas, o risco técnico é neles alto. Esse risco é comensurado à capacidade tecnológica que se pretende atingir, e esta é uma das decisões estratégicas da política industrial, devido a suas implicações em termos de dinâmica interna do sistema industrial, de sua inserção internacional, tanto em termos comerciais como dos papéis representados por firmas internacionais e, de forma ampla, das relações entre o Estado e a sociedade civil. 

Nesses setores, mais que nos demais, é desejável obter uma capacidade de inovação, devido aos seus efeitos econômicos, sociais e políticos. Ao mesmo tempo, aqui, maiores são as dificuldades para lograr essa capacidade, pela própria rapidez do progresso técnico, sua complexidade cognitiva, escalas crescentes de gastos mínimos e pelas restrições existentes à transferência internacional de conhecimentos, decorrentes tanto da operação do mercado de tecnologia como da estratégia de firmas internacionais. 

Em conseqüência, impõe-se uma seletividade na busca de uma capacidade de inovação. Em princípio, esta deveria ser orientada para famílias de produtos e processos dotados de economias de escopo, de uso amplo e para os quais as especificidades do mercado brasileiro trouxessem vantagens naturais de proximidade entre fornecedores e usuários. Os produtos utilizados para automação bancária, resultado bem sucedido da política de informática, constituem uma boa aproximação. Políticas sociais, por exemplo, nos campos da educação e da saúde, inclusive de reaparelhamento das agências governamentais, constituem outras áreas a serem exploradas. 

A capacidade de inovação tem as mesmas características de uma indústria” infante” (economias de escala estáticas e dinâmicas, efeitos de aprendizado e sinergia, etc), que justificam sua proteção contra a competição externa, ao custo de um hiato tecnológico em relação à fronteira internacional. 

Entretanto, diferentemente do caso da indústria “infante”, onde a proteção está baseada no acesso dos produtos ao mercado, a defesa da capacidade de inovação requer, para ser eficaz, que o acesso ao mercado interno seja vedado tanto aos produtos fabricados no Exterior como às técnicas que expressam a inovação externa. 

Estabelece-se, a esse propósito, uma distinção crucial entre firmas sob controle nacional e estrangeiro, posto que é parte da lógica destas últimas utilizar as técnicas desenvolvidas nos países avançados, induzindo o mesmo comportamento em seus competidores nacionais. É ilusório imaginar que firmas multinacionais venham a desenvolver uma capacidade de inovação no País, mesmo que o Governo lhes conceda incentivos para tal, seja atuando isoladamente, seja em “joint-ventures” com firmas nacionais. 

Assim, a proteção à capacidade de inovação requer o estabelecimento de condições diferenciadas para firmas nacionais e estrangeiras que protejam as primeiras da competição tecnológica das segundas. 

Na argumentação acima sumariada, justificava-se a política de reserva de mercado para firmas nacionais, instituída para a informática e que mereceu ser estendida a outros setores motores, modificada de modo a tomar-se mais seletiva em termos de produtos e processos e condicionada à obtenção de resultados que evidenciassem uma progressiva redução do hiato tecnológico antes mencionado. 

Por constituir um modelo utilizável em outros setores além da informática e por estabelecer distinções entre firmas nacionais e estrangeiras, a política de reserva de mercado tomou-se o centro de um debate que atualiza o nacionalismo. Problemas de gestão da política, como a sua seletividade, não logram esconder o seu ceme — a diferenciação de interesses nacionais, que se traduz em lógicas e comportamentos dos atores econômicos e políticos distintos segundo a nacionalidade. 

No momento, o nacionalismo encontra-se em refluxo, e o presente Governo liquidou, na prática, com a política de informática. No entanto a diferenciação acima mencionada garante a permanência do debate, e a Constituição brasileira, em seu artigo 171, estabelece o marco legal para traduzir essa diferenciação em política econômica. 

A reserva de mercado, tal como aparecia na política de informática, constituía a forma mais completa de diferenciação redutora de riscos, técnicos e econômicos, centrada no mercado. É possível que, mesmo havendo um revigoramento do nacionalismo, o que é previsível, não existam condições para restabelecê-la, embora com as qualificações (seletividade, objetivos definidos com horizonte certo, etc.) acima postas. 

O uso do poder de compra do Estado de forma diferenciada, previsto no mesmo artigo da Constituição, constituiria, nesse caso, uma versão reduzida de reserva a ser utilizada como meio de privilegiar os bens e serviços localmente concebidos. 

A esse instrumento poderiam somar-se outros, como o aporte de capital de risco ou créditos para pesquisa e desenvolvimento reembolsáveis apenas em caso de sucesso do projeto, diferenciados segundo a nacionalidade da empresa, bem como o estímulo à associação de empresas nacionais para a realização de projetos científicos e tecnológicos e, de uma forma mais geral, o reforço dos segmentos do sistema científico e tecnológico que abastecem os setores motores de recursos para inovação. 

Estes últimos instrumentos não são incompatíveis com a reserva de mercado plena. Com efeito, uma das singularidades da política de informática e causa parcial dos seus problemas foi o uso quase exclusivo da reserva como instrumento. 

Qualquer que seja a combinação de mecanismo adotada, é inequívoco que a diferenciação de empresas segundo a origem do capital não passa despercebida e traz custos econômicos e políticos não triviais, decorrentes, inclusive, da ação de outros governos. Tanto esses custos como os benefícios resultantes de uma maior capacidade de inovação não são redutíveis a um cálculo monetário, dependendo de valores como o apreço pela independência de decisões. Aqui, revela-se plenamente a politização da política industrial. 

Enfatizou-se acima a capacidade de inovação tanto pela sua importância nos setores motores como pelos conflitos que a sua constituição traz. Porém a capacidade técnica desses setores não se reduz à inovação, e a política industrial deverá buscar reduzir os riscos e, notadamente, os custos das demais competências técnicas dos mesmos mediante o uso de instrumentos como créditos e incentivos fiscais e pelo reforço do sistema científico e tecnológico que se articula mais intimamente a eles, na ótica de complexo acima proposta. 

A dimensão financeira da política de constituição dos setores motores foi comentada em diversas passagens deste texto, e a ela voltaremos mais tarde, ao discutir a norma de financiamento que deveria presidir um novo padrão de desenvolvimento industrial. 

4.2.2.2. A modernização dos demais setores 

Os setores intermediários e receptores do progresso técnico encontram-se, “grosso modo”, já implantados no Brasil. No entanto, ao cabo do processo de estabilização, deverão encontrar-se numa situação de capacidade produtiva ao mesmo tempo ociosa e obsoleta, especialmente os setores fornecedores de meios de produção, que, como vimos anteriormente, tendem a ser os mais atingidos. 

Concomitantemente, se o presente Governo tiver implementado o seu programa de privatização de empresas públicas, na área de insumos industriais terá ocorrido uma substancial transferência de ativos para o setor privado. Dadas as características desses setores, parece provável que neles a privatização avance mais celeremente que nos serviços de infra-estrutura, e é previsível que os novos proprietários, livres das peias que vêm impedindo a modernização das empresas estatais, estejam dispostos a acelerar sua atualização tecnológica. 

É de se desejar que a futura política industrial se desenrole num contexto político que provoque modificações na iníqua distribuição de renda nacional. Nesse contexto, haverá uma grande pressão, tanto sobre os setores supridores de serviços sociais como sobre os setores industriais fornecedores de bens-salários, que são, essencialmente, receptores de progresso técnico. 

Todos esses setores poderão responder a um movimento inicial de recuperação econômica, utilizando a capacidade ociosa, mas esta não apaga a necessidade de uma atualização tecnológica — apenas concede-lhes um curto tempo para tomar as medidas, técnicas e financeiras, requeridas para esse fim. 

O processo de atualização tecnológica demandará novos conhecimentos e novos meios de produção, ativando as relações interindustriais e com o sistema científico e tecnológico. Dessa maneira, pode-se estabelecer um “círculo virtuoso” de acumulação e progresso técnico — a base para um novo ciclo de desenvolvimento industrial. 

Nesse processo, os setores motores da inovação e os sistemas científico e tecnológico e educacional encontrariam nos setores intermediários e receptores do progresso técnico seus principais mercados, validando o estabelecimento e o reforço daqueles sistemas e setores. 

Essa visão fortalece, uma vez mais, a necessidade de abordar-se a política industrial ao nível de complexos industriais e das relações destes com outros sistemas, como o de produção e difusão de conhecimentos e de formação de recursos humanos. 

Nesse contexto, a futura política industrial distinguir-se-ia das anteriores pela ênfase na capacitação tecnológica, que envolve não só a inovação como a difusão de novos processos produtivos. Medidas como as sugeridas acima para os setores motores visam, precisamente, estabelecer outro “círculo virtuoso” na economia brasileira — o da inovação-difusão. 

Note-se, também, que as características atuais do progresso técnico privilegiam modificações nas relações entre firmas ao longo da mesma cadeia produtiva (por exemplo, “just-in-time” externo), o que tende a reforçar a conveniência de adotar uma abordagem por complexos industriais. 

Ao mesmo tempo, o progresso técnico atual vem recolocando em questão a rigidez das normas de relação entre trabalhadores e administradores de empresas, tanto pela exaustão do padrão fordista como pelas possibilidades de flexibilização baseada na automação fundamentada na microeletrônica. Introduzir essa nova norma de produção no Brasil constitui um desafio que vai muito além da política industrial, implicando grandes transformações na “cultura” empresarial do País e, em última instância, no contexto político nacional. 

É previsível que a oferta nacional não seja suficiente para atender à demanda oriunda desse processo de atualização, que solicitará importações significativas de meios de produção e tecnologia. Havendo restrições de divisas, essas importações deveriam ser privilegiadas. 

O exemplo de ciclos anteriores de desenvolvimento industrial no Brasil mostra que as importações de bens de capital são fortemente pró-cíclicas e que, em fases de forte desenvolvimento, tende a haver espaço seja para essas importações, seja para a oferta local. 

Não obstante, a atualização tecnológica da indústria de bens de capital nacional é fundamental nesse contexto, bem como o estabelecimento de condições de financiamento competitivas com o Exterior. 

A importação de tecnologia deveria ser especialmente estimulada, por exemplo, através de incentivos fiscais, desde que fosse vinculada a esforços locais de desenvolvimento tecnológico, conforme o que foi proposto no Decreto-Lei nº 2.433/88. 

As filiais de firmas multinacionais poderiam desempenhar um papel importante na introdução de novas técnicas de organização social da produção, como elemento difusor dessas técnicas ao longo da cadeia produtiva em que operam e, eventualmente, para outras firmas do setor. Incentivos com esse fim poderiam ser acordados no âmbito de uma política por complexos. 

A análise anterior enfatizou as vantagens decorrentes da existência de uma densa malha de relações industriais no Brasil, fruto do processo de substituição de importações. No entanto é hoje consensual que esse processo foi levado a extremos, havendo atividades industriais cuja presença só se justifica em condições de extrema restrição de divisas. 

A abertura seletiva às importações preconizada a seguir provavelmente levará à redução do nível de atividades em alguns ramos industriais, principalmente nos setores intermediários do progresso técnico. Essa redução deveria ser administrada por meio de medidas que minimizassem os custos sociais envolvidos, especialmente para os trabalhadores, que deveriam merecer programas de retreinamento e relocação de emprego. 

As medidas acima sugeridas, para todos os setores, concedem estímulos para que as empresas adotem comportamentos julgados socialmente desejáveis. Entretanto tais benefícios devem ter uma contrapartida de resultados — daí a insistência no caráter pactuado que a política industrial deve assumir. Em decorrência, o instrumental dessa política deve incorporar medidas que imponham sanções às empresas que não cumpram os acordos sem justificação ou que tenham comportamento inadequado do ponto de vista social. 

Nesse sentido, a reformulação de leis que coíbem o abuso do poder econômico e que protegem os consumidores, iniciada pelo presente Governo, bem como o uso das importações como elemento de pressão sobre fabricantes nacionais constituem parte integrante desse instrumental, que deveria ser complementado por uma reforma no sistema judiciário que assegurasse a efetiva aplicação da lei e de suas penalidades, tomando o sistema de sanções mais dissuasório que punitivo. 

O uso desse instrumental não implica uma adesão ao ideário neoliberal, nem um movimento em direção a um mítico estado de concorrência perfeita. Ao contrário, reconhece-se a prevalência do oligopólio como forma de organização típica da indústria moderna, frequentemente a menos “contestável”. Mais além, em vários setores no Brasil, seria conveniente reduzir o número de ofertantes existente para lograr economias de escala estática e induzir a associação entre os restantes para realizar projetos conjuntos, especialmente de pesquisa e desenvolvimento. 

Essas características definem-se setorialmente, assim como é ao nível do setor que melhor se detectam comportamentos a serem penalizados, remetendo, nesse aspecto, também a uma política industrial enfocada pelo ângulo setorial. 

4.3. A nova norma de financiamento 

A retomada do processo de desenvolvimento industrial passa pela transformação da norma de financiamento do padrão de desenvolvimento brasileiro e, dada a gravitação do Estado nessa norma, pela redefinição dos papéis que o Estado cumpre. A análise anterior sugere que a norma de financiamento atual é totalmente inadequada a uma retomada do desenvolvimento e que é necessário reformular, ao mesmo tempo, todos os seus componentes e suas inter-relações. 

Assim, é pouco provável que se possa contar com aportes significativos de recursos do Exterior, mesmo na hipótese otimista de uma renegociação exitosa da dívida. 

Dado o peso assumido pelo Estado na norma de financiamento brasileira, qualquer solução passa pela modificação do seu padrão de financiamento. As medidas de política industrial acima propostas implicam um aumento de demanda por recursos das várias esferas do Estado, tanto do Tesouro como das agências financeiras e empresas sob seu controle. 

Parece consensual que a capacidade financeira do Estado só pode ser alcançada mediante uma profunda revisão das fontes tributárias e, ao mesmo tempo, uma transformação das transferências implícitas nas condições de pagamento da dívida pública, interna e externa, dos incentivos fiscais e dos preços dos bens e serviços diretamente fornecidos pelo Estado. 

A utilização da capacidade já existe nos setores motores, especialmente na informática, e pode levar a um aumento substancial de produtividade em várias atividades desempenhadas pelo Estado, notadamente em serviços básicos, reduzindo a necessidade adicional de recursos — processo que tenderá a ampliar-se na medida em que os setores motores amadureçam, formando um “círculo virtuoso” de produtividade entre demanda pública e oferta privada, que justifica, inclusive, a prioridade a ser dada àqueles setores industriais e serviços conexos. 

O mesmo tipo de “círculo virtuoso” pode ser estabelecido entre as empresas estatais, os setores intermediários fornecedores de seus insumos e bens de capital e os setores motores. Cabe notar que, no passado recente, essas empresas sofreram de forma perversa o efeito de sua “ambiguidade estrutural” — de serem, ao mesmo tempo, empresas, norteadas por uma lógica de acumulação, e Estado, onde várias lógicas coexistem. Nos últimos anos, dominou a “rationale” de utilizar essas empresas como elementos de captação de recursos no Exterior e, através dos seus preços, de controle da inflação e de subsídios aos seus consumidores. Oneradas pelos custos financeiros e impedidas de se autofinanciarem via mercado, o corte de recursos do Tesouro, em nome da redução do déficit público, veio a completar o processo de estagnação de investimentos e o progresso técnico, ou seja, a utilização dessas empresas como instrumentos de política financeira de curto prazo do Estado prevaleceu em detrimento de seu uso como elemento de desenvolvimento industrial. 

Para financiar essas empresas, seria conveniente centralizar suas operações financeiras em um único agente, que poderia ser, por suas características de banco múltiplo sob controle da União, o Banco do Brasil. 

Essa centralização poderia ser acompanhada por uma reestruturação do conjunto de agências federais de financiamento, entre as quais se destacam o BNDES, a CEF e a FINEP, além do Banco do Brasil (especialmente depois da criação do Banco de Investimento deste), articulando suas operações. 

Nesse contexto, o Banco de investimento do Banco do Brasil, se devidamente aparelhado, pode desempenhar um papel-chave. Exemplificando, o Banco poderia utilizar mecanismos de crédito e capital de risco para reduzir os custos e riscos de empresas situadas em setores estratégicos, notadamente os setores motores, onde há maior carência das duas formas de recursos de longo prazo. 

Nessas áreas, onde a inteligência é, freqüentemente, o principal recurso, as práticas usuais de exigências de garantias reais para financiamento agravam os problemas de incerteza e longo prazo de maturação, impedindo o surgimento de empresas de pequeno porte, intensivas em tecnologia. O BB poderia desempenhar proficuamente no Brasil um papel análogo ao das instituições de capital de risco americanas, através de uma estratégia de “portfólio”, que combinaria lucros privados, inclusive para o Banco, e alta rentabilidade social. Dado que os investimentos nessas empresas tendem a ser de uma escala relativa reduzida, o risco dessa ação para o Banco não seria excessivo. 

Além do apoio específico e privilegiado aos setores motores da inovação, o BB pode ser o grande agente financeiro do processo de difusão de tecnologia, explorando sua capilaridade regional. A possibilidade que tem de financiar todas as atividades de uma empresa, ao contrário de outras agências federais, como o BNDES e a FINEP, que são especializadas, permite-lhe ser um financiador singular do processo de inovação e difusão, agindo isoladamente ou em conjunto com outras instituições. 

Assim, o BB poderia trabalhar em conjunto com a FINEP na difusão de conhecimentos técnicos (inclusive organizacionais) já disponíveis no País, em firmas de consultoria, institutos de pesquisa e universidades, divulgando a existência desses conhecimentos, identificados a partir da experiência da FINEP, e concedendo créditos às empresas que desejassem utilizá-los. Dessa forma, estreitar-se-iam os vínculos entre geração e uso de tecnologia no País, num “círculo virtuoso” que proporcionaria aumentos de produtividade e economias de escala tanto no uso como na geração. 

A redistribuição de recursos tributários da área federal para os estados operada pela Constituição poderá levar ao revigoramento dos bancos estaduais de desenvolvimento (até o presente meros repassadores de fundos federais), tomando conveniente e necessário articular esses bancos às agências federais. 

Finalmente, as agências federais de financiamento poderiam alavancar o desenvolvimento do setor financeiro privado no crédito e no investimento de longo prazo, mediante operações conjuntas sob sua liderança. 

A transformação da norma de financiamento envolve uma maior participação do setor financeiro privado na provisão de recursos de longo prazo para investimento. Alguns desenvolvimentos recentes, como a participação dos dois maiores bancos comerciais no capital de firmas do setor eletrônico, indicam um caminho possível, mas outros, explorando, por exemplo, os novos bancos múltiplos e a ação articulada entre agências públicas e o sistema privado, devem ser explorados. 

Esse envolvimento seria facilitado se o setor financeiro privado, a exemplo de outros países, buscasse inovar suas operações passivas e ativas (por exemplo, através de operações de “securitization”). Esse processo, fortemente condicionado pela queda da taxa de inflação e dos altos lucros que esta traz aos bancos, poderia ser incentivado por medidas fiscais e pela desregulamentação do setor financeiro que estimulassem a entrada de outros atores no mercado (tais como companhias de seguro). 

Finalmente, a nova norma de financiamento deveria propiciar a associação de empresas para a realização de projetos de pesquisa e desenvolvimento e para o investimento. 

As modificações da norma de financiamento anteriormente sugeridas reduziriam a importância dos mecanismos inflacionários, atuando sobre uma das principais causas estruturais da crônica inflação brasileira. 

No entanto, como os mecanismos inflacionários respondem, em boa medida, por uma disputa redistributiva com um horizonte de curtíssimo prazo, a eficácia da modificação da norma de financiamento provavelmente depende de uma política de rendas que administre as mudanças de preços relativos, combinando elementos de estímulo (reduções de custos, especialmente) com sanções que sejam previsíveis e efetivamente implementadas. 

4.4. Normas de inserção internacional 

Conforme visto anteriormente, o contexto econômico e político mundial encontra-se em fase de grandes transformações, que impõem modificações nas normas de inserção internacional da economia brasileira. 

As características continentais da economia brasileira e sua história industrial condicionam a sua inserção internacional. Essas dimensões levam a um padrão de desenvolvimento em que o principal elemento dinâmico é o mercado intemo, tanto pela demanda final como pelas relações intersetoriais. Essa feição tenderá a manter-se, mesmo que a inserção internacional se modifique. 

Infelizmente, o quadro internacional não é favorável ao Brasil. No plano comercial, o processo de formação de blocos econômicos e de crescente protecionismo dos países avançados, tanto em produtos manufaturados como em bens primários, tende a limitar o crescimento das exportações. A importação de tecnologia tomar-se-ia cada vez mais difícil, especialmente nas áreas de ponta. Finalmente, é pouco provável que os fluxos de investimentos diretos e financiamento abandonem a órbita do Hemisfério Norte de forma significativa. Se, como parece no modelo, houver, adicionalmente, uma redução do nível de atividade nos países avançados, as tendências negativas acima delineadas serão substancialmente reforçadas. 

No presente, a inserção internacional da economia brasileira é altamente desequilibrada. Em termos comerciais, o processo de substituição de importações foi levado às últimas conseqüências, importando-se, na prática, apenas o que não podia ser fabricado no País. Do lado das exportações, após grandes sucessos em termos de expansão e diversificação de pauta e destino, há uma crescente preocupação com a sua competitividade internacional, especialmente dos produtos manufaturados. Com efeito, recursos naturais abundantes, baixos salários e incentivos fiscais constituem uma base competitiva frágil no mercado internacional atual. 

Em termos de tecnologia, o País também tem importado pouco e principalmente (cerca de 80% dos gastos) serviços técnicos, especialmente os que envolvem pouca transferência efetiva de conhecimentos. Esse baixo nível de importação parece ser o resultado da crise dos anos 80. No mesmo período, as exportações nessa área tomaram-se negligenciáveis após o fechamento dos mercados dos países latino-americanos e africanos. 

Finalmente, a mesma crise (e o padrão de financiamento a ela associado) levou a um estancamento dos fluxos de entrada de capitais, tanto de risco como de financiamento, tomando o País um remetente de recursos para o Exterior. 

A política industrial do atual Governo tem privilegiado a abertura da economia ao Exterior, através da liberalização das importações, da revisão das posições de negociação do GATT e de mudanças na legislação sobre propriedade industrial e capital estrangeiro que visam ampliar o espaço de ação de firmas estrangeiras no País. Ao mesmo tempo, o Governo apresentou uma inovadora proposta de negociação da dívida externa, centrada sobre a capacidade de pagamento do Estado. Em contrapartida, não há uma política de elevar o nível tecnológico das exportações. 

Alinhadas ao ideário neoliberal, de interesse dos países avançados, essas medidas, até o presente, estiveram mais subordinadas a uma lógica de estabilização do que de desenvolvimento industrial. Assim, a título de exemplo, a liberalização das importações parece concebida mais como um instrumento de pressão sobre preços internos do que como meio de aumentar a produtividade do sistema econômico. Pode-se mesmo conjecturar que essa política de alinhamento (onde se incluiriam mudanças nas políticas de vendas externas de armamento e na área nuclear) vise obter melhores condições de negociação da dívida externa, elemento crucial de uma política de estabilização. 

Uma nova política industrial, nos moldes daquela antes esboçada, introduziria mudanças significativas nas normas de inserção propostas pelo atual Governo. No plano das importações, embora concordando com a necessidade de ampliar o coeficiente de abertura da indústria instalada, administraria esse processo com o objetivo de atualizar tecnologicamente o parque produtivo, privilegiando a importação de bens de produção. Esse objetivo, no entanto, não exclui a utilização das importações como elemento de pressão para que os fabricantes locais realizem dados objetivos, produtivos e tecnológicos. 

Sob esse critério, não seria necessário abrir mão do uso de barreiras não tarifárias como uma questão de princípio, cabendo utilizar esses instrumentos de forma pontual, sempre que o uso da tarifa não seja viável.

A política de comércio exterior deveria ainda abranger um componente de melhoria do conteúdo tecnológico das exportações como parte integrante da abordagem por complexos. Embora as medidas antes sugeridas (capacitação tecnológica, formação de recursos humanos, etc.) contribuam para superar a atual competitividade “espúria” das exportações brasileiras, a penetração em mercados externos exige medidas específicas. Estas podem ser melhor equacionadas no âmbito de programas que as integrem a medidas voltadas para o mercado interno, rompendo os dualismos exportações/mercado interno e política de comércio exterior/política industrial característicos do passado. 

Conforme sugerido anteriormente, a importação de tecnologia deveria ser substancialmente incentivada, desde que esses incentivos fossem condicionados à realização de esforços de desenvolvimento tecnológico local. Essa orientação, prevista no Decreto-Lei nº 2.433/88, foi recentemente recuperada na proposta governamental de capacitação tecnológica e deveria ser mantida. 

Contrariamente à visão neoliberal, a proposta aqui esboçada sugere que a atuação do capital estrangeiro deve ser negociada, atendendo às especificidades da lógica de comportamento de grandes grupos internacionais, para os quais o Brasil é uma área marginal. Conforme prevê a Constituição, empresas de capital nacional deveriam receber um tratamento preferencial pela política industrial, visando, especialmente, à constituição de uma capacidade de inovação endógena, principalmente nos setores motores, é sujeito à consecução de objetivos previamente acordados. 

Ao mesmo tempo em que a política industrial deve reconhecer as limitações que a lógica de empresas multinacionais impõe à contribuição dessas firmas à capacidade tecnológica do País, essa política deve buscar maximizar os efeitos positivos da atuação de suas filiais compatíveis com essa lógica. 

No quadro que se prevê para o futuro próximo, a política industrial deve incentivar essas empresas a introduzirem no País técnicas de fabricação moderna e a difundirem esses procedimentos (notadamente os relativos à organização da produção e gestão de qualidade) ao longo da cadeia produtiva em que operam. E a capacidade exportadora dessas empresas deve ser explorada, enfatizando-se as práticas de subcontratação com fornecedores locais e a difusão de conhecimentos relativos à operação em mercados externos. 

Sob a mesma ótica, essas firmas deveriam ser estimuladas a estabelecer vínculos com o sistema científico e tecnológico nacional. Mesmo que, realisticamente, os trabalhos encomendados não constituam a ponta da pesquisa e desenvolvimento dessas empresas, esses vínculos darão ao referido sistema uma importante experiência de relação com a indústria, além de recursos financeiros adicionais. 

Em alguns setores intensivos em recursos naturais específicos do País, é mesmo possível que as firmas multinacionais tenham interesse em desenvolver uma capacidade de inovação nas suas filiais locais. Esses esforços deveriam ser estimulados, especialmente mediante relações com o sistema científico e tecnológico que assegurassem a socialização de, pelo menos, parte dos conhecimentos, reduzindo seu “encapsulamento” no âmbito do grupo internacional. 

A mesma postura que reconhece tanto as diferenças como as comunidades de interesses nacionais deveria informar a postura negociável do país em fóruns internacionais, como o GATT e OMPI, onde deveria ser retomada a posição, de defesa da implantação dos setores motores da inovação em condições protegidas, a exemplo do que fizeram os países avançados no passado. 

Finalmente, a situação geográfica do País enfatiza a conveniência de dar prosseguimento, de forma acelerada, ao processo de integração latino-americana, iniciado no último Governo e aprofundado no atual. 

Para concluir, é importante reconhecer que a inserção internacional do País passa, necessariamente, pela renegociação da dívida externa. A inovadora proposta do atual Governo, que deixaria uma razoável margem de manobra para o seu sucessor, vem encontrando fortes resistências por parte dos credores, sendo impossível antecipar o resultado final da negociação. Convém, entretanto, alertar que alternativas de cunho mais ortodoxo provavelmente introduzirão uma substancial restrição de divisas ao desenvolvimento industrial, com o provável efeito de reduzir a margem de abertura da economia brasileira. 

4.5. Normas de intervenção do Estado 

As diversas medidas sugeridas para transformar as normas de acumulação, produção, consumo e financiamento que conformam o padrão de desenvolvimento brasileiro requerem uma profunda modificação nas normas de atuação do Estado. 

É inútil insistir que essas normas estão em frontal oposição ao receituário neoliberal. As demandas de um padrão de desenvolvimento mais eficiente e mais justo impõem uma participação significativa do Estado. Por outro lado, tampouco se trata de reivindicar o presente padrão de intervenção que é reconhecidamente ineficiente e injusto, especialmente após a degradação imposta aos aparatos estatais na última década. 

A norma de intervenção aqui proposta se caracteriza pela seletividade, pela flexibilidade e pelo seu caráter negociado e transparente. É preciso definir objetivos de política industrial e ter em conta a heterogeneidade de recursos necessários para atingi-los (expressa na tentativa formal de taxionomia acima proposta). Esses recursos de política têm que ser utilizados de modo abrangente, consistente e coerente, com um horizonte de tempo adequado (por exemplo, para o aprendizado nas indústrias “infantes”). Reiterar esses truísmos só se justifica, provavelmente, à luz do que foi a política para a indústria na última década. Cabe, porém, insistir que as novas tecnologias, notadamente a informática, fornecem a base técnica adequada a um Estado moderno. 

É também oportuno reiterar que as condições políticas em que se desenvolve o novo padrão de intervenção alteram-no substancialmente em relação ao passado próximo. A retomada de poderes pelo Legislativo, a descentralização de recursos para os estados e a organização da sociedade civil em torno de temas de política industrial, como os efeitos sociais e ecológicos desta, introduzem novos atores no quadro de formulação da mesma, exigem uma maior transparência nos objetivos de política e um acompanhamento mais detalhado de seus resultados. 

Ao mesmo tempo, as relações entre os atores tradicionais da política industrial — empresários nacionais e estrangeiros e aparatos de Estado — também serão modificados. Assim, se as políticas para os setores motores privilegiarem as empresas nacionais, conforme sugerido na Constituição, conflitos análogos aos da informática, que dividiram os atores acima citados e transbordaram para o Legislativo e a sociedade civil, deverão repetir-se. Da mesma forma, a maior seletividade na proteção a ser dada à produção local contra as importações tende a gerar conflitos ao longo das cadeias produtivas, conforme a sua incidência. 

Não há cálculo estritamente econômico que resolva esses inevitáveis conflitos, que são permeados tanto por valores políticos relativos ao controle de decisões e à soberania nacional como por horizontes de tempo distintos. 

Até o presente, a maioria desses conflitos foi resolvida de forma casuística e, no mais das vezes, em círculos restritos (a informática com sua legislação aprovada pelo Congresso é, novamente, uma exceção), características incompatíveis com o novo padrão político do País. 

Em conseqüência, a nova política industrial requer um novo arcabouço institucional, tanto para sua concepção como para sua implementação e acompanhamento, que garanta uma maior transparência e controle social. Algumas das medidas antes sugeridas, como a política por complexos, têm, entre outras, as virtudes acima mencionadas. 

É falacioso argumentar que a democratização da vida política é contraditória com o planejamento e com um Estado forte. Ao contrário, na medida em que o Estado é utilizado como instrumento de um padrão de desenvolvimento mais rápido e equitativo, ele serve ao processo de democratização. A verdadeira questão é a do controle das decisões do Estado, que, no atual padrão de desenvolvimento, feitas “in camera”, casuisticamente, privatizaram os benefícios em privilégio de poucos e socializaram os custos. Para esse controle, o planejamento é instrumento indispensável.

Referências Bibliográficas

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A Indústria Petroquímica Brasileira: Regulação...

1. Introdução

O complexo petroquímico, entendido como o conjunto de atividades industriais que vai do petróleo a transformação de plásticos, resinas e outros derivados do petróleo constituem um dos pilares da industrialização moderna. O cerne...