O tema “política industrial” evoca divisões profundas entre os economistas. Durante a década dos 90, a própria expressão tornou-se um tabu, tendo sido banida da retórica dominante (quando indispensáveis, usavam-se eufemismos como “política de competitividade”). No entanto, no atual debate pré-eleitoral, conduzido no meio de uma profunda crise do padrão de desenvolvimento adotado durante os anos noventa, o tema e a expressão voltaram a ter legitimidade, embora usados para designar políticas e objetivos distintos.
Este artigo pretende contribuir ao debate através de cinco seções analíticas, além desta introdução e das conclusões.
Na segunda seção é caracterizada a especificidade da “política industrial” (PI, para abreviar) em relação às demais políticas e sua relação com objetivos de desenvolvimento. À luz da literatura recente, este pequeno exercício me parece conveniente seja para delimitar as expectativas quanto ao alcance da PI seja para evitarmos a percepção de que existe uma e apenas uma política industrial.
Keynes já advertia que, por detrás do “pragmatismo”, haviam teorias econômicas (frequentemente de economistas mortos). A terceira seção recupera, sucintamente, a projeção do debate teórico sobre a política industrial através de três “agendas” teóricas (liberal radical, evolucionista e liberal reformista) cuja influência se faz presente no debate atual sobre a PI.
A política industrial é um meio de alcançar determinados objetivos, que são definidos, em parte, à luz da teoria sobre o processo de desenvolvimento, discutidas na terceira seção. A quarta seção analisa o padrão de desenvolvimento pretendido para o Brasil desde os anos noventa, discutindo o papel da PI nesse padrão. O fracasso desse tipo de desenvolvimento e as consequentes restrições macro que incidem sobre a economia brasileira trouxeram a PI de volta à legitimidade e forjaram um novo consenso quanto ao objetivo que essa política deve ter: aliviar a restrição externa. Enfocando essa restrição sob um ângulo evolucionista e usando os elementos característicos da PI vistos na seção II, debate-se o prazo no qual poderão ser alcançados resultados significativos, sugerindo a elaboração de duas agendas de PI. Por fim, questiona-se se aliviar a restrição externa deve ser o único objetivo da PI, mostrando como ela pode ser um instrumento para alcançar outros objetivos de desenvolvimento como a redução da desigualdade.
A instrumentação de uma política depende, obviamente, de seus objetivos e de seu âmbito. Baseada nas seções anteriores, a quinta seção discute alguns aspectos instrumentais de futuras PIs, tratando principalmente dos princípios que deveriam nortear essa instrumentação. A última seção resume as principais conclusões do artigo.
O retorno da política industrial
Fabio S. Erber, Exposto no Fórum do Ministro Reis Veloso realizado no BNDES e publicado por A.D.Leite, J.P.Reis Velloso (Org). O Novo Governo e os Desafios do Desenvolvimento: José Olympio, 2002, v.1, p.-.
O tema “política industrial” evoca divisões profundas entre os economistas. Durante a década dos 90, a própria expressão tornou-se um tabu, tendo sido banida da retórica dominante (quando indispensáveis, usavam-se eufemismos como “política de competitividade”). No entanto, no atual debate pré-eleitoral, conduzido no meio de uma profunda crise do padrão de desenvolvimento adotado durante os anos noventa, o tema e a expressão voltaram a ter legitimidade, embora usados para designar políticas e objetivos distintos.
Este artigo pretende contribuir ao debate através de cinco seções analíticas, além desta introdução e das conclusões.
Na segunda seção é caracterizada a especificidade da “política industrial” (PI, para abreviar) em relação às demais políticas e sua relação com objetivos de desenvolvimento. À luz da literatura recente, este pequeno exercício me parece conveniente seja para delimitar as expectativas quanto ao alcance da PI seja para evitarmos a percepção de que existe uma e apenas uma política industrial.
Keynes já advertia que, por detrás do “pragmatismo”, haviam teorias econômicas (frequentemente de economistas mortos). A terceira seção recupera, sucintamente, a projeção do debate teórico sobre a política industrial através de três “agendas” teóricas (liberal radical, evolucionista e liberal reformista) cuja influência se faz presente no debate atual sobre a PI.
A política industrial é um meio de alcançar determinados objetivos, que são definidos, em parte, à luz da teoria sobre o processo de desenvolvimento, discutidas na terceira seção. A quarta seção analisa o padrão de desenvolvimento pretendido para o Brasil desde os anos noventa, discutindo o papel da PI nesse padrão. O fracasso desse tipo de desenvolvimento e as consequentes restrições macro que incidem sobre a economia brasileira trouxeram a PI de volta à legitimidade e forjaram um novo consenso quanto ao objetivo que essa política deve ter: aliviar a restrição externa. Enfocando essa restrição sob um ângulo evolucionista e usando os elementos característicos da PI vistos na seção II, debate-se o prazo no qual poderão ser alcançados resultados significativos, sugerindo a elaboração de duas agendas de PI. Por fim, questiona-se se aliviar a restrição externa deve ser o único objetivo da PI, mostrando como ela pode ser um instrumento para alcançar outros objetivos de desenvolvimento como a redução da desigualdade.
A instrumentação de uma política depende, obviamente, de seus objetivos e de seu âmbito. Baseada nas seções anteriores, a quinta seção discute alguns aspectos instrumentais de futuras PIs, tratando principalmente dos princípios que deveriam nortear essa instrumentação. A última seção resume as principais conclusões do artigo.
1. Política Industrial e outras políticas
A PI1 é aqui tratada como a ação do Estado que visa, explicitamente, alterar o comportamento de empresas industriais. Duas características estão acima enfatizadas, visando circunscrever o âmbito da PI. Em primeiro lugar, o objeto da política, que são apenas as empresas industriais. Em segundo, a intencionalidade da política. Excluem-se, desta forma, medidas de política que são dirigidas a diversos setores, mesmo que entre estes se inclua a indústria. Assim, políticas macro-econômicas ou de constituição de infra-estrutura não fazem parte da PI. É óbvio que essas políticas afetam o desenvolvimento industrial, mas elas são concebidas com propósitos diversos. Neste sentido, constituem uma política industrial implícita2.
Se concebemos uma empresa como um conjunto de ativos estruturado por rotinas e direcionado por estratégias, a PI tem como objetivo modificar a composição dos ativos (através do portfolio de gastos da empresa) e alterar suas rotinas e estratégias num dado sentido. No entanto, é possível que as políticas implícitas tenham um sentido distinto. Conflitos deste tipo são freqüentes, a exemplo de quando a PI visa ampliar os investimentos em projetos de longo prazo de maturação e forte incerteza e a política monetária direciona os investimentos para aplicações financeiras. Nestes casos, forma-se um campo de forças em que as políticas implícitas tendem a ser dominantes. A cena brasileira das duas últimas décadas é pródiga de exemplos desse tipo de situação, cujo caso-limite é dado pela prevalência de inflação alta e crônica, quando as condições macro inviabilizam qualquer PI3.
Em outras palavras, a eficácia da PI depende da sua convergência com as políticas industriais implícitas nas demais políticas, notadamente as de natureza macro-econômica. Embora a PI possa ser utilizada como elemento compensatório das políticas macro, seu alcance para tanto é limitado. A convergência entre os dois tipos de política é dificultada ainda pelas diferenças no seu timing. Os hiatos que medeiam entre a apresentação aos atores de medidas de PI e seu efeito sobre as decisões destes tendem a ser maiores do que os vigentes para as políticas macro e os resultados das decisões decorrentes da PI (por exemplo, constituição de ativos fixos) mais irreversíveis. Ou seja, a convergência precisa ser sustentável dinamicamente. Quando convergem, porém, políticas macro e PI obtém um poderoso efeito de sinergia, ilustrado pelo conhecido exemplo dos efeitos fiscais positivos decorrentes de uma política industrial expansiva.
A convergência entre políticas industriais explícitas e implícitas depende das condições macro-econômicas que o país enfrenta no momento em que as políticas são decididas – muitas das quais estão fora do seu controle, como as condições da economia internacional – e dos objetivos de desenvolvimento que o Estado pretende alcançar. Este último ponto é especialmente relevante em períodos de transição como o vigente. Como os objetivos tendem a ser múltiplos, podem coexistir várias PIs, ponto a que voltaremos a seguir.
A diversidade de PIs é também uma imposição técnico-econômica: os setores e cadeias produtivas apresentam características distintas, que impõem seu tratamento diferenciado. Mesmo as políticas mais “horizontais”, como as políticas macro, têm rebatimentos setoriais distintos. Freqüentemente, o Estado faz políticas “verticais” da mesma forma que Messieur Jourdain falava em prosa – sem saber que o faz. Igualmente, a heterogeneidade das empresas, em termos de tamanho e origem do capital, introduz diferenças importantes na sua lógica de transformação de portfólios – o que implica em PIs diferenciadas. Finalmente, a especificidade dos ativos que compõem a empresa também implica em diferenciação de PIs – compare-se, por exemplo, uma PI que vise apenas aumentar a capacidade de produção de um bem com outra que pretenda, adicionalmente, constituir a capacidade de inovação do mesmo bem.
2. Vale a pena ter uma PI?
A teoria econômica4 apresenta três respostas distintas a essa pergunta. Como a configuração de políticas é influenciada pela visão teórica dos tomadores de decisão, vale a pena revê-las, mesmo que sucintamente.
2.1. A visão liberal radical
A primeira resposta, dada a partir de uma agenda liberal radical é francamente negativa. Em sua versão mais moderna, esta perspectiva repousa sobre um tripé:
(i) o programa de pesquisas novo-clássico (especialmente o axioma de expectativas racionais e seu corolário da ineficácia das políticas públicas),
(ii) a teoria política das coalizões e da escolha pública (uma “invasão” da teoria política pelo individualismo metodológico e pelos supostos maximizadores da economia neo-clássica), que enfatiza a “apropriação” do Estado por interesses particulares e pela própria burocracia, gerando “rendas não-produtivas” e
(iii) a “nova economia institucional”, que destaca a importância de instituições de mercado e market-friendly para o desenvolvimento.
A visão do “fim da História”, pela qual as sociedades convergiriam rumo a um padrão dado pela economia de mercado e pela democracia liberal, dá um sentido teleológico a esta perspectiva e o decálogo do Consenso de Washington (estendido ao países africanos sob o nome de “structural adjustmente programs”) definiu os lineamentos de política a serem seguidos.
Dada esta perspectiva, a PI serviria apenas a beneficiar interesses particulares ao (alto) custo de distorcer o mercado, prejudicando o desenvolvimento. A expansão industrial resultaria de aumentos de produtividade derivados de uma distribuição de recursos mais eficiente, definida por vantagens comparativas estáticas, e, a prazo mais longo, da incorporação de “safras” mais modernas de bens de produção e de investimentos em “capital humano” via educação. Embora possam existir falhas de mercado, a intervenção do Estado causa problemas ainda maiores, devendo ser evitada, exceto para estabelecer fundamentos macroeconômicos “corretos e sólidos” e um quadro institucional favorável ao mercado.
Na América Latina, esta visão demonizou o antigo padrão de desenvolvimento e, ao fazê-lo, reeditou sob nova forma uma das suas lacunas principais: o desenvolvimentismo preocupava-se exclusivamente com a estrutura produtiva – a estrutura institucional, supunha-se, iria se adequando devidamente; na visão liberal radical as “reformas estruturais” (uma expressão cara aos desenvolvimentistas d’antanho) estavam dirigidas para a estrutura institucional, supondo-se que a estrutura produtiva se adaptaria positivamente aos ditames do mercado. Inversões conceituais e retóricas deste tipo não são incomuns, especialmente em visões míticas do desenvolvimento, que, convictas que detém a Verdade, são constitucionalmente radicais.
2.2. A visão evolucionista
A segunda resposta, provinda do programa de pesquisas evolucionista, é francamente favorável à existência de uma PI. Nesta perspectiva, o desenvolvimento resulta da co-evolução das estruturas institucional e produtiva. Quanto à primeira, destaca que o mercado é apenas uma das formas institucionais desenvolvidas ao longo da história pelas sociedades capitalistas para organizar suas relações econômicas e, quanto à segunda, enfatiza a importância das inovações (técnicas e organizacionais) para alavancar o desenvolvimento, que, longe de tender ao equilíbrio, é um processo de natureza cumulativa, sujeito a rupturas. A diferenciação de agentes econômicos, de setores e de trajetórias nacionais contrapõe-se à visão uniformizadora do liberalismo, assim como o acento sobre o caráter coletivo das ações econômicas (expresso, por exemplo, nas relações dentro das cadeias produtivas e na constituição de redes) contrapõe-se ao individualismo metodológico.
Ao Estado cabem, dentro desta perspectiva, papéis da maior relevância, seja como agente estruturante das novas forças produtivas seja como propulsor da sua difusão através da sociedade. As vantagens comparativas internacionais, crescentemente dependentes das inovações, são construídas, através da ação conjunta dos Estados com empresas. Em suma, coalizões estratégicas entre o Estado, empresas e outros segmentos da sociedade civil, como o sistema científico, constituem um elemento importante do desenvolvimento.
Tanto o Estado como as empresas vivem em condições de incerteza, que não é passível de eliminação pelo acréscimo de informações. A incerteza, somada a importância atribuída à diversidade e à cooperação, impõe limites à intervenção do Estado, excluindo esquemas de planejamento rígido. Ao contrário, a flexibilidade e a adequação da intervenção a condições específicas são atributos privilegiados.
Os novos paradigmas tecnológicos que imprimem dinamismo ao sistema partem de um conjunto restrito de setores e são difundidos pelo resto do sistema pelos setores fabricantes de meios de produção, que atuam como intermediários no processo de difusão do progresso técnico. Os ativos com que uma empresa tem que contar para ser competitiva são fortemente condicionados pela sua inserção setorial. Em conseqüência a agenda de desenvolvimento industrial tem um forte conteúdo setorial, atendendo à diferenciação de papéis que os setores desempenham5. No entanto, ao enfatizar a constituição de uma capacidade de inovação local e as relações entre produtores e usuários de inovações recuperam-se aspectos sistêmicos do processo de desenvolvimento industrial e alarga-se o leque de atores sociais e instituições envolvidos (incluindo, por exemplo, a comunidade científica). Apesar disto, a perspectiva evolucionista continua predominantemente micro e mesoeconômica (ao nível de setores, cadeias produtivas e redes institucionais), faltando-lhe uma perspectiva de dinâmica macroeconômica de curto prazo.
Esta lacuna deve-se, provavelmente, à sua origem schumpeteriana, que tende a ater-se ao “lado real” da economia. Um tratamento “monetário” (no sentido keynesiano) da economia evolucionista daria uma ênfase à estrutura financeira análoga à importância atribuída às estruturas produtiva e institucional e permitiria ver melhor o papel desempenhado pelas políticas macroeconômicas na definição das estratégias de investimento seguidas pelas empresas industriais6 e, portanto, avançar no entendimento das relações entre estas políticas e a PI.
2.3. A visão liberal reformista
Finalmente, a terceira resposta é “depende das falhas do mercado provocadas pelo próprio ou pelo Estado”. Distingue-se da agenda evolucionista por aderir ao programa de pesquisas liberal e dos radicais deste programa, vistos acima, pela refutação do axioma de que as falhas geradas pelo Estado são sempre piores do que as falhas oriundas do próprio mercado. Suas propostas de PI aproximam-se de um ou outro programa dependendo do peso relativo que atribuam às falhas do mercado e do Estado.
Convém lembrar que, segundo a teoria do bem-estar, na presença de várias falhas de mercado, a eliminação de apenas uma (ou algumas) destas falhas não conduz necessariamente a uma situação melhor do que a original e que a situação paretiana só se restabelece pela eliminação de todas as imperfeições. Se a última condição é impossível, os critérios paretianos não são inequívocos quanto a qual imperfeição deve-se tentar eliminar (Nath, 1969).
Ou seja, a teoria do bem-estar não valida a visão radical do peso relativo das imperfeições e abre espaço para intervenções do Estado para sanar imperfeições originadas do mercado. No entanto, a teoria não oferece um guia seguro para priorizar as imperfeições a serem atacadas.
Na prática, a prioridade sempre dependeu de condições econômicas e políticas específicas. Assim, não é acidental que o debate dos anos 50 sobre a industrialização da periferia do mundo capitalista tenha enfatizado os problemas de indivisibilidades e ausência de mercados de capitais no plano interno e as imperfeições do mercado internacional de bens primários e manufaturados. Da mesma forma, situações de industrialização mais avançada levam a enfocar as falhas de mercado que afetam o processo de capacitação tecnológica das empresas.
Mesmo dentro de um contexto histórico específico, variam as opiniões quanto às imperfeições a serem atacadas e quanto à abrangência e intensidade da intervenção estatal. A esse respeito, é ilustrativo comparar a análise do Banco Mundial (World Bank, 1993) com a de Lall (1994) sobre o “Milagre Asiático”: enquanto o Banco enfatiza a intervenção do Estado para sanar falhas de coordenação entre os agentes econômicos e falhas no mercado de fatores (notadamente em educação), Lall destaca as falhas relativas ao processo de capacitação tecnológica das empresas e a intervenção seletiva ao nível de setores e empresas.
Em última instância, a decisão de quais falhas são mais importantes e, portanto, a decisão quanto às prioridades e características da intervenção estatal dependem dos objetivos perseguidos pelo Estado. Como os Estados têm múltiplos objetivos – por exemplo, reestruturar indústrias ameaçadas pela competição internacional e, simultaneamente, avançar em setores industriais que tenham grande dinamismo internacional – e os mercados apresentam imperfeições distintas, a PI orientada pelas falhas de mercado é necessariamente seletiva e diferenciada.
Na falta de uma teoria que hierarquize as falhas a serem atacadas ou, alternativamente, que estabeleça prioridades setoriais, a PI orientada pelas falhas de mercado tende a assumir um caráter ad hoc e/ou a ser definida por critérios exógenos ao corpo teórico que a rege – o que explica sua rejeição pelos liberais radicais, que nela vêm a janela para a busca de “rendas não-produtivas”. A salvação, no âmbito do programa de pesquisas adotado, é essencialmente operacional: a intervenção do Estado deverá ser sempre temporária e cadente, transparente e condicionada à realização de objetivos específicos, até que o mercado funcione “adequadamente”.
As divisões entre economistas mencionadas na Introdução estão muito vinculadas à sua opção por uma das três agendas teórico-práticas acima descritas7, que, por sua vez, refletem “visões de mundo” distintas. Minha simpatia, é dever declará-lo, está com os evolucionistas.
3. A volta da PI no Brasil: causas e objetivos
3.1. O processo de volta
Lograda uma relativa estabilidade de preços com o Plano Real, abria-se a possibilidade de estabelecer uma PI no Brasil. No entanto, a visão de desenvolvimento que prevaleceu à época excluiu essa alternativa.
Segundo aquela visão, pautada pela agenda liberal radical acima descrita, dois “círculos virtuosos”, entrelaçados, levariam ao desenvolvimento, sem o auxílio de uma PI. O primeiro círculo dizia respeito à globalização, caracterizada como o crescimento do comércio e investimento internacionais em níveis superiores ao da produção. Promovendo a abertura comercial, de investimentos e financeira, o país participaria deste processo, potencializado pela política de câmbio valorizado. A abertura comercial (reforçada pelo processo de integração regional) traria importações de bens de produção modernos, que levaria a um aumento de produtividade, permitindo, no futuro,um aumento das exportações. O mesmo efeito seria alcançado pelo aumento dos investimentos diretos estrangeiros (IDE). As duas aberturas estavam articuladas, posto que supunha-se que as empresas internacionais teriam maior propensão a importar e a exportar. As empresas locais seriam pressionadas a modernizar-se pela competição com as importações, processo facilitado pela entrada de bens de produção. O previsível déficit em transações correntes seria coberto pelo investimento direto e pelos capitais financeiros (objeto da terceira abertura), cuja entrada era estimulada por uma política monetária de juros altos. No segundo círculo virtuoso, a estabilidade de preços (garantida pela abertura) daria aos empresários um horizonte de longo prazo e um mercado ampliado pelo fim do imposto inflacionário, ensejando investimentos que aumentariam o produto e as exportações. A estes estímulos viriam a somar-se o aumento da competição, trazido pelas importações, pela entrada de capitais estrangeiros e pela privatização, além do reforço das instituições de defesa da concorrência e dos consumidores.
Nesta visão de desenvolvimento, em que a tripla abertura compatibilizaria estabilidade e crescimento, tendo por pano de fundo as reformas institucionais preconizadas pelo Consenso de Washington, uma PI seria não só dispensável como contraproducente, posto que tenderia a interferir com os mecanismos de mercado que regeriam a consecução dos círculos virtuosos. É sintomático que o mais ambicioso programa setorial encetado no período – o regime automotriz – tenha sido orientado para a atração de investimentos estrangeiros sem sequer propor aos entrantes e “incumbentes” uma “visão” do futuro da indústria que sanasse as falhas de coordenação, conforme defendia o insuspeito Banco Mundial. A fé no investimento externo e nos mecanismos de mercado era tanta que sua entrada não foi negociada, como fez, por exemplo, a China, maior receptor mundial de IDE. As demais intervenções setoriais (têxteis, brinquedos, etc) tiveram caráter ad hoc, sem qualquer visão estrutural do setor e, muito menos, da indústria como um todo. Tendo por fim proteger os referidos setores da competição internacional, estavam, presumivelmente, pautadas por uma visão de falhas de mercado. Embora coexistissem na equipe econômica liberais dos dois tipos acima descritos8, os radicais foram claramente hegemônicos.
Durante o segundo mandato do Presidente Cardoso o modelo de crescimento não mudou, mas as energias da equipe econômica estiveram dedicadas principalmente a administrar o legado macro do primeiro período: a dupla restrição, externa e fiscal (articuladas através da política monetária e seus efeitos sobre a dívida pública), num quadro internacional de crescente turbulência. Apesar das mudanças ocorridas na equipe, manteve-se a oposição a uma PI que fosse além de medidas defensivas, motivadas agora principalmente pela herança do processo de privatização, como a reestruturação acionária dos setores siderúrgico, petroquímico e de papel e celulose. Embora tenham sido anunciados programas de estímulo à exportação com metas muito ambiciosas, sua implementação foi muito limitada. Carente de força política e de instrumentos de política econômica, o MDIC logrou principalmente avançar no conhecimento dos setores industriais, através dos Fóruns de Competitividade.
Existem várias respostas para explicar porque o modelo de crescimento não funcionou. No plano micro, falhou a premissa de que o IDE, a quem cabia o papel motor dos círculos virtuosos, seria fortemente exportador – seja porque o investimento foi fortemente direcionado para non-tradables (telecomunicações, energia) seja porque seu objetivo principal foi o mercado brasileiro, ampliado pelo MERCOSUL. Embora, de uma forma geral, as firmas industriais tenham modernizado suas instalações e aumentado sua produtividade, sua capacidade de inovação tecnológica (que requer ativos distintos daqueles necessários para produzir com eficiência) pouco se desenvolveu, assim como a capacidade de vendas no mercado internacional continua muito limitada. No plano macro, a premissa de que o mercado internacional de capitais continuaria disposto a financiar economias “emergentes” tampouco se mostrou verdadeira e, no plano interno, a estabilização de preços não conduziu a uma estabilidade macro que ensejasse o crescimento sustentado – ao contrário, o padrão foi de stop and go, com mais stop do que go, fazendo com que a taxa de crescimento do período Cardoso seja similar à da “década perdida”, com um aumento substancial do nível de desemprego. No plano mesoeconômico, a análise da estrutura de produção e de comércio internacional do Brasil aponta para a fraqueza dos setores motores e transmissores de inovações e, conseqüentemente, para uma pauta de exportações de baixo dinamismo internacional e importações que apresentam forte elasticidade em relação ao crescimento interno – impasse estrutural a que voltaremos a seguir.
A PI ressurge das cinzas desse fracasso. A julgar pelo aparente consenso entre os candidatos à Presidência e pelas opiniões divulgadas pela mídia, as posições liberais mais radicais estão no ocaso: haverá uma PI no próximo Governo.
Admitindo que esta conjectura proceda, cabe indagar a que objetivos servirá esta nova PI e quais suas características.
3.2. Para onde ir?
A pressão generalizada para aumentar a taxa de crescimento e a herança macro do presente Governo sugerem um primeiro objetivo para uma nova PI: o alívio da restrição externa. A ampliação do superávit do balanço comercial permitiria reduzir a dependência da entrada de capitais para equilibrar o balanço de pagamentos, reduzindo o ritmo de desvalorização do real e possibilitando reduzir a taxa de juros, beneficiando (pelas duas vias) as contas públicas. Para tanto, a PI deverá visar, simultaneamente, o aumento das exportações e a substituição de importações. Esta última é sempre qualificada como devendo ser “competitiva”, de modo a não despertar suspeitas de que se pretende voltar ao deprecado desenvolvimentismo.
Note-se que este é o objetivo que suscita consenso quanto à necessidade de uma PI, atestando o peso da restrição externa. Também não é ocioso notar que o consenso surge após três anos e meio de operação de um regime de câmbio flutuante, em que este sofreu forte desvalorização: embora os efeitos da desvalorização tenham tido o sinal previsto pela teoria, aumentando as exportações e reduzindo as importações, a magnitude da mudança é insuficiente para produzir um superávit comercial que alivie substantivamente a restrição externa. O consenso indica que poucos ainda acreditam que mecanismos horizontais de política macro são suficientes. Em outras palavras, reconhece-se agora que a PI tem que ter um forte conteúdo setorial, tal como reivindicado pelos evolucionistas.
O avanço de posições identificadas com o evolucionismo é evidenciado ainda por vários diagnósticos da balança comercial brasileira que usam o conteúdo tecnológico das importações e exportações para identificar problemas e sugerir soluções (por exemplo, Além et al., 2002; Erber, 2001; IEDI, 2001 e 2002). Estas análises são concordes em apontar a perda de posição competitiva da indústria brasileira no mercado internacional. Esta perda é associada ao conteúdo tecnológico das exportações, que, por sua vez, reflete a estrutura produtiva nacional. Assim, embora durante a década de noventa tenha havido um aumento da participação de produtos de maior intensidade tecnológica nas pautas de produção e exportações nacionais, estas pautas ainda são dominadas por produtos de média e baixa intensidade tecnológica. Em contraste, na pauta de importações prevalecem produtos de média e alta intensidade. Como a elasticidade da demanda é, grosso modo, proporcional à intensidade tecnológica, a disparidade entre as pautas de exportações e importações brasileiras implica que, dada a mesma taxa de crescimento no Brasil e no mundo, as importações do país tendem a crescer mais do que as exportações. A demanda por altas taxas de crescimento no Brasil implica em uma tendência a déficits na balança comercial industrial. A problemática levantada por Prebisch há mais de meio século ressurge atualizada.
Este diagnóstico propõe uma estratégia: aumentar o conteúdo tecnológico da estrutura produtiva brasileira para, simultaneamente, reduzir importações e aumentar exportações. Esta conclusão óbvia encerra alguns problemas não triviais, que convém apontar para não despertar expectativas irrealistas.
Em primeiro lugar, retomando um ponto já discutido na seção II, há a questão do timing das medidas e seus resultados. Suponhamos, pelo momento, que a política já tenha sido definida em termos de objetos (setores e cadeias produtivas, atores, etc) e instrumentos (crédito, incentivos fiscais, capital de risco, etc) – pontos a que voltaremos a seguir – e concentremo-nos nos resultados.
É plausível supor que a desvalorização do câmbio já tenha produzido a expansão “fácil” do saldo comercial, ampliando as exportações e contraindo importações, resultado reforçado pelo baixo crescimento de 2001 e do ano em curso. Ou seja, daqui para frente, conseguir de forma sustentada um superávit significativo na balança comercial requer alterações na capacitação tecnológica da indústria já implantada e a instalação de novos setores, mais dinâmicos do ponto de vista de saldo comercial, que também são mais intensivos em tecnologia. O cenário internacional também não favorece a obtenção de um saldo positivo sustentado, nem tampouco a ampliação dos fluxos de capital.
A transformação da capacitação tecnológica da indústria requer a ampliação dos setores motores da inovação (eletrônica, biotecnologia e novos materiais) e dos setores difusores (notadamente bens de capital) e o aumento da competência de inovação nos demais setores. Supondo que tudo dê certo, os resultados na balança comercial só se farão sentir no médio prazo. Dada a premência de reduzir a dependência de capitais externos, parecer recomendável que, sem abandonar a agenda de médio prazo, elabore-se uma agenda de curto prazo, que busque maximizar as atuais competências para exportação. Centrada na operação da capacitação existente, esta é, essencialmente, uma agenda de remoção de gargalos – administrativos, financeiros, de protecionismo externo, etc – mais que uma agenda de PI9.
A questão do timing incide também sobre a escolha de setores. Como a maior parte das importações industriais brasileiras é composta de bens de produção, é necessário operar a PI por cadeias produtivas. Se o objetivo é obter resultados positivos na balança comercial o mais rápido possível, o critério mais imediato é o de escolher as cadeias que apresentam maiores déficits, ponderando importações e exportações pelas respectivas taxas de crescimento da demanda interna e internacional. Prima facie, os complexos químico e eletrônico seriam prioritários. A esta listagem, poderiam ser acrescentadas duas outras. A primeira, voltada prioritariamente para o aumento de exportações, seria composta de setores onde a penetração de importações no consumo aparente do setor e da cadeia a montante seja baixa, mas tenham um bom potencial de agregar valor às exportações através de melhorias técnicas e de canais de comercialização, a exemplo do beneficiamento de produtos naturais e calçados. A segunda, composta de fornecedores de setores non-tradables, estaria dirigida à substituição de importações, principalmente de bens de capital.
O objetivo de ampliar a capacitação tecnológica em tempo curto torna recomendável o uso do conceito de “sistema setorial de inovações”, em que busca-se coordenar a cadeia produtiva com seus fornecedores de conhecimentos. Com este mecanismo de identificação de gargalos e necessidades de investimento pode-se reduzir o tempo de maturação dos programas e aumentar a cooperação entre os agentes envolvidos, com efeitos de sinergia.
Corre-se, porém, com esta PI tangida pela urgência, dois riscos graves: o primeiro, de negligenciar setores que ainda têm pouca presença na pauta comercial brasileira mas têm forte potencial de crescimento interno e externo e grandes efeitos de encadeamento tecnológico, a exemplo de produtos de biotecnologia e, o segundo, de concentrar as atenções sobre a capacidade de produzir no país bens de maior intensidade tecnológica. Uma estrutura produtiva na qual os produtos mais intensivos em tecnologia tenham peso significativo mas que careça de capacidade de inovar é fragilizada pela rápida obsolescência desses produtos e pela dependência de fontes externas de inovação.
A perspectiva evolucionista sugere que deveríamos aproveitar a oportunidade aberta pela crise e tentar fomentar esses produtos de alto potencial e mudar o padrão de capacitação, incorporando à estrutura produtiva a capacidade de inovar. Do ponto de vista dinâmico, esta última asseguraria à estrutura produtiva a sustentabilidade da sua contribuição ao crescimento acelerado, seja no plano internacional, seja no suprimento do mercado interno.
Se o objetivo da PI abarcar, conforme sugerido, a transformação da capacitação tecnológica do indústria, de produzir a inovar, o uso dos sistemas setoriais de inovação é ainda mais importante, acrescido, agora, de uma função prospectiva.
Finalmente, o objetivo de reduzir a restrição externa tem, além de implicações setoriais, conseqüências em termos de atores sociais. Produtores de bens tradable serão objeto privilegiado desta PI. A inclusão de capacidade empresarial para o investimento em tecnologia, produção e comércio internacional entre os atributos desejados tende a favorecer empresas de maior porte e o processo de aglomeração entre empresas, especialmente nos setores onde as economias de escala são mais significativas. Uma vez mais, a premência de resultados pode ser um fator discriminante adicional, especialmente no desenvolvimento de novos setores, como é o caso de circuitos integrados. Caso venha a se optar, pelas razões acima, por firmas internacionais, a negociação com estas empresas deveria incluir a maior internalização possível da cadeia de suprimentos e de atividades tecnológicas que produzam externalidades.
O padrão de capacitação tecnológica que se observa na indústria brasileira – competência na produção e baixa capacidade de inovação – é histórico. Se for alterado no futuro próximo, a restrição externa terá cumprido, uma vez mais, o papel de alavanca das transformações estruturais da economia brasileira. No entanto, cabe a dúvida: suponhamos que esta transformação tenha lugar e que a restrição externa seja aliviada, permitindo maior crescimento, isto basta? Em outras palavras, os objetivos do desenvolvimento (ao qual a PI se subordina, conforme discutido acima) são: aumentar a taxa de crescimento,a qualidade/preço dos produtos ofertados, a oferta de empregos (especialmente os de maior qualificação) e a margem de soberania nacional?
Um desenvolvimentista dos velhos tempos responderia inequivocamente “sim” – a alteração das forças produtivas era a essência do desenvolvimento. No entanto, o longo período desenvolvimentista legou-nos, ao lado de forças produtivas renovadas, um padrão de desigualdade sem par. Tampouco as reformas dos anos oitenta e noventa lograram alterar este padrão. O “momento de transição” postulado pelos organizadores deste livro abre o espaço para incluir a redução da desigualdade como objetivo do desenvolvimento e da PI.
A PI pode servir a reduzir a desigualdade em, pelo menos, dois aspectos. O primeiro é atuar nas funções que a indústria cumpre como aprovisionador dos serviços sociais básicos, cuja carência é um dos principais problemas da população de baixa renda: saneamento básico, saúde, educação, habitação e transporte público. Parte significativa dos produtos industriais utilizados nestes serviços tem baixo conteúdo importado e, portanto, a ampliação destes serviços não incide fortemente sobre a restrição externa, embora dependa do alívio da restrição fiscal. Um programa de capacitação tecnológica voltado para estes produtos poderia reduzir o seu custo e, portanto, seu ônus fiscal. No entanto, parece provável que o aumento de eficácia desses serviços envolva o uso crescente de bens e serviços de maior intensidade tecnológica, a exemplo da informatização de escolas públicas, visando reduzir o “abismo digital” e aumentar a empregabilidade dos educandos. Neste sentido, as duas PIs, voltadas para a redução da restrição externa e da desigualdade, convergem.
Uma vez mais, a exploração das particularidades de interdependência existentes na cadeia que vai dos fornecedores de conhecimento até o suprimento dos serviços ao consumidor (ou seja, um “sistema setorial de inovação”) permitiria diminuir prazos e custos, reduzindo o ônus fiscal desse tipo de programa.
Um segundo aspecto da desigualdade que pode ser reduzido por uma PI é o regional. No passado recente logrou-se uma relativa descentralização de atividades produtivas via incentivos fiscais. No entanto, as restrições fiscais existentes limitam tanto o uso deste mecanismo como a margem de transferência da União para Estados e Municípios, estimulando a busca de novas formas de fomentar o crescimento econômico local. Parte dos arranjos produtivos regionais tem escopo internacional (a exemplo dos pólos calçadistas e automobilístico) e estariam, portanto, incluídos no âmbito de uma PI voltada para a restrição externa. Outros arranjos, porém, têm um alcance mais restrito, embora relevante do ponto de vista local. Para este segundo tipo de arranjo poderiam ser desenhadas PIs específicas, definidas ao nível local, desenvolvendo as redes de cooperação existentes pela eliminação dos gargalos ao investimento e à capacitação técnica, administrativa e de vendas. Tal abordagem por pólos teria a vantagem de combinar três dimensões da PI: setorial, regional e tamanho de empresa, posto que parte substancial deste tipo de arranjo produtivo local é constituído por pequenas e médias empresas10.
Para concluir, cabe enfatizar que a orientação da PI para a redução da desigualdade não se opõe à PI para a aliviar a restrição externa. Em alguns aspectos, conforme apontado acima, as várias políticas são convergentes. Em outros, correriam em paralelo, embora usando metodologias semelhantes, que ensejam processos de “fertilização cruzada”. Em verdade, esta multiplicidade de PIs reflete apenas a diversidade de problemas que uma nova trajetória de desenvolvimento terá que abordar.
4. Instrumentos
Foge ao âmbito deste ensaio um detalhamento dos instrumentos de política a serem usados. No entanto, alguns comentários a respeito das suas características podem resultar úteis a precisar as propostas.
4.1. Redução de riscos e custos
Ao nível da empresa, os instrumentos de PI podem se divididos entre os que reduzem custos ou os diferem ao longo do tempo e os que reduzem riscos do investimento. Entre os primeiros estão, por exemplo, os incentivos fiscais e o crédito e entre os segundos, a proteção contra as importações, políticas de compras pelo Estado e o aporte de capital de risco.
Embora, obviamente, o “mix” de instrumentos varie caso a caso, parece provável que a intenção de induzir transformações estruturais em termos de composição setorial e capacitação tecnológica da indústria implique num uso mais intenso de instrumentos redutores de risco.
As reformas dos anos noventa reduziram o escopo de alguns dos tradicionais instrumentos redutores de risco, como a proteção contra as importações e as compras estatais. Seu uso, no atual quadro internacional, demandará maior engenho e capacidade de negociação, inclusive com empresas internacionais. Nesse sentido, milita a favor da nova PI a tendência observada nos países da OCDE de contrabalançar a liberalização comercial com políticas de apoio aos setores mais intensivos em tecnologia, inclusive das atividades científicas e tecnológicas que lhes dão suporte (Além, 1999; Erber e Cassiolato, 1997). Ao mesmo tempo, os objetivos da nova PI impõem cautela redobrada nas negociações de integração com áreas mais desenvolvidas como a ALCA e a UE, que implicam no risco de restringir severamente as possibilidades de transformação estrutural acima discutidas.
O aporte de capital de risco pelas agências de desenvolvimento do Estado, como BNDES e FINEP, deverá ser um importante instrumento da nova PI. Admitindo que a política macro, coadjuvada pela PI, leve a uma redução da remuneração relativa dos títulos públicos, diminuindo a “financeirização” do mercado de ativos, é de se esperar que as instituições privadas do mercado financeiro e de capitais venham, motu próprio, a aportar recursos de risco às empresas industriais, estabelecendo a necessária conexão entre sistema financeiro e produtivo privados que caracteriza economias capitalistas complexas11. No entanto, numa fase de transição, o Governo deveria estudar o uso mecanismos fiscais e de política monetária (por exemplo, taxa de redesconto e depósitos compulsórios) para direcionar os fundos do sistema privado para fins da PI, inclusive em parceria com as agencias de desenvolvimento.
Quanto aos instrumentos redutores de custos, aplica-se ao crédito o mesmo que foi acima discutido para o capital de risco. O consenso em relação à necessidade de uma reforma fiscal é forte e é de se desejar que o quadro político permita superar os diversos obstáculos que até agora impediram sua realização. Neste âmbito, cabe à PI reivindicar o estímulo seletivo aos investimentos em capacidade de produção e capacitação tecnológica.
Finalmente, ainda ao nível da empresa, é pertinente reconhecer a legitimidade da crítica liberal à concessão de benefícios sem reciprocidade. Estas terão que fazer parte explícita e transparente de todas as medidas tomadas no âmbito da PI, mesmo que expressas sob forma contingente. Da mesma forma, a natureza temporária e cadente dos benefícios é apropriada.
4.2. Políticas por sistemas setoriais de inovação
Embora empresas individuais sejam, em última instância, o objeto da PI, a abordagem proposta para a nova política, por “sistemas setoriais de inovação”, em que estão combinadas as cadeias produtivas e as fontes de conhecimento necessárias para o seu desenvolvimento, implica em que o principal objeto da política sejam as cadeias produtivas. Desta forma, o grosso dos recursos alocados à PI será destinado aos programas setoriais e às empresas que deles participam. O atendimento “de balcão”, pulverizado entre várias empresas, teria caráter residual dentro da PI, embora mecanismos que atendem demandas pontuais, como a FINAME, fossem preservados. Esta orientação teria uma tripla vantagem: mobilizaria uma ‘massa crítica’ de recursos públicos, daria maior eficácia ao seu uso e estimularia as empresas a constituir e participar de programas setoriais, ampliando o escopo para a cooperação e geração de externalidades.
A flexibilidade é um atributo essencial da abordagem aqui proposta. Flexibilidade na adequação de instrumentos aos objetivos setoriais e no plano regional. A descentralização da PI, especialmente as PIs orientadas para a redução da desigualdade provavelmente seria facilitada se fossem feitos programas de preparação das burocracias dos Estados e Municípios, à semelhança do realizado pelo BNDES com o propósito de adequar os últimos à Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal.
A multiplicidade de objetivos e PIs e a própria abordagem por sistemas implica em inovações institucionais. Enquanto o sistema “de balcão” incentiva as instituições públicas a operarem de forma individualizada a abordagem proposta estimula sua cooperação. Para tanto, será necessário estabelecer mecanismos de coordenação entre as várias entidades públicas, em dois níveis, pelo menos: o dos programas setoriais/regionais e da PI como um todo. O Estado brasileiro já experimentou algumas formas institucionais que podem servir de ponto de partida para esse fim: a gerência por projetos do Ministério de Planejamento e o Conselho Monetário Nacional (em sua forma atual). A experiência indica, porém, que qualquer forma institucional corre o risco de ser uma casca vazia se os detentores de poder não lhe derem substância – nenhuma PI será eficaz se o Ministério da Fazenda não a validar. Por sua vez, o Ministro da Fazenda não aplicará parte do seu capital político numa nova política, como a PI aqui sugerida, se as forças políticas que se expressam através do Presidente da República e do Congresso e na sociedade civil não fizerem pressão nesse sentido. No fundo, a existência de uma PI e suas características são, como o próprio nome indica, decisões políticas.
5. Conclusões
Argumentou-se aqui que o retorno da política industrial à agenda nacional não é fruto do acaso – ao contrário, reflete o fracasso de um projeto de desenvolvimento perseguido durante mais de uma década. O momento presente, mais que uma transição política, oferece a possibilidade de mudar esse projeto.
Formou-se, recentemente, um primeiro consenso quanto a alguns objetivos que a nova PI deverá buscar: aumentar as exportações e reduzir as importações, visando aliviar a restrição externa e, indiretamente, a restrição fiscal, que pesam sobre a macro brasileira. Também parece haver um consenso sobre a necessidade de dar conteúdo setorial e coletivo a estes objetivos, enfocando os setores segundo o ângulo da cadeia produtiva. Há também um consenso sobre a prioridade a ser dada à incorporação de novos setores (notadamente nas cadeias eletrônica e química) à matriz produtiva, assim como ao aperfeiçoamento generalizado da capacidade tecnológica e de vendas no exterior.
Finalmente, testemunhando o legado positivo da reforma liberal, há um concordância quanto à natureza transitória, cadente e transparente do apoio estatal às empresas, sujeito sempre à realização de objetivos previamente acordados.
O consenso, parece-me, pára aí. Não é pouco, considerando o passado recente, mas sugiro que deve-se ir além.
Em primeiro lugar, argumento que essa nova estrutura só é dinamicamente sustentável se desenvolvermos uma capacidade de inovação interna, rompendo uma condição histórica do nosso subdesenvolvimento – sermos, no máximo, capazes de produzir. Para tanto, a Pi deveria agregar à cadeia produtiva as fontes de conhecimento (operando por sistemas setoriais de inovação) com uma visão prospectiva e privilegiar mecanismos de política que reduzam riscos e favoreçam a ação coletiva.
Em segundo lugar, sugiro que os objetivos do desenvolvimento não se esgotam no desenvolvimento de “novas forças produtivas”, por melhores que sejam seus resultados. A redução da desigualdade é um objetivo prioritário, que merece tratamento específico, além dos efeitos decorrentes do crescimento. PIs podem servir a esse objetivo segundo, pelo menos, dois ângulos: suprir os serviços sociais básicos e reduzir as disparidades regionais.
A política industrial tem, por certo, outros objetivos relevantes, alguns tangenciados apenas no texto (como o alívio das restrições fiscais) e outros que minha vã filosofia não percebe. Exatamente por levantar esta temática – os objetivos do desenvolvimento – o debate sobre a política industrial é agora especialmente oportuno.
Referências Bibliográficas
Além, C. (1999) “As novas políticas de competitividade na OCDE: lições para o Brasil e atuação do BNDES”, Revista do BNDES, vol. 6, n.12
Além, C; Mendonça de Barros, J.R e Giambiagi, F. (2002) Bases para uma política industrial moderna, mimeo, BNDES, Rio de Janeiro.
Bielschowsky, R. e Mussi, C. (2002) Políticas para a retomada do desenvolvimento - reflexões de economistas brasileiros, IPEA e CEPAL, Brasília.
Erber, F. (2001) “O padrão de desenvolvimento industrial e tecnológico e o futuro da indústria brasileira”, Revista de Economia Contemporânea, Vol. 5, n. especial
__________ (2002) “A portfolio approach to investment in technology – some uses and theoretical implications”, em R. Constantino (org.) Institutional conditions to enhance innovation. Theoretical considerations and empirical evidence, UNAM, Mexico, no prelo.
Erber, F. e Cassiolato, J. E. (1997) “Política industrial: teoria e prática no Brasil e na OCDE”, Revista de Economia Política,vol. 18, n.3
IEDI – Instituto de Estudos para o Desenvolvimento Industrial (2001) “Exportações líquidas e substituição de importações: análise da década de 1990, os efeitos da mudança da política cambial de 1999 e as perspectivas brasileiras diante da desvalorização de 2001”, mimeo, São Paulo.
__________ (2002) “A política de desenvolvimento industrial: o que é e o que representa para o Brasil”, mimeo, São Paulo.
La Rovere, R., Erber, F. e Hasenclever, L. (2002) “Industrial and technology policy and regional development: promoting clusters”, em J.M. Caravalho de Mello e H. Etzkowitz (comp.) Triple Helix III – the endless transition, CD ROM, COPPE/UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro.
Lall, S. (1994) “The East Asian Miracle: does the bell toll for industrial strategy ?”, World Development, vol. 22, n. 4
Nath, S. (1969) A reappraisal of welfare economics, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Londres.
World Bank (1993) The East Asian miracle: economic growth and public policy, World Bank, Washington.
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Veja o artigo completo
No caso de Ciência e Tecnologia (C&T) na América Latina, a recorrência de algumas dificuldades ao longo de várias décadas permite defini-los como problemas estruturais, onde operam características de cumulatividade, rigidez e fixação de trajetórias. Na primeira seção foi realizada análise histórica estática comparativa e, na segunda foi desenvolvido um mínimo esquema analítico. A terceira seção discute a evolução das atividades de C&T na região nos anos 90 à luz do padrão de desenvolvimento adotado, explorando as implicações da base desse padrão – as reformas estruturais das instituições –sobre as atividades científicas e tecnológicas. A quarta seção apresenta as conclusões quanto às conclusões quanto às perspectivas de C&T na América Latina, à época.
Perspectivas da América Latina em Ciência e Tecnologia
Fabio S. Erber, Parcerias Estratégicas, nº 8 – Maio 2000. – Citações: Scopus
No caso de Ciência e Tecnologia (C&T) na América Latina, a recorrência de algumas dificuldades ao longo de várias décadas permite defini-los como problemas estruturais, onde operam características de cumulatividade, rigidez e fixação de trajetórias. Na primeira seção foi realizada análise histórica estática comparativa e, na segunda foi desenvolvido um mínimo esquema analítico. A terceira seção discute a evolução das atividades de C&T na região nos anos 90 à luz do padrão de desenvolvimento adotado, explorando as implicações da base desse padrão - as reformas estruturais das instituições –sobre as atividades científicas e tecnológicas. A quarta seção apresenta as conclusões quanto às conclusões quanto às perspectivas de C&T na América Latina, à época.
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This paper analyses the science and technology policies (STP) in Argentina and Brazil during the nineties. It begins (section 2) by a brief excursion around the setting in which such policies were conceived and performed...
Este artigo analisa as políticas de ciência e tecnologia (STP) na Argentina e no Brasil durante os anos noventa. Começa (seção 2) por uma breve excursão em torno do cenário em que tais políticas foram concebidas e executadas – a onda de reformas institucionais que engolfaram os dois países durante esse período. O principal objetivo dessa excursão é discutir as implicações das reformas para o desempenho das atividades de C & T (S & T), descritas na Seção 3. A próxima Seção discute as principais características do STP nos dois países – seus objetivos, instrumentos e resultados. A seção 5 discute as medidas de STP relacionadas ao MERCOSUL. As seções 2 a 5 enfocam o presente e o passado recente. A última Seção apresenta as conclusões do artigo e lança um olhar cauteloso para o futuro.
Structural reforms and science and technology policies in Argentina and Brazil
Fabio S. Erber, Texto preparado para o Seminário “Políticas para fortalecer el Sistema Nacional de Innovación: La experiencia internacional y el camino empreendido por la Argentina”, organizado pela Secretaria de Ciencia y Tecnologia, Buenos Aires, Setembro 1999.
Este artigo analisa as políticas de ciência e tecnologia (STP) na Argentina e no Brasil durante os anos noventa. Começa (seção 2) por uma breve excursão em torno do cenário em que tais políticas foram concebidas e executadas - a onda de reformas institucionais que engolfaram os dois países durante esse período. O principal objetivo dessa excursão é discutir as implicações das reformas para o desempenho das atividades de C & T (S & T), descritas na Seção 3. A próxima Seção discute as principais características do STP nos dois países - seus objetivos, instrumentos e resultados. A seção 5 discute as medidas de STP relacionadas ao MERCOSUL. As seções 2 a 5 enfocam o presente e o passado recente. A última Seção apresenta as conclusões do artigo e lança um olhar cauteloso para o futuro.
1. Introduction
This paper analyses the science and technology policies (STP) in Argentina and Brazil during the nineties. It begins (section 2) by a brief excursion around the setting in which such policies were conceived and performed – the tidal wave of institutional reforms which engulfed the two countries during this period. The main aim of such excursion it to discuss the implications of the reforms for the performance of S&T activities (S&TA), described in Section 3. The next Section discusses the main features of the STP in the two countries – their objectives, instruments and results. Section 5 discusses MERCOSUL-related STP measures. Sections 2 to 5 focus on the present and the recent past. The last Section presents the conclusions of the paper and casts a wary eye to the future.
2. The Concept of Structural Reforms, S&TA and STP
Looking at the paths of development followed by Argentina and Brazil over the last fifteen years two strong features emerge: first, the degree of interdependence between the two economies; second the similarities, the parallelism which exists in the policies pursued in the countries. The first phenomenon is largely attributable to the bilateral agreements of the mid-eighties and more recently to the Assuncion Treaty which created the MERCOSUL. As a result of such policies, the two economies have become inextricably interdependent in terms of trade and investment, firms (especially transnational companies – TNC) look at the two countries as a single market and cultural ties have tightened. However, the integration of STP is very limited (as we shall argue in more detail later on) – in both countries STP retain a national focus. A possible explanation for this is that in the two countries STP are marginal to the structural reforms which have dominated their environment during the nineties. STP are weak swimmers in a strong tide – they can hardly support each other.
This argument brings to the fore the second feature mentioned above: the parallelism of structural reforms. The way in which the reforms were conceived and implemented strongly conditions the STP and the S&TA and it is by the reforms, by the environment of science and technology policies and activities, that the analysis should begin.
The origin of the reforms can be traced to the failure of the policies of the Alfonsin and Sarney governments during the mid-eighties to bring about economic stability and growth, coupled to a strong consensus between the international financial and industrial community and the governments of the main industrialised countries about what should be done in Latin America to produce stability and growth and, at the same time, support their stakes in the region. The Ten Commandments of the Washington Consensus are too well known to need repeating here (Williamson 1990), but it is worth recalling that the Consensus did not lay a blueprint for the sequencing of the reforms; neither was it clear about how growth would result from the reforms, except for a faith that, given the “right” institutions (“market-friendly”) the market mechanisms (national and international) would produce the desired result.
“Structural reforms” is an expression with deep emotional and political undertones and full of ambiguities. In the early sixties it was the banner of the left. In the nineties, it changed hands. Present-day evolutionary theories argue that development is the result of the co-evolution of two structures: productive and institutional. The theoretical underpinning of the reformers of the early nineties — traditional neo-classical economics enhanced by the new institutional economics and public choice theory — focused on institutions only. If the institutional structure was duly reformed, development would follow. The market and comparative advantages would look after the productive structure.
In the view of policy-makers, growth would result from a complex process in which two virtuous circles were entwined. The first circle was related to the process of globalisation (defined as the growth of trade and investment above the growth of production and the elimination of distinctions between foreign and national capitals). Trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) would introduce competitive pressure into the erstwhile protected markets and bring in more modern machinery and inputs, increasing productivity. Trade and FDI are closely related: FDI requires freedom to import but, at the same time, has a greater propensity to export. In the long run such investment would lead to increases in productivity and hence to greater exports. It did not matter that a considerable part of FDI was directed to purchasing local (private and State-owned) firms, since this was a prelude to increases in productivity and greater exports. Therefore, the large deficit in the transactions account of the balance of payments was a temporary phenomenon as was the reliance on short-term international finance to fill in the foreign exchange gap. By the same token the very high interest rates required to attract financial capital would be short-lived.
The second virtuous circle was related to the internal market. Here, trade liberalisation would lead to a progressive income distribution by acting as a brake on price increases by domestic producers and regional integration would enhance the domestic market further. Price stability would provide entrepreneurs with long term horizons. Privatisation and de-regulation would coalesce with imports and FDI to increase competition. Wider markets, positive expectations and greater competition would lead to new investments and trade liberalisation would allow the imports of new vintages of machinery and inputs and therefore to increases in productivity, exports and growth. Fiscal reform would support the decline of interest rates and more “flexible” labour legislation would reduce costs and increase international competitiveness. The adoption of an over-valued exchange rate strengthened the mechanisms of the two circles, linking further the stabilisation and growth components of the strategy.1
The establishment and operation of the two virtuous circles was fully entrusted to market mechanisms enhanced by State reform. If STP had a role, it would be found in the eventual failure of such mechanisms. But the very abundance of market failures poses a strategic problem: by which failure should STP begin? Welfare theory does not provide an answer to that question since in the presence of several failures and being impossible to remove them all simultaneously, there is no a priori Paretian criterion to distinguish between two imperfect positions (Nath 1969). External criteria deriving from other economic and political considerations must be introduced to select priorities, as Lall (1994) argued was done in Southeast Asia.
A possibility, adopted throughout the world, would be to establish sectoral priorities, since one of the main aims of STP is to support the change of the productive structure. Potato chips are not equal to computer chips: there are sectors which are more dynamic because they are more S&T-intensive and which supply the means of technological change to other sectors. According to their technical characteristics and the role they play in the process of creation and diffusion of technology different types of sectors require different policies. STP is necessarily differentiated by sectors (Erber 1992). But to the to the reformers of Latin America sector-specific policies where anathema, equated to “picking the winners”, no matter how strong the evidence that such policies had served well other newly-industrialised countries such South Korea and Taiwan2.
In other words, the concept of development by institutional reform adopted in the two countries implied that STP was limited to intervene only when the market failed and to do so by means of “horizontal” measures, designed to serve all sectors alike.
Although the view of development summarised above was shared by the policy-makers of the two countries, adherence to it was much stronger in Argentina than in Brazil – na indication that “history matters”. To take a few examples from the reforms: in Argentina trade liberalisation run faster and deeper, privatisation was quicker and included even the oil company, a symbol of national development.
The silence about differences among sectors was not complete ( the productive structure is like the naturel, chassez-le il revient au gallop!), especially in Brazil, which had the strongest tradition of sectoral policies. Although the Informatics Policy of the eighties was abhorred by the new policy-makers since it favoured local entrepreneurs and local technology (and was a bone of contention with the United States), it was replaced by special fiscal incentives to the sector (in fact, the electronics complex) and by a special programme to stimulate software exports, discussed below. The main development agency, the National Bank of Economic and Social Development (BNDES) reformed its structure to introduce departments responsible for sector studies, by the mid-nineties started specific programmes to support sectors most affected by import competition (e.g. shoes) and, more recently, has announced its intention to intervene in petrochemicals and steel in order to clear the imbroglios of crossed equity participation and size of enterprises resulting from the privatisation process. In 1999 the Government created a new Ministry for Development out of the old (and highly inefficient) Ministry of Industry and Trade and put BNDES under its jurisdiction. Ministry’s high officers are presently holding meetings to define sector policies
The social and economic pact which had produced in Brazil what Castro (1994) has aptly termed “the social convention for development” was resilient – sixty years of history could not be abolished by fiat. Although the pact had come asunder and lacked any strategic direction from the State its fragments still marched on under the guise of sector policies. Macroeconomic policymakers deprecated such measures but turned a blind eye on them. Nonetheless, even those within the Government who advocated a “policy for investment and competitiveness” (Mendonça de Barros and Goldenstein 1997) did not go as far as presenting a “vision” of the structure of the sectors in which intervention was introduced (justifiable to compensate the well-know market failures as regards myopia and co-ordination, as even the World Bank accepts) and, much less, a “vision” of the overall industrial structure. The latter authorities retained an ad-hoc view of sector policies – the State as fireman.
Even Argentina, where adherence to the reform orthodoxy was strongest, succumbed to temptation and introduced in 1991 a special regime for the automotive sector, based on import restrictions and export incentives, duly followed by Brazil three years later, with a significant difference: incentives for local purchases of capital goods, which did not exist in the Argentinean automotive regime. Such difference reflects not only the larger role of capital goods in Brazilian industrial structure but also a lasting commitment of Brazilian policy makers to industrialisation. Setting tariffs on machine-tools at zero level as Argentineans policy-makers did in 1992 was not politically feasible in Brazil, no matter what the macroeconomic planners said about the virtues of importing capital goods. Quite the contrary, FINAME, the subsidiary of BNDES in charge of financing purchases of equipment, expanded its operations.
Such differences are present in STP too. In Argentina laissez faire for S&TA prevailed until 1996, when the Secretary of Science and Technology resurrected from the ashes. In Brazil the Ministry of Science and Technology was for a while transformed into a Secretary attached to the Presidency but soon recovered its ministerial status and, no matter how limited its resources and power, it was taken for granted that a STP had to exist. It is also noteworthy that in Argentina the two official STP plans (GACTEC 1997, 1998) justify the policy by virtue of market failures, while in Brazil it is not felt that such justification is necessary.
Notwithstanding such deviations, in both countries the reform rhetoric and plans were adopted wholeheartedly by the macroeconomic policy-makers, which laid the ground rules whereby development should resume. In both of them the sequencing was similar, albeit with the differences in speed and force above mentioned: it begun by trade liberalisation, by the privatisation of State enterprises, elimination of legal differences between local and foreign capitals and by the reduction of State regulation (e.g. as regards foreign capital). Financial liberalisation and new institutions intended to increase competition (e.g. laws on intellectual property) followed, but State, fiscal and labour legislation reforms have not been completed to date. The latter provide ammunition for those who argue that the reform path has to be trod on.
Let us forget the failures of the market, suppose that the model had worked and high and sustained growth had been achieved and then examine the consequences for S&TA. To simplify, let us concentrate on S&TA of enterprises since the latter were, by definition, the main actor of the model. To do this it is useful to take a “portfolio” approach, whereby the firm is seen as a bundle of assets organised by routines and conventions which distributes its expenditures on new assets according their expected costs, revenues and uncertainties over time. According to such view, technological assets are just one of the many assets in which a firm may invest3. Moreover, technology assets are a portfolio by themselves, with different expected costs, revenues, uncertainties and timing. The structure of the latter portfolio defines the “technological strategy” of the firm.
The amount of investment a firm does in technological assets is conditioned by the technological opportunities and by the type of competition and user-producer relationships it faces in the sectors in which it operates, as well as by growth prospects, determined be macroeconomic conditions such as the rate of growth of the economy, the degree of international openness and income distribution. A crucial determinant of such investments is the national market for credit and capital, not only because it defines the availability of finance for technological assets but also because it defines the opportunity cost of technology investment (a feature normally overlooked in evolutionary analysis because it does not operate in the context of a “monetary economy” in the Keynesian sense)4. Obviously, the level of investment in technological assets is conditioned not only by macro and mesoeconomic factors: micro factors, such as the previous accumulation of technological assets and the routines and conventions attached to such history play an important role as does the ownership and size of the firm and its financial capability to increase debt and/or run risks.
Technological assets may suffer depletion in the same way (and probably faster) than physical assets – e.g. by closing down labs, disbanding engineering teams, but it is assumed here that a firm has to maintain a minimal level of expenditures on technological assets to remain in business (e.g. quality control and for minor product and process improvements). Such level is largely a consequence of the macro and mesoeconomic factors outlined above. Moreover, the increase in technological assets has also limits, given by a combination of meso and micro factors. In other words, firms invest in technology according to a floor and ceiling pattern.
Then, following the portfolio approach outlined above, what would have happened to the investment in technological assets had the reform growth strategy performed according to plan? A higher and sustainable rate of growth combined with an increase in competition stemming from trade and investment liberalisation and de-regulation would probably lead to higher investments in technology, reinforced by longer time horizons and lower interest rates and lower wage costs. The floor of the investment level in ST&A would probably be shifted upwards. At the same time, globalisation (trade and investment) would increase the time and competitive pressure on firms to use international process technologies and to supply products according with international standards. In other words, the idiosyncratic element of S&TA – the local element – would be discouraged in terms of uncertainty and revenue. Therefore imports of technology (embodied and disembodied) would become the most valuable asset in the technology portfolio. Although such imported assets require complementary local assets to be properly used (e.g. production engineering and detailed design skills) so as to adapt processes and products to local conditions, the local assets (many of which were already available in Argentina and Brazil as a consequence of the previous period of industrialisation) do not require a large deployment of resources and time to develop. Therefore the ceiling of the investment level would tend to be low.
A further linkage between the macroeconomic policies and S&TA may be found through the portfolio approach outlined here. Two main important features of the structural reforms were higher internal interest rates and lower exchange rates. Both lead to a preference for imported assets, especially in the cases of Argentina and Brazil where stability was “anchored” by an over-valued exchange rate and rates of interest were kept high to attract financial capital to fill in the current transactions account. Moreover, high interest rates tend to shift the composition of the overall portfolio towards financial assets and the structure of the technology portfolio towards investments in assets with relatively short periods of maturity. In other words, monetary and exchange policy tended to favour imports of technology and investments in local S&TA directed to changes in management organisation and adaptations of products and processes. In this context, firms having access to international sources of finance (i.e. with lower interest rates and longer maturity) were better placed to invest in local S&TA.
Given the macroeconomic strategy outlined above, the role of FDI in the definition of the ceiling of investments on technology is critical. First, international firms are supposed to set the pace at which the economy is growing and, therefore, the intensity of technological efforts. Second, more directly, by their size and connections international firms are better placed to carry out more ambitious technological programmes (if they are likely to carry them out is an issue discussed below). Third, they exert an important influence on the S&TA investments of their suppliers and customers, as well as of their local competitors. Fourth, FDI has transferred to foreign ownership some of the local firms which had developed significant technological assets, in the private sector (e.g. the leading auto parts producers) and privatised public companies (e.g. telecom). Finally, FDI dominates the sectors which are more technology-intensive within the productive structure of the two countries (especially in durable consumer goods and capital goods production).
Prima facie, it seems unlikely that firms which have easy access to technological assets already developed elsewhere (i.e. which represent sunk costs from the point of view of the group as whole) will replicate such investment under conditions where there are less economies of scale and scope and less externalities deriving from a long-established national system of innovation. Investments which would be necessary would be geared to adaptations of products and processes to specific local conditions, such as raw materials (e.g. producing pulp and paper based on short fibre eucalyptus) or income distribution (safety devices in autos). Under such circumstances, R&D facilities set up by the companies FDI purchased could become easily redundant.
Although the broad picture outlined above is consistent with S&TA conducted by international companies in Argentina and Brazil in the past, there are variants which may be important5. First, a considerable part of recent FDI was from firms already established in the two countries. The local subsidiaries of such companies have already developed some important technological assets in terms of engineering capabilities which may be used within the group, leading to an eventual upgrading of local S&TA. Second, MERCOSUL enlarged market in many cases led the international group to attribute greater responsibility to their subsidiaries in Brazil or Argentina, often extending to the rest of Latin America. Third, the trend towards “global” products, standardised urbi et orbi, coexists with the trend towards more regional approaches, where the accumulated technological assets of Brazilian and Argentinean subsidiaries may be important. Finally, not all acquisitions of local firms were in fields where the purchaser already had fully fledged technological assets – some had the objective of acquiring simultaneously market share and technological assets. In the latter case, one may expect an expansion of S&TA rather than its reduction.
Notwithstanding the nuances above painted, the overall picture of FDI S&TA seems to be one in which the level of technological investment is relatively low, designed mainly for adaptations of innovations produced elsewhere.
The role attributed to FDI in the overall growth strategy has another significant, stemming from denial rather than affirmation. An important determinant of STP in the past was the desire for greater national autonomy. Autonomy (or nationalism) evolved from the control of natural resources in the thirties to technological capabilities in the seventies and it was always associated with national enterprises, private and – quite often – State- controlled. In this view STP was a means for achieving autonomy and its legitimacy was a consequence of this functionality.
To sum up this old view, foreign firms would not transfer to their Latin American subsidiaries innovation capabilities, so national firms were the main actor for strengthening technological autonomy. However, market mechanisms tended to operate so as to reduce the technological capabilities of national firms to adaptation too. Therefore, State intervention was required to stimulate national enterprises to upgrade their technological programmes. Such intervention did not require failures of the market to be justified – national interest in terms of greater autonomy and (supposedly) entry in the new industries and services which warranted further development sufficed.
Such view played a much stronger and lasting role in Brazil than in Argentina and it may at least partially explain the different trajectories followed by STP in the two countries during the preceding decades.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the virtues and shortcomings of such view, but is important to point out that the prevailing view, which concentrates on the market, denies any significant difference between capitals of distinct origin and looks upon FDI as the carrier of modernity, completely reverses the rationale of the old STP. Whatever legitimacy it held in the past by its autonomy-enhancing properties is not only negated but militates against it, as a symbol of a past that should be forsook6.
3. Reforms and S&TA in Argentina and Brazil
The reform path followed by the two countries was similar. Trade and foreign investment were indeed liberalised. As foreseen, imports soared, but, alas, exports lagged behind, not only because commodities performed poorly in the international market but also because FDI (which did come in) had (as expected) high propensity to import, often disarraying whole productive chains, but did not conform to expectations as regards exports. This was in part due to the fact that a considerable part of FDI came in to buy local enterprises7, many of which, such as the public utilities, were engaged in non-tradable activities but also because most of the tradables-related FDI has the national markets as a focus, or, at best, the MERCOSUL enlarged market.
Let us consider some evidence. From many points of view Argentina could be taken as a show-case for the reforms. As shown in Table 1, albeit starting from very depressed levels, growth rates and investment were very high from the inception of the Plan de Convertibilidad (which pegged the peso to the dollar) until 1995, when the Mexican crisis took its toll. Nonetheless, the economy recovered fast, partly as a result of the over-valuation of the Brazilian currency, and achieved high growth rates in 1997. Growth rates plunged back in mid-1988 and in 1999 are negative, partly as a result of the drastic devaluation of the Brazilian currency early this year.
Brazil started reforms in the beginning of the decade too, but in the early nineties an ill-conceived stabilisation plan led the country to its deepest recession ever. Inflation was curbed only in 19948, as a result of the Plano Real, leading to high growth rates in 1994/95 and to a mini-cycle of investment. This growth spurt was short-lived, since the Government, fearing inflation would return and the balance of payments deficit would become unmanageable, put the brakes on the economy. For the next three years the Government fought an inglorious battle to keep its foreign exchange policy9, at the cost of holding the highest interest rates in the world (except Russia), only to devaluate in February this year. As a consequence, during 1996/98 growth rates and investment have been modest and the most recent estimates for 1999 put growth, at best, at zero level (see Table2 ).
In both countries unemployment has soared to historically unprecedented and dramatic levels and the overall public deficit (central Government and provinces/states) is proving very difficult to control (see Tables 1 and 2), though not for lack of IMF pressure. In fact, in the recent past both countries have been obliged to seek help from the IMF to overcome balance of payments problems.
Data on S&TA performed by enterprises in the two countries are limited. For Argentina GACTEC (1998) and INDEC (1998) present the results of a survey covering 1534 enterprises, of which 534 (34.8%) declared expenditures for “innovation”, but only 278 (18%) had formal structures for R&D.
“Innovation” encompasses from R&D to purchases of capital goods to be used in new products or processes. In order to focus on S&TA, we adopted a slightly more restrictive approach by including only intra-muros S&TA (R&D and non-R&D), licences and technology transfer from abroad and technical agreements with local institutions. As shown in Table 3 between 1992 and 1996 total expenditures on S&TA by the innovating firms increase by 57%, more than their sales, increasing the S&TA intensity from 1.28% of sales to 1.38%. Looking at the structure of such expenditures (ibid.) we see that the share of R&D within intra-muros expenditures and within total expenditures declines, while licenses and technical transfer expenditures increase their share substantially, as well as their intensity over sales. Imported technology expenditures were 80% higher than R&D expenditures in 1966, up from 49% higher in 1992. Reliance on local institutions, limited to begin with, declines over the period, accounting for only 8.5% of S&TA expenditures in 1996.
Such data seem to confirm the argument of the previous section: led by a growing economy, firms increased their outlays in S&TA (starting from a very low level) and, simultaneously, increased their reliance on imported technology, increased non-R&D activities (presumably, adaptations of imported technology) and reduced contacts with local research institutions. Data on technology embodied in capital goods confirm the trend towards imports. Between 1992 and 1996 new technology embodied in capital goods as the share of total investments performed by the firms remained the same (27.4%) but while in 1992 imported capital goods accounted for 43.7% of total embodied technology in 1996 this share was 53.1% (GACTEC 1998, p.129).
Innovation efforts in Argentina manufacturing industry in 1966 were aimed mainly at improving the quality of products, widen the product range and reducing labour costs. The bulk of R&D (60%) was directed to product development. The sectors in which innovation efforts are strongest are chemicals (especially pharmaceuticals and pesticides) and food industries. The latter, together with steel and non-ferrous metal products, also present the largest increase of expenditures on innovation. Those are industries which went through an important process of restructuring and growth during the nineties and grew faster during the 1992/96 period (ibid.).
The fact that sectors which present a high intensity of local natural resources and face a strong demand are the heaviest spenders on innovation fits in well with the pattern outlined above and with the behaviour of firms observed in Brazil (see below). What is at odds with the Brazilian experience is the survey finding that the intensity of innovation expenditures is inversely correlated with enterprise size and with foreign ownership of the enterprises. Given the relative size of foreign firms in Argentina the two findings may be connected. After presenting the Brazilian data we suggest a possible explanation for the difference observed in the two countries as regards the intensity of innovation efforts of foreign companies.
INDEC (1998, p.55) points out the main obstacles to innovation perceived by the enterprises interviewed. The five most important deterrents are (in decreasing order of importance): lack of appropriate sources of funding; excessive economic risk; high costs; market size and too long time for recouping the investments. Cost-related factors rank third in the list and the other four obstacles are risk-related. In other words, Argentinean firms seem to conform to the portfolio approach.
For Brazil, in the turbulent and depressed early years of the decade, evidence from sector studies suggest that firms either reduced their expenditures on innovation (mainly by cut-backs on personnel) or shifted the focus of such expenditures towards short term goals, geared mainly to cost reductions – in line with the overall defensive strategies followed during that period10. A cross-section study for 1992 (Coutinho and Ferraz 1994) shows out of 495 enterprises interviewed more than half (54%) informed that they did not invest in R&D. Those which did, intended to maintain on average the same (low) intensity of expenditures (0.7% of earnings) between 1987/89 and 1992. Although R&D intensity tended to be higher in sectors which are internationally technology-intensive (e.g. industrial automation), the most important increases in R&D/earnings ratio were observed in low-tech sectors such as cement, leather shoes and clothing.
For more recent years the only available data on S&T expenditures by enterprises are collected by ANPEI (Brazilian R&D Association of Industrial Enterprises), an organisation akin to the Industrial Research Institute of the United States. ANPEI collects its data since 1992, based on a very thorough questionnaire, which firms respond to voluntarily (and often find difficult to answer). As a consequence, the number of respondents varies considerably from year to year11. Recently, Sbragia et al (1999) have analysed the evolution of a small sample of respondents over the period 1993/1997. The 86 firms which compose the sample are mostly Brazilian-owned, medium-sized or large and concentrated in the manufacture of chemical products (21%), industrial machinery (14%) and electro-electronics (12%). Therefore, the sample cannot be taken as representative of the Brazilian industry. Nonetheless, the data presented by the authors present some interesting features.
As shown in Table 4 the intensity of R&D&E (research, development and non-routine engineering) over the period 1993/97 increases in 1994 (1.28% of earnings), when economic and political conditions were very favourable and then steadily decline, to 1.09% of earnings (below the 1993 level). As expected, the share of expenditures accounted for by technology acquired abroad practically doubles over the period. The brightest feature is given by the share of R&D in total expenditures which increases from 1993/94 to 1995/97 from 50 to about 60%. Although this may be due to changes in data classification12, the increase of the share of R&D, which partially falsifies our hypothesis, requires further research.
A comparison with GACTEC data for 1996, arguing that Brazilian firms spent more on R&D in absolute and relative terms13 is tempting but should be viewed with extreme caution given the nature of the two samples as regards sectors and firm size.14
Quadros et al. (1999) have recently analysed the results of a wide-scale study done in the State of São Paulo by Fundação SEADE, the agency of the State in charge of producing statistics. The survey covered 41 193 enterprises and the authors show that 24.8% of such firms introduced product and/or process innovations during the years 1994/96, a share substantially lower than the share of innovative firms reported by GACTEC (1998), although methodological differences between the two studies inspire great caution in such comparison. Quadros et al. report that innovations are positively correlated with technology-intensiveness of the sector of activity of the enterprise, size of the enterprise and foreign-ownership (i.e. the latter tend to introduce more innovations than Brazilian-owned firms).
The same authors study the intensity of technological efforts of firms with more than 99 employees by using the number of graduate employees engaged in R&D activities. 8905 persons are employed by the 3422 firms studied – a low average of 2.6 persons per firm. The intensity of effort (the share of graduate R&D staff in total employment) is 1.2% on average. Such intensity is higher in sectors of medium technological opportunities, such as specialised equipment suppliers and scale-intensive sectors (motor vehicle and metal products), which is consistent with the pattern of competitiveness of the Brazilian industry. Since foreign-owned firms tend to dominate the more technology-intensive sectors, the two factors tend to be co-related. Intensity is higher in foreign-controlled firms, except in sectors producing machinery (electrical and mechanical) and electronics equipment for telecom. Both sectors bear out the past purchase policies of State enterprises, which exerted pressure on their suppliers to increase their local technological activities.
Using the same indicator used by Quadros et al. for Argentina, we find that GACTEC (1988 p.29) reports that engineers accounted for 20.3% of the R&D staff of 455 firms which declared they had invested in R&D in 1996. Applying this ratio to the R&D staff of the wider universe of 534 firms, it yields an average of 1.8 engineers per firm and an intensity (R&D engineers/ total employment) of 0.62% – roughly half that of the State of São Paulo.
As mentioned, the findings of Quadros et al. on the influence of capital ownership on the introduction of innovations and the intensity of innovation efforts stand in contrast with GACTEC (1998) observations. A possible explanation, which deserves further research, may lie in the restructuring of foreign companies in the region following the MERCOSUL. It is possible that many of such firms have concentrated their technological activities for the region in Brazil, the largest of the two markets (and where fiscal incentives started earlier and are more significant).
According to Quadros et al. the firms in the State of São Paulo aim their innovation efforts mainly at product quality improvement and production costs reductions – a pattern observed across the size spectrum. Consistent with this finding, their main sources of information are either customers or materials suppliers, followed by competitors. However, for large firms (500 or more employees) the internal R&D Department is the second most important source of information, preceded only by clients. Other local institutions such as consulting firms, universities and research institutes play a minor role in providing information for innovation, as do publications and patents. In Argentina suppliers and customers are two of the most important sources too but the internal R&D appears to be the main source of information. Similarly to Brazil, other components of the NSI (universities, research institutes, etc) play a negligible role as sources of information (INDEC 1988,p 54).
In other words, the study of the sources of information for innovation points to the importance of the productive chain (user-supplier relationships). From this point of view, the disruption of such changes caused by import liberalisation, leading to the replacement of local suppliers by imports, may be detrimental to local innovative efforts. On the other hand, increasing exports may act in the opposite sense, providing more advanced sources of information. Needless to say, such effects vary considerably between sectors, according to their foreign trade content.
If one includes capital goods purchases within innovation efforts (as GACTEC 1998 does), they dwarf all other types of expenditures (ibid. p.129). Such inclusion is partly justifiable on the ground that they may be complementary assets. Since the investments recently made in Argentina and Brazil seem to consist mainly of limited expansions of capacity, by the addition of new pieces of equipment coupled to changes in the organisation of production (with the outstanding exception of the motor vehicle industry), this pattern of investment is consistent with the incremental S&TA performed. The history of enterprises in Argentina and in Brazil show that, given the limited scope of their innovation activities, it is only when firms introduce major changes in their productive capacity that they introduce more radical process and product transformations. The innovation capabilities which underlie the new products and processes tend to be developed abroad. In other words: while in more technologically dynamic economies the development of innovation leads to investment, in countries such as Argentina and Brazil it is investment which brings along innovation, but mainly the use of innovation, not its local development.
Local technological development occurs when growth is combined with local specific conditions. This is a feature presented by many industries which are natural resources-intensive, as already mentioned, but it may happen in other industries too. This is illustrated by the motor vehicle industry, recently studied by Quadros and his colleagues. As reported by the press (Gazeta Mercantil 26/8/1999) during the nineties 22 new vehicles families or platforms were introduced in Brazil, as opposed to seven during the eighties. The Brazilian vehicle market presents several differences as regards the more advanced countries: roads are like Swiss cheese – a bit of road around pot-holes, alcohol is used as combustible and poorly distributed income (coupled to fiscal provisions) stimulate the use of 1.0 litre engines. Although research remains concentrated in the Northern hemisphere, Brazilian subsidiaries of TNC have developed substantial technical competence in suspension and engine design. Specific market conditions lead to the development of specific technological assets. Such assets are then used to service other markets in which the same conditions apply – adaptation of models for the Argentinean, Mexican, Venezuelan and South-African markets are performed in Brazil.
Turning to output indicators, patent data provide a similar picture. In Argentina patenting was very limited during the early nineties, largely because of problems at the Patent Bureau (an average of 608 patents per year only). In the two ensuing years the bottleneck was overcome and patents averaged 2780 per year. However, in the final two years (1995/96) the flow abated and patenting averaged 1397 patents per year. The latter figure is 77% of the average yearly patenting of the eighties and less than 40% of the seventies (GACTEC 1997). Moreover the share of non-resident patent holders increased from 70% in the eighties to 80% of total patents in the present decade (ibid.). Patents obtained in Argentina during the period 1992/96 by firms which had some R&D in 1966 totalled 320 only. Such firms obtained 88 patents abroad during the same period.
In Brazil the yearly average during the period 1990/95 (2572 patents per year) is 82% of the average for the period 1985/89. The share of non-residents is constant and overwhelming: 85% of total patents (Maldonado, 1998). Looking more closely at the patents granted to Brazilian residents, the same author shows that a considerable share of patents goes to individuals. The number of patents received by national private enterprises is very limited, never exceeding 174 in the selected years examined. Resident foreign-owned private firms play a diminutive and declining role, similarly to State enterprises. In the sample of 86 innovative firms studied by Sbraggia et al. (1999) during the 1993/97 period the number of patents obtained per firm is also very small and declining – from 1.7 per company per year to 1.1 (according to the authors, companies studied by IRI obtain, on average 130 patents per company per year).
Patenting abroad is also very limited: GACTEC(1997) reports that the European Patent Office received 34 patent requests from Argentina and 127 from Brazil over the period 1991/1993. Requests presented to the U.S. Patent Office over the years 1990/93 totalled 230 from Argentina and 570 from Brazil (ibid.). Using patent data for the period 1990/96 to study technological co-operation, Maldonado (1998) found 572 cases in which there was more than one enterprise holding the patent. Brazilian firms were present in 48 of such cases, but joint-holding between Brazilian and foreign-owned firms was found in three cases only.
Let us recall that the reform of the legislation on intellectual property was included in the ten main recommendations of the Washington Consensus. Both countries duly obliged and eliminated administrative controls of technology contracts (which aimed at, among other objectives, to restrict abusive clauses such as export prohibitions) and passed new legislation in accordance with TRIPS. In fact, Barbosa (1999) argues that the Brazilian new law is “ultra-TRIPS” in its protection to (foreign) innovators.
Since the new industrial property law have come into effect in 1966 in Brazil and in Argentina is not being applied yet (the grace period will last for five years), it is too early to assess their effects on local innovation, but it seems that the change in controls, coupled to the stimuli to import technology and (in Brazil) the change in the fiscal treatment of technology payments abroad (see below) led to a upsurge in such remittances, contributing thus to the balance of payments difficulties. In Brazil remittances rose from US$ 180 million on average for the period 1990/92 to US$ 990 million in 1996. Since such stupendous growth is not proportionate to the evolution of S&TA in the country, it is possible that the main effect of liberalisation was to open a new channel for remittances rather than stimulating the import of technology . In Argentina remittances started the nineties from a very high level (US$ 420 millions), but declined and then increased again, to reach in 1998 the same level of 1991.
Accepting the authorities’ estimates of enterprises expenditures15 for S&TA and comparing it with technology remittances, the ratio in 1996 would be 1 for Argentina and 2.8 for Brazil, suggesting that in the latter country local content of total S&TA is higher than in the former. Although this seems consistent with other indicators previously analysed it must be stressed that the estimates of the Brazilian Ministry of Science and Technology for enterprises’ expenditures are the result of complex imputations and are not very reliable.
Does it pay to be innovative in such peculiar contexts? GACTEC (1998) gives (not surprisingly) a affirmative answer by showing that the sales of the 534 innovative firms increased by 45% over the period 1992/96, in comparison with 35% increase in the total sample studied (1534 firms). Moreover society benefited from a smaller employment reduction in the first group (2%) than in the second (6%). In Brazil, for the 86 enterprises studied by Sbragia et al. (1999) the firms increased their revenue from new products from 40% in 1993 to 46% in 1997. Cost savings resulting from process improvements show a opposite trend: they decline from 7.5% of gross profit in 1993 to 0.5% in 199716. Sbragia et al. (1998) divide a wider sample of 247 innovative firms into two groups: “more” or “less” innovative according to the share of yearly sales generated by products introduced in the last five years17. Similarly to GAGTEC, they show that from 1995 to 1996 the gross earnings of the “more” innovative firms increased substantially more than the other group: while in the first case sales increased 18% in the second group they fell by 13%. However, the difference in profitability between the two groups is not statistically significant.
Since the evolution of sales is highly dependent on sectors further analysis is clearly needed. Moreover, it is possible that the causation posed by the studies who want to show that “to be innovative pays” is the reverse. Firms which had more resources available because they were selling more may have found profitable to increase their limited outlays on innovation in order to improve further product quality and to reduce costs, leading to a moderately virtuous circle. Again, further research is needed.
Exports of technology provide another partial answer. In Argentina such revenues are minimal – for the whole period 1990/98 they total US$ 56 millions. In Brazil they increase from U$$ 156 million in 1990 to US$ 474 million in 1996. Throughout the 1990/96 period over 90% of such exports are produced by “specialised technical services”, probably deriving from enterprises doing infrastructure works abroad and from Petrobras foreign operations. In both cases exports are a consequence of technological assets developed with the internal market in view and then used abroad.
Therefore it seems fair to conclude that growth and the structural reforms in Argentina and Brazil have not brought about a significant increase in S&TA performed locally by private enterprises, but they did increase the expenditures on imported technology. Historically weak links with other local technical and scientific institutions, so as to build up a “national system of innovation”, have become even weaker. Local innovation efforts aim mainly at product quality improvement and cost reductions, meritorious objectives no doubt but scarcely the stuff out of which substantial development comes. Major changes in technology seem to occur only when there are discontinuities in capacity investment, i.e. the routines of technological development, in the limited share of enterprises which have them, are geared to incremental change, not to Schumpeterian transformation of productive structures.
Some could argue that the pursuit of such incremental trajectories develop technical capabilities which then could be used for more radical innovations. This argument assumes that there is a continuum of skills which goes from small adaptations to R&D. Technical realities do not seem to conform to such view – no matter how integrated R&D has become with production, the division of labour still prevails and skills are different. The same applies to facilities, equipment, etc. Routines in a firm which does R&D systematically are very different from routines geared to incremental change. In short, the assets required for a higher ceiling of S&TA are different and require investments to be developed. As we argued above, the macroeconomic environment is detrimental to such change in the technology investment portfolio. Import liberalisation has probably increased the pace of introduction of new processes and products, raising the floor of technology investments but, by its timing, has increased the uncertainty about the revenue flow deriving from more ambitious technological investment, as discussed previously.
So far we concentrated on private enterprises but the structural reforms of the nineties have affected the S&TA of other important actors.
Historically, State enterprises were among the main investors in science and technology in Brazil. It is estimated that by the late eighties the R&D centres of Petrobras (oil) (CENPES), Eletrobras (electricity) (CEPEL) and Telebras (telecommunications) (CPQD) accounted for 10% of country’s total expenditure on S&T (Erber and Amaral 1995). In 1997 the 86 companies studied by Sbragia et al. (1999) spent, on average, US$ 7.9 million per enterprise. In the same year, the budgets of CENPES, CEPEL and CPQD were, respectively, US$ 202, 44 and 115 million – another scale of operation. The three Centres had important contributions to their record – e.g. deep water oil exploration, oil recovery and refining; energy conservation; switching technology and products (ibid.) It is estimated that CENPES research programmes to optimise offshore technology have brought benefits of about US$ 1 billion (Botelho 1999). Over the years such centres had built close links with universities and research institutes, demanding services which involved more than the simple tests commissioned by private enterprises18. Moreover State enterprises exerted a strong influence on the technological upgrading of local suppliers of equipment, machinery and other inputs. In the three Centres, especially in CENPES and CPQD, achieving greater technological autonomy was an important motivation.
Privatisation in Brazil begun with manufacturing industry, especially petrochemical and steel, purchased by local groups. In the first case this process led to the abandonment of the research centre of Petroquisa (Petrobras’ petrochemical subsidiary) which was projected to provide a qualitative change in the level of technological activities performed in that industry (Erber 1997) and to a drastic reduction of CENPES petrochemical research, intra-muros and in co-operation with the privatised firms. The latter do not seem to have increased their very limited local S&TA. In steel, the privatised companies are investing considerable sums for technological upgrading of their products and process modernisation, often linked to environment protection requirements, with support of the National Bank of Economic and Social Development. Although the monopoly of Petrobras was eliminated, the company was not privatised and the core activities of its research centre, related to the oil sector, were not harmed.
The pattern of technological activities followed by the privatised manufacturing companies seems to be determined by market requirements – in steel there was an urgent need to upgrade products and processes and to adapt them to more stringent pollution controls. The same applies to the most technology-intensive privatised firm, Embraer, a producer of medium-range jet airplanes. Building on the technical capabilities developed during its period of State-ownership, Embraer earned in 1998 about US1.5 billion, of which 90% were exports and is planning to invest US$ 850 millions in the development of new airplanes (Gazeta Mercantil, 12/8/1999).
As regards the utilities, which have been mostly acquired by foreign companies, the Telecommunications Law states that a fund for technological development should be created, but this remains, so far, a pious intention, due to the resistance of the new owners of the companies. CPQD, the R&D centre of Telebras became a non-profit private foundation and Anatel (the telecomm regulatory agency) obliged the privatised companies to provide for its budget for a three-year period (starting in 1998). According to Cassiolato et al. (1999) the Centre has changed its “product mix” against research and towards technological services. Moreover, suppliers of telecommunication equipment have decreased R&D expenditures and, within a smaller investment, increased the share of activities with a lower innovative intensity (ibid.) CEPEL (Eletrobras R&D centre) is also facing a cut in resources, since some of its main supporters were acquired by foreign firms, which can rely on the laboratories of their parent companies19 and its role and funding in the new institutional context seems uncertain. Some of the subsidiaries of Eletrobras also have important R&D centres of their own20. Since the privatisation of electric sector is still incomplete, it is too early to assess its consequences for local suppliers.
In three sectors new regulatory agencies were created: oil, telecomm and electric power. The legislation and commitment of the agencies to local technological development varies in the same order. The most important result is the creation by ANP (the oil agency) of a sector programme for R&D based on the revenue of oil royalties. This programme will be managed by MCT (Ministry of Science and Technology) with the technical support of ANP and it is estimated that it will provide R$ 340 million for S&TA over the next four years.
The consequences of privatisation for local S&TA vary then according to sectors and to the conditions prevailing during the most recent period of State-ownership. Where, as in manufacturing, State ownership was impeding investment (the State would not invest directly and did not allow the companies to increase their indebtedness), privatisation has allowed the companies to develop their S&TA according to market requirements. For the utilities privatisation will probably lead to a reduction of spending in R&D, but this could be partially offset if the regulatory agencies follow the lead of ANP.
In Argentina a few state corporations such as Petroquimica Bahia Blanca, YPF, SEGBA and Hidronor had small R&D programmes, on a much smaller scale than their Brazilian counterparts. Although not much is known about what happened to them, at least in the first case the outlook was glum because of the technological strategy of the TNC which acquired its control (Lopez 1997). The most significant case in terms of R&D, training, operation of highly complex technical facilities. and relationship with suppliers was that of CNEA (Atomic Energy Commission). CNEA was “favoured in terms of public endowments, due to its own trajectory and performance, as well as the national consensus on its strategic character partially related to military considerations. Its main liability are its sunk costs in a technology that is now put in question on a global level. After the separation of most energy-producing facilities, its budget and personnel were considerably reduced; by 1997 it employed only 500 researchers.” (Chudnovsky et al. p.11). Local technological development is not included in the priorities of the regulatory agencies in Argentina.
History then comes again to the fore. The impact of privatisation on S&TA in Brazil is much greater than in Argentina because in the former S&TA performed by State enterprises was much more important, both for the enterprises and for the rest of the national system of innovation.
As mentioned above, some of the structural reforms, especially the intertwined State and fiscal reforms, remain incomplete in the two countries. The worsening of the external accounts has added urgency to such reforms, since the IMF is exerting its well-known pressure towards a reduction of the overall public deficit. The incompleteness of the reforms cannot be ascribed to lack of technical proposals but rather to the complexity of interests which have to be taken into account, not least the relationship between regional and central Governments.
In both countries the bulk of graduate education rests in the hands of public universities. Federal universities play a more important role in Argentina than in Brazil, where the universities of the State of São Paulo are very important. Although the Federal Research Councils have institutes associated to them which perform basic research, in Argentina the role of such institutes is much greater than in Brazil, where most research is performed by the public universities. In Argentina the Secretary of Science and Technology (SECYT) is nominally part of the Ministry of Education while in Brazil Science & Technology and Education are separate ministries. Maintenance of the Federal universities is entrusted to the latter.
Most analysts agree that investment in basic research and education is a field fraught with market failures, making State intervention acceptable. In Argentina such intervention is all the more necessary given the disruption of the system of education and research caused by the military regime. In Brazil, at the same time it led to exile many prominent scientists (including the present President of the Republic), the military regime undertook the establishment of the system of graduate education and research. This type of system takes a long time to mature, but with the debt crisis of the eighties the process was interrupted and, since then, has followed a trajectory of stop-and-go, where stops are more frequent than goes. It is worth stressing that the conditions South of the Equator are totally different from those prevailing North, where the system of research and education is fully established and State intervention may be incremental – in countries such as Argentina and Brazil the problem is to establish a system. However, the World Bank doctrine of the early nineties focused investment in human capital on primary and secondary education, leaving universities and research institutes outside the pail.
In Brazil the Ministry of Education has indeed given top priority to primary education and has curbed the growth of Federal universities. The freezing of university salaries since 1995( as part of the fiscal policy for the sake of containment of expenditures) coupled to the reduction of funds for research led to a long strike of Federal universities in 1998, which ended up with a modest salary increase, leaving both parts dissatisfied. The relationship between universities and the Government is presently becoming even more adversary because of the proposals of the Ministry of Education for university autonomy, in the context of the reform of the State (the other main reform which remains incomplete). At the same time the National Research Council has adopted measures which curtail the growth of the number of researchers.
In Argentina, where salaries at the universities are among the lowest in the world, an incentive to full time professors who are also researchers was given since 1995.
It is hazardous to establish a direct connection between the financial conditions of the universities/research institutes and scientific production, but it is interesting to notice that Argentina increased the number of articles published in international journals more than Brazil21. Nonetheless, the two countries are marginal to international science – in 1995 Brazil accounted for 0.6% of the world articles in sciences and engineering and Argentina for 0.4% (GACTEC 1998).
Although the overall fiscal pattern is similar for both Federal Governments, the specific fiscal policies for S&T are different. In Argentina, as shown by GACTEC(1998), expenditures by the Federal Government (excluding Universities) increased from an average of US$ 388 millions during 1990/92 to US$ 560 millions during 1995/97. For the same two periods, expenditures by State universities increased from US$ 181 million to US$ 363 millions. Expenditures during the nineties were considerably higher than in the previous decade22. In Brazil, after reaching a peak in the late eighties (US$ 3.4 billion in 1988)23, Federal Government expenditures for S&T fall drastically until 1992 (US$ 1.6 billion), recover in the next two years (peaking at US$ 2.47 billions in 1994) and then slides down again, albeit slowly, reaching US$ 2.31 billions in 1997 (MCT/CNPq 1997). Such vagaries cannot be ascribed to overall fiscal problems only, since total Federal Government expenditures increased from US$ 111 billions in 1988 to US$ 384 billions in 1997. As a consequence, the share of S&T in total Federal expenditures fell from 3.1% in 1988 to 0.6% in 1997 (ibid.), a good indicator of the priority attached to such activities.
Notwithstanding the different trends, which point out to divergent commitments, the difference in the volume of expenditures by the Federal Governments remain very large, a shown by the figures above.
The same pattern emerges from the analysis of fiscal incentives24. In Argentina a fiscal incentive to technological activities (included in the Law 23.877 but not applied) based on rebates of income tax was put into force in 1998. The amount devoted to the tax credit in Argentina was limited to U$S 20 million for each fiscal year 1998 and 1999. Fiscal credit certificates have a validity of three years and there are maximums that can be used in each year, according to taxable income of the beneficiary. Fiscal credits can be applied to basic and applied research, pre-competitive research, technological adaptation and improvements. Excluded are administrative expenditures, energy and communications, real estate acquisition or rental, and depreciation of equipment used in the projects. In 1988 and 1999 bids were opened to firms interested in benefiting from such incentives.
In Brazil the story is more complex. In 1988, 17 years after the first proposal to establish fiscal incentives for S&T was put to the Finance Ministry, a Law providing such incentives was approved. In 1990 the S&T incentives were abrogated, together with many others. In 1991, to substitute for the Informatics Policy (an anathema to the Washington Consensus25), special fiscal incentives were given to electronics firms which complied with some local production requisites and performed S&TAs in the country, part of which had to be contracted out to universities and research institutes (Law 8248/91). Such incentives are due to expire in October this year and, so far, the Finance Ministry has shown little enthusiasm to extend them.
In the same year, as part of the liberalisation movement, Law 8343 was passed, eliminating fiscal restrictions on remittances from subsidiaries to parent companies abroad to pay for imports of technology26 and in 1994 an Executive decree eliminated a tax on remittances which still existed. As mentioned above remittances have then soared.
In 1993 the fiscal incentives of 1988 were re-established (Law 8661/93). Such incentives consist of a deduction of the income tax up to a limit of 8% of the income tax due; exemption of VAT on equipment for S&TA, accelerated depreciation of equipment and intangible assets used for such activities and reductions in the payment of taxes for technology imports if such imports are coupled to local S&T (the latter incentive was nullified by the changes mentioned in the previous paragraph). Enterprises wishing to benefit from the incentives must present a five-year plan. All S&TA are covered by the Law – from R&D to absorption of imported technology and the income tax reduction is the most sought after incentive.
However, at the end of 1997 in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, the Government introduced a new fiscal package in which the incentives for S&T of Law 8661 were cut by half and merged with other incentives which are more important to enterprises (providing food to employees). For all practical purposes, such S&T incentives have lost significance. It is worth mentioning that the Informatics fiscal incentives accounted for 2.8% of the total fiscal incentives given by the Federal Government (0.05% of the GDP) and the incentives of Law 8661 for 0.9% of the total incentives (0.02% of GDP) (MCT/FINEP 1998) – i.e. their extinction has little bearing on the fiscal equilibrium of the country.
Similarly to budget outlays, the volume of resources involved in fiscal incentives to S&T in the two countries is substantially different: while in Argentina the incentives were limited to US$ 20 millions, in Brazil the amount estimated for the general S&T fiscal incentives (Law 8661) for the 1998 budget (before the cuts) was US$ 142 millions (MCT/FINEP 1998).
A possible explanation for such divergent fiscal trajectories may be found in the political economy of budgeting. A Ministry (or Secretary, as in Argentina) of Science and Technology represents a specific and small constituency (the academic community) and a wider but diffuse group (enterprises interested in performing S&TAs). The former may be vocal but holds little power, few connections in Congress and often faces considerable prejudice against it within the Government bureaucracy, which sees it as idlers. The latter is limited, as shown above, and often has more pressing claims to pose to the financial and economic authorities (e.g. other taxes, credit conditions, protection against imports).
Given this background a Ministry/Secretary of S&T is poorly protected against the financial Ministries when the latter go on a rampage, cutting expenditures where they can. Under such conditions, the political connections of the Minister/Secretary play a very important role in protecting its fiscal instruments. In fact, the great spurt of S&T expenditures in Brazil during the period 1985/88 is largely the result of the Ministry being held by important politicians belonging to main faction of the dominant party. During the nineties the Minister was always a scientist. This may have gratified the scientific community but has certainly hindered the fiscal fight since the Minister had no political connections and was, in practice, expendable.
As a complement to such conjectures, SECYT seems to have done a much better job in explaining to society the importance of its actions, by publishing two well-cared rolling Plans for S&T 1998-2000 and 1999-2001 (GACTEC 1997, 1998), in which the difficulties of reaching the target of investing 1% of the GDP in S&T are carefully stated. In Brazil no such document can be found. Its most approximate counterpart, the Indicators of Science and Technology 1990/96 may, in fact be counterproductive, since it presents, by virtue of many imputations, a rather rosy picture of Brazilian S&TA, synthesised by the evolution of the share of GDP spent on S&T, which grows from 0.84% in 1992 to 1.22 % in 1996, with private enterprise funds rising 234% in the same period. In the foreword to the statistics it was confidently stated that the target of 1.5% of GDP for S&T would be achieved by 1999 (MCT 1997). It is a familiar dilemma for sector office holders facing the jaws of the financial ministries: one has to show that one’s job is being well done, but at the same time, no sign can be given that success is so great that it renders unnecessary increases in the resources available, or worse, that cuts can be made. Although both SECYT and MCT provide optimistic data on the evolution of S&TA in their countries, MCT seems to have overdone its Argentinean counterpart, at the cost of drastically reducing its credibility.
So far we have dealt with the fiscal issues at the Federal Government level, but a brief mention is necessary to mention the fiscal crisis at the level of the provinces/states. In Argentina GACTEC (1998) makes it clear that “the fundamental deficit as regards the Public Sector lies in scarce resources the provinces and the City of Buenos Aires allocate to this fundamental activity for the social and economic development” (p.39) – the provinces share of the public sector S&T expenditures was 5.3% in the period 1996/98. In Brazil, in the wake of the Constitution reform of 1988, most of the States passed legislation earmarking a percentage of fiscal earnings to S&T (varying from 1 to 3%) and set up institutions to manage such resources, patterned upon the very successful example of the Foundation for Research Support of the State of São Paulo (FAPESP), established in 1962. With the cold wind of fiscal problems blowing all those buds have withered – to give an example, in 1998 the Foundation of the State of Rio de Janeiro received only a tenth of what was due to it according to the law. In some States, such as Maranhão, the Foundation was simply extinguished. Only FAPESP thrives – in good measure because the law establishes that its share of the fiscal earnings goes directly to its coffers, without passing through the hands of the Finance Secretary of the State27. Its budget in 1996 was US$ 136 millions, to which should be added US$ 580 million from the State of São Paulo budget, making the State a considerable force in the development of Brazilian S&TA.
It is worth mentioning that when regional interests can be marshalled in favour of S&T expenditures some important results can be achieved. The creation of the oil R&D fund by ANP previously mentioned was due to the mobilisation of several political forces from the State of Rio de Janeiro, which accounts for 70% of oil production and where Petrobras has more R&D linkages. Additional political support was acquired by stipulating that 40% of the resources of the fund had to go the North and NE regions.
Notwithstanding the progress made by SECYT in Argentina the question remains whether setting up a system which produces science is at all relevant for the reform growth strategy. In some fields where local specificities are strong and knowledge cannot be imported, such as natural resources and tropical diseases28, such efforts are clearly necessary, but the pattern of technological development previously described suggests that “science” tends to be relegated to the highest and most unnecessary levels of the superstructure – a luxury which the market does not produce neither requires.
Again, this is not new. The insulation of scientific activities from the productive structure was a feature of the import-substitution model frequently pointed out and deprecated in both countries. The setting up of the system of research and graduate education was based on the expectation of policy-makers of the seventies that local industry would eventually need it. Present macroeconomic policy-makers do not seem to hold a similar expectation (or wishful thinking).
To conclude, I wish to share a nagging doubt: to what extent the supply of graduate students emerging from the education system is really needed by the productive sector (except for the well-paid MBAs which work strenuously in the financial sector)? Or is the graduate education level a new device for, at the same time, to retard the entry in the job market of a large contingent of the elite’s youth and to establish a new filter for access to the better-paid jobs?
3.(sic) STPs : Objectives, Instruments, Results
The broad objectives of the STP in the two countries are the same: to increase national scientific and technological capabilities, to contribute to ecologically sustainable development and to promote social and economic development, including reducing regional differences. The main novelty, as compared with the past, is the commitment to improve environmental conditions, to which several specific programmes are allotted29. As we shall see below the similarities go deeper.
As argued in the preceding section, the institutional reforms play a very important role in determining the rationale of the actors the S&TP is trying to influence. Moreover there are many S&TA performed directly by institutions which belong to other Ministries than the MOST or performed by private actors which are influenced by the other Ministries (e.g. Agriculture, Education).Therefore we begin by examining the mechanisms of co-ordination between the S&TP and the other policies.
In the two countries the highest echelon of S&TP is composed by a Council (GACTEC in Argentina and CCT in Brazil). In Argentina the Council is chaired by the Head of the Ministers Cabinet and in Brazil by no less than the President of the Republic. The Finance Minister as well as most sector Ministers (Education, Health, Defence, Foreign Affairs, Environment) have a seat in the Council. Given the distinct organisation of the State in Argentina, where the number of full-fledged Ministers is much lower than in Brazil, there are less Government representatives in GACTEC. In Brazil distinguished members of the civil society hold a seat in the Council by virtue of their scientific and technological knowledge.30
The high level of authorities present in the Council should, in theory, ensure that policy co-ordination and implementation should follow. Alas, it does not work. Simply to co-ordinate the agendas of many Ministers is an unyielding task, moreover if the subject is not regarded by the Chairman as top priority. To solve this governance problem a second layer was introduced in Argentina (an Executive Committee) where Government officers are of the level of under-secretary for specific affairs (industry, agriculture, etc), with the conspicuous absence of budget authorities. In Brazil, where the plenum of CCT has met only twice since 1994, for a session once every beginning of Presidential term, the Council was broken down into three committees. However, such committees have very broad (and vague) mandates.
In other words, in both countries there is no operative mechanism for co-ordination of S&TP with macroeconomic and sector polices. Moreover, no matter how important the contribution of representatives of civil society is for increasing policy content and legitimacy, their presence tends to worsen governance because they tend to inhibit frank discussions of problems between Government officers. The Argentinean solution to this dilemma – members of the civil society are play an advisory role to GACTEC but are not fully fledged members of the Council – is better than the Brazilian way.
Assuming that plenary sessions of the Council will be few and formal, governance of the system may be improved by establishing “functional” committees, which would bring together ministries to discuss specific issues in which all hold a stake, such as budgeting, environment control, etc. In Argentina one of such committees was created, to co-ordinate the non-university S&T public institutions (GACTEC 1998) but more are needed. In Brazil during the seventies, when STP was placed within the Planning Ministry (which is responsible for preparing the national budget) and there were national plans for S&T, budgeting was the main instrument of co-ordination. The remnants of the system can be observed in the availability of detailed information about Federal institutions spending on S&T, an instrument which seems to be less developed in Argentina.
Since S&TA are “horizontal” activities, in the sense that they are present in many sector Ministries, it could be argued that the ideal location of such function would be within the structure of the Ministry of Economics (or Planning, in Brazil). The political economy of budgeting contradicts this technocratic solution. As argued above the organised interests behind S&TA are politically weak. In contexts where the Ministry of Economics is always under pressure to cut down expenditures of other Ministries, reducing its own budget has a strong political pay-off and limited political costs. A separate Ministry for S&T provides a specific locus of defence of S&TA. Moreover, a full-fledged S&T Minister can always take its case for more resources or against cuts (against the Minister of Economics) to the President of the Republic, the ultimate authority in deciding budget allocations. Quite obviously, the stronger the S&T Minister is politically, strongest will be his/her capability to ensure a good portion of the budget for S&TA. This argument suggests that the Brazilian MCT is better placed, institutionally, than the Argentinean SST.
The morphology of SECYT and MCT share strong similarities: both have attached a Research Council (CONICET and CNPq) which finances science and performs research through institutes; and a financial agency (AGENCIA and FINEP) which directs its funds to technological activities. In Brazil there are also research institutes which are connected to MCT directly. The division of labour between CNPq and FINEP along science/technology lines dates from the nineties. Prior to that FINEP was an important source of funds for scientific institutions. The specialisation of agencies reflects in part the lack of connections of between scientific and technological activities in the two countries.
An organisation such as the Research Councils to fund scientific activities is a feature observed urbi et orbi and there is a consensus that it fulfils a function the market does not do properly. In both countries the funding of graduate education is shared with special organisations of the Ministry of Education. External evaluation of graduate courses has been an important feature of science policy in Brazil since the seventies. Such evaluation includes teaching and research facilities and the research and publication performance of the institutions and has important implications for the funds they receive in the future, as well as their prestige within the academic community. In Argentina the setting up of evaluation procedures started much later, in 1995, reflecting the different evolution of the graduate education system in the two countries.
Although the funds deployed by CNPq are substantially larger than CONICET’s – in 1997 the former spent US$ 593 million and the latter had a budget of US$ 198 millions (MCT/CNPq 1997 and GACTEC 1997) – the difference is smaller than for other STP instruments. Moreover, while CNPq uses most of its budget for graduate scholarships, CONICET is mainly a research-funding agency, using the bulk of its resources to pay personnel.
A financial agency for technological activities is justified in the light of the peculiarities of the credit and capital markets of the two countries. The private financial sector does not offer long term credit or risk-capital. The equity and securities markets are restricted to a few and large firms. This market incompleteness is the result of a long history of high inflation and alternative sources of revenue for the capital-holders. It was the hope of the reformers that financial liberalisation would lead to market-completion. Although liberalisation has opened channels for obtaining funds abroad (mainly for larger firms) it did not lead to the development of long term credit and capital internal markets. In fact, monetary policy has strengthened the short term horizons and risk-avoidance of financial institution by providing a safe and well-paid source of income – public securities. As a consequence there is no private institution offering either long-term credit or risk capital for technology projects. Finally, it is important to stress that the two agencies provide credit on conditions (interest rates, grace and repayment periods, share of project cost covered by credit) that are very generous when compared with the other internal sources but which are more restrictive than those prevailing abroad (especially as regards interest rates, which are about 10% per year) – a further stimulus to perform S&TA elsewhere.
Although they hold similar functions the two S&T financial agencies have substantially different resources available to perform their roles: for 1997 the AGENCIA had a budget of US$ 53 millions (GACTEC 1997), while in the same year FINEP disbursed US$ 479 millions – nine times more.
In both countries international financial agencies have been important actors of STP, with the same differences in timing observed in other aspects of the policy, but in Argentina such role is much more important, especially for the operation of the AGENCIA and, hence, for the technological component of STP.
In Argentina in 1993 IDB provided a loan for US$ 95 millions, which is still being utilised, while a new loan of US$ 140 millions is being negotiated. In Brazil IDB was an important source of funds for FINEP in the early nineties but the most influential organisation is the World Bank. IBRD is presently at the third consecutive sector loan for S&T (PADCT) (US$ 94 millions). In both countries such loans are important not only because they provide additional funds to the system but also because the commit the Government to allocate the counterpart resources to the same purpose, safeguarding ( to some extent) such resources from budget cuts.
At the same time, such loans are not neutral in terms of resource allocation. IDB’s funds of the current loan are being used mainly for financing projects of technological modernisation or for strengthening institutions which supply technological services, especially to small and medium enterprises. For the next loan it is planned that IDB shall fund the AGENCIA’s technological programmes, CONICET’s programme of human resources development for R&D activities and the build-up of the STP institutions (SECYT, AGENCIA and provincial institutions). In Brazil IBRD resources were at first (mid-eighties) surrounded by controversy, since many resented the interference of the Bank in the definition of priorities31 and feared the Government would divert funds from other ends to comply with the counterpart requirements. Notwithstanding the soundness of such qualifications, the shortage of funds soon assuaged them and PADCT became a welcome source. The present loan (US$ 94 millions, carrying a Government counterpart of US$ 216 millions and an estimated US$ 50 millions from private sources) signed up in 1998, focuses on technological development and emphasises the establishment of partnerships between academic institutions and enterprises.
The role of the National Bank for Economic and Social Bank (BNDES) in Brazil deserves some comments. The Bank was the cradle of Brazilian STP: it started the involvement of economic authorities in the area by setting up a special fund for S&T in the mid-sixties32 and was the originator of the informatics policy. However, after the Planning Ministry established a larger fund for S&T and put a different agency in charge of managing it (FINEP) (in the early seventies) the Bank disengaged itself from STP. Although FINEP was subordinated to the same Ministry as the Bank (the Planning Ministry) until the creation of MCT in 1985 and was directed by Bank officers for the first seven years and notwithstanding the considerable scope for co-operation which exists between the two agencies, the Bank has pursued its own technology policies independently of FINEP and MCT. Its two main instruments in this area are loans for technological development and the provision of risk capital through one of its subsidiaries (BNDESPAR), analysed below.
Technological development, per se, does not rate high on the Bank’s lending priorities. In fact, during the last two years (1997/98), when Bank’s disbursements reached record levels (US$ 33 billions over the two years), loans for technological development (covering the full range of S&TA) accounted for 1.8% of such outlays. Although their absolute value (US$ 595 millions in the two years) is significant33– they are heavily concentrated in a few large enterprises. In fact, the main borrower accounts for 57% of the value lent. Such loans, provided by the Bank directly, are normally part of a wider investment “package” which includes production facilities too. The Bank may also lend through its private financial agents, but in such operations the risk of the operation lies with the agent. In 1997 and 1998 this type of indirect operation disbursed about US$ 13 million, of which about half went to small and medium enterprises34.
The disengagement of BNDES from STP has important implications because the Bank is the main development agency of the country and the sole which retains a sector focus in its operations. Moreover, its operations have a strong complementarity with those performed by FINEP. Some of the State reform proposals that were floated recently suggested that FINEP should be merged with the Bank. Given the latter’s “culture”, this would not help local S&TA.
Another Federal development bank which has a regional mandate (the Northeast Bank -BNB) has a special fund for S&T (FUNDECI). In 1995 FUNDECI was revived after a long period of inactivity. Since that year it is operating through yearly bids and it has supported 340 projects out of a demand of 1633 projects. The demand has been rather stable over the period 1995/1999, both in terms of number of projects (circa 400) and in terms of value (around US$ 20 million) per yearly bid. In the last bid (1998) 89 projects were approved accounting for loans of US$ 3.2 million, directed mainly to agriculture and agri-business projects of small and medium enterprises – conforming thus with the productive structure of the region. Although the operations of FUNDECI were supposed to be funded jointly by BNB and FINEP, the latter has not contributed to the Fund since 1997 (BNB,1999).
Other development banks, belonging to the States, were used by FINEP as agents for its operations but the operations of such banks were recently curtailed in the wake of the reforms.
In Argentina there is no institution analogous to BNDES – a major limitation to any prospects for a STP integrated with industrial policy. The AGENCIA operates through the Banco de la Nación and has just signed agreements with two other public banks for co-financing projects of technological modernisation.
Following the priority attached to small and medium enterprises, the AGENCIA has signed a co-operation agreement with the Secretary of Small and Medium Enterprises of the Presidency of the Republic. Similarly, FINEP has an agreement with a non-profit organisation which supports SME in Brazil (SEBRAE), which covers two types of programmes, presented in more detail below.
In short, the institutional set-up of STP at the Federal government level in the two countries is roughly similar. The policy instruments used by such institutions are also similar: the Research Councils provide grants for research and graduate education, the financial agencies provide credit and risk capital and manage the fiscal incentives. However the volume of resources managed by the Brazilian institutions is of a different scale of magnitude than the Argentinean, especially as regards the technological component of STP (see Table 5). Given the scale of S&TA of the private sector, this “critical mass” of the STP instruments is probably significant.
A major difference in the institutional structure lies at the provinces level, since in Argentina there is no organisation comparable to FAPESP (the State of São Paulo Foundation for Research Support) and probably no Argentinean province spends on S&T as much as the State of São Paulo does (0.3% of the State GDP).
As mentioned above, STP is supposed to act in a “horizontal” way, i.e. making no distinction between recipients of incentives in order to avoid the well-known State failures. As a consequence, STP policies would act as “counters” to which recipients would direct their demands, prompted by market forces unleashed by the reforms. Since the social actors which are the targets of STP have different demands and the market forces do not encourage a high level of local S&TA, STP policy-makers have to search for focusing devices which will direct the demand to their instruments. In fact, precluded by the general view of policy-making to use a productive structure approach and, at the same time, striving to surmount the passiveness inherent to horizontal policies, STP policy-makers have devised an alternative set of foci for their instruments.
A well-known feature of all systems of innovation is the difference between enterprises and academic institutions as regards objectives, reward and penalty criteria, timing, etc. However, while in the countries where such systems are geared to innovation there are wide and strong channels of communication between the two types of actors, in countries such as Argentina and Brazil where technological activities consist mainly of adaptations of imports the linkages between enterprises and research institutions are sporadic and weak. In such countries a “national system of innovation” is more of a desire than an accurate description of what exists. Since the seventies STP policy-makers in the two countries have strived to establish such linkages and continue to do so.
This focus of action is found in several STP mechanisms. In Argentina it is present in the Programme of Technological Advisers for SME (see below), in the financing of projects of R&D (PID) in which there must be an enterprise which “adopts” the project and contributes to its funding and in a projected new programme which aims at allowing professionals from public scientific institutions to work in enterprises, with the AGENCIA taking care of the wages of the professional (100% during the first year and then gradually decreasing)35. In Brazil the same focus is found in the fiscal incentives, where contracted out S&TA are mandatory in the informatics incentives and accepted in the general incentives, as well as in some credit lines of FINEP. MCT has a programme (Omega) which provides a grant component for co-operative research projects led by an academic institution with the participation of at least two enterprises36. In the State of São Paulo, since 1995 FAPESP expanded its activities beyond its traditional role of research support and launched a partnership programme between enterprises and research institutes in which it covers all the latter’s expenditures37.
Incubators located at universities and research centres are another type of linkage mechanism, focused on new-born enterprises. In Brazil, establishing incubators begun in the late eighties and there are now 74 incubators spread throughout the country, which are organised under a national association and are supported by several policy instruments, such as CNPq, SEBRAE38 and local authorities. It is estimated that expenditures on incubators total about U$ 80 millions per year and that almost 3000 enterprises have “graduated” from the incubators. In Argentina, the development of incubators has been slower and, at the present time, there are 8 incubators. SECYT and the AGENCIA plan to foster their development and an association of incubators, similar to the Brazilian one, was established.
At the same time they try to establish a national system of innovation by providing linkages between the two separate parts, STP policy-makers have to face the heterogeneity of their constituency and have different mechanisms (institutions and instruments) to support scientific and technological activities. However, within the two broad categories of activities the heterogeneity persists and STP have used different focusing devices.
For scientific activities there are three main devices which act in a complementary way. The first is to focus on specific (albeit wide) problem-areas, such environment, space, health, biotechnology. The second is to open bids for projects in these areas. The third is to use peer-judgement to select the projects. In Brazil the focusing by bids was introduced by PADCT and it co-exists with the more traditional “counter” of CNPq, to which any researcher accredited by the Council may present projects, which are then evaluated by ad-hoc consultants. More recently CNPq has closed the accreditation process and introduced a programme for “centres of academic excellency”, aiming at concentrating resources in a selected number of institutions39. In Argentina the bidding procedure is a standard feature of the new policy, but, contrary to Brazil, it is enlarging its basis of researchers by providing salary stimuli to university research and hiring researchers for CONICET. GACTEC (1998) suggests that in 1999 75% of the funds for projects of scientific and technological research (PICT) should be directed to specific sectors, areas and regions, retaining 25% of the total for “curiosity driven research” (the counter).
For technological activities the foci of the two countries are different. In Argentina there is a strong focus on SME, as shown by the priority given to this type of enterprise in the regulation of the loans and fiscal credits given under the Law 23877, by the credit and risk-capital instruments operated by the AGENCIA and by the Programme of Technological Advisers Within this Programme, managed by the AGENCIA, projects are presented by “linkage agents”, which may either profit or non-profit organisations. Although the agents cannot be state agencies, they may be connected to public bodies. SECYT must approve the agent to enable it to participate in the Programme. Projects submitted to the programme may cover the full range of technological activities and involve a grant component of up to 50% of the total project cost, restricted to US$ 110000 per project. The grant component is justified on the light of information market failures (GACTEC 1997 p.40).
In Brazil, MCT has a programme (Alpha) for financing technical feasibility studies for SME but its resources are very limited. FINEP has two special programmes for SME, in collaboration with SEBRAE. Under the first programme (PATME), FINEP provides non-reimbursable funds to cover up to 70% of the cost of technical assistance provided by research institutes, technical schools, etc. to SME. The value of the grant is contingent upon the technical complexity of the project. This programme is operated directly by SEBRAE’s regional offices. In 1998 4855 enterprises benefited from it, leading to a disbursement of about US$ 6.7 million40. The second programme (AMPEG) provides reimbursable loans to SME but, differently from loans to large enterprises, if a SME is not able to provide real collateral to the loan (a situation frequently found), it may use a collateral fund established by SEBRAE for this purpose (a device which the Argentineans policy-makers could adopt too). In 1998 AMPEG performed 173 operations with a total value of US$ 19.6 million (Guimarães 1998) but it stopped operating this year, pending a change of focus (see below). As mentioned above SME may also use the resources of BNDES and BNB.
At the State level, FAPESP initiated in 1997 a new programme (PIPE), complementary to the partnership programme above mentioned, especially directed to small enterprises (less than 100 employees). Under the new programme, FAPESP may cover all costs of technical feasibility studies (up to R$ 50 thousand) and then the cost of developing new products (up to R$ 200 thousand). Up to mid-1999 102 projects had been approved for a total value of US$ 7 million (Guimarães 1998), accounting for a marginal share of the Foundation’s resources.
Notwithstanding such programmes directed to SME, the focus of the Brazilian technology policy lies on large enterprises. Loans by BNDES tend to be given to medium and large enterprises and risk-capital provision by BNDESPAR has taken in medium-sized enterprises only (see below).Even for FINEP, SME operations accounted for only 7.4% of the total value of disbursements in 1998 (MCT, 1999) and the agency is now considering a shift of AMPEG towards SME which act mainly as either suppliers or customers of large enterprises. This shift is consistent with the recent devaluation of the Real, which has led many large enterprises to consider increasing local purchases, but its success is contingent upon the co-operation of the large enterprises. Moreover, there is a consensus that the general fiscal incentives of Law 8661, which are strongly dependent on income tax, tend to favour large enterprises. The informatics incentives, based on value added tax, have a stronger bearing on SME ( MCT/FINEP 1998).
This different focusing on enterprise size is consistent with the findings about the intensity of technological efforts by size of firms in the two countries reported in the previous section (see GACTEC 1998 and Quadros et. 1999). However, such consistency cannot be attributed to the studies, since the policies predate the latter. It may be conjectured that policy-makers had a “feeling” for what went on in the two countries but some muddling through was also present, at least in Brazil. To take an example from fiscal incentives: when such incentives were designed in 1988, the representatives from MCT and INPI were aware of the bias towards large enterprises but they had to accept the type of fiscal incentive the Finance Ministry was willing to give, hoping that in the future such bias could be corrected. Moreover, Federal financial agencies such as FINEP and BNDES are constrained by regulations of the Accounts Court (the institution of the Judiciary power which oversees the operations of the Executive institutions) to operate without real assets collateral – a regulation which limits their concession of loans and risk-capital to SME.
Another important difference in foci between the two STP regards regional issues. In Argentina the Federal Government is mandated by Law 23877 to reserve 75% of the incentives created by that Law for the provinces and the city of Buenos Aires. Moreover, in 1999 25% of the resources for funding projects of scientific and technological research (PICT) should be directed to provincial problems. In Brazil the Federal Government has traditionally supported programmes designed for special ecological systems (e.g. Humid Tropics) but has tended to leave specific States’ issues to the latter’s Foundations. The latter, with the exception of the State of São Paulo, are barely surviving in the present fiscal crisis41. More recently, following the strategy of concentration of resources, the Minister of S&T floated the idea that research support should be concentrated in the Southeast region, since universities from that region respond for the bulk of the country’s scientific production. The ensuing political uproar led the Minister to withdraw his proposal, but it is significant that it was made. As mentioned above, 40% of the oil fund for R&D is supposed to go to the less developed regions but this seems to be more the result of Parliamentary bargaining than an Executive policy decision.
A combination of the two foci previously mentioned – SME and regional – could have led the Argentinean authorities to a sector focus, since sector-specific SME tend to conglomerate in regional poles. This would help the authorities to overcome some of the classic problems of SME policies – the low level of scale and scope economies and the high transaction costs in the use of policy instruments42. In countries with a large territory such as Argentina the efficacy of policies for SME is contingent upon the fulfilment of at least one of the three following conditions: (i) a focus on specific chains of production; (ii) a focus on regional poles; (iii) capillary policy mechanisms, covering most of the territory. The first two conditions enable policy-makers to concentrate resources on specific technological problems, leading to economies of scale and time. Moreover, both types of foci tend to produce “contagion” effects either through vertical (user/supplier) or horizontal (competitive) relationships, which tend to produce externalities and economies of scope in the course of policy implementation. In the absence of such foci the policy requires the use of instruments with a wide regional coverage. If such institutions exist, the cost of preparing them to deal with (different) technological projects is enormous. At best, they tend to deal with the simplest problems only.
The Brazilian experience is illustrative of the latter problems: FINAME, the subsidiary of BNDES in charge of financing the purchase of individual pieces of equipment has successfully established a network of agents throughout the country using the commercial banks. Its operations are simple and any branch manager can do them. FINEP was never able to use the commercial banks as agents and managed to reach SME only through the regional offices of SEBRAE, which were established to provide technical assistance to SME. As shown by Furniel (1997) the operations of PATME over the period 1992/95 had a strong sectorial bias according to the State’s industrial specificities – e.g. clothing in the State of Rio de Janeiro, furniture in the State of Rio Grande do Sul.
The Brazilian programme for exporting software (SOFTEX 2000) presents a good example of sector focus with regional decentralisation and progressive State disengagement. The programme was started in 1993, partly as a reaction to the demise of the Informatics Policy, and it aims at sponsoring software exports, combining several instruments (development of entrepreneurial capabilities in incubators and by training, financing by CNPq and FINEP, fiscal incentives of local authorities). Two features deserve to be stressed: first, the Programme was organised by regional poles; second: CNPq, which started the Programme, was replaced in 1996 by a non-profit organisation which co-ordinates the regional nuclei. Although Brazilian software producers face enormous structural disadvantages (e.g. language, poor telecomm, scale of enterprises, etc.) and their main market is still local, the Programme has produced important results in terms of strengthening technical and entrepreneurial capabilities and, more moderately, increasing exports, which amounted to US$ 56 million in 1998. The Programme has a sales office in Buenos Aires.
The fact that the Argentinean authorities did not follow the natural trajectory of combining the foci on SME and regions to operate by sectors/poles is indicative of the extent to which goes their adherence to the concept of strictly horizontal policies.
As regards specific sector policies, MCT has recently made some forays in this area by establishing ten agreements with enterprise associations to promote technological development. However, such agreements lack any specific instrument, being part of the consciousness-raising efforts to which MCT dedicated a lot of energy in the last years (Vermulm 1999). Moreover, the range of institutions with which agreements were established, which goes from the Union of Industries producing milk and derivatives in a city of Minas Gerais to the National Association of Chemicals Producers, shows a complete lack of structural perspective.
Finally, we may divide the STP policy instruments by their focus on the determinants of decisions of enterprises. Here a lies a critical distinction between the scientific and technological components of STP. Scientific institutions have no alternatives to the STP instruments but enterprises do. The bulk of STP directed to enterprises (credit and fiscal incentives) leads to a reduction of costs of S&TA. No matter how generous such incentives are they do not reduce the uncertainty of doing R&D locally – the main deterrent of R&D investments all over the world. All other incentives which increase such uncertainty, ranging from macroeconomic uncertainty to import incentives, continue to operate. In other words, the cost-reducing STP instruments are weak in comparison with the uncertainty-increasing results of macroeconomic and trade policies.
To overcome such uncertainty STP counts with venture-capital instruments. As mentioned above BNDESPAR has a special window for investing in technology-intensive enterprises (CONTEC). Under present regulations, to benefit from CONTEC resources an enterprise must not earn more than R$ 15 millions (circa US$ 8 million) yearly. CONTEC contributes with a maximum of R$ 2 millions or 40% of the capital, through convertible debentures or equity. Analysis procedures are lengthy and the minimum profitability required is high (presently 18% per year in nominal terms). The programme is operated as a counter – interested enterprises go to BNDESPAR. The record is not brilliant: in 12 years (from 1988 to 1999) 32 operations were completed, with total disbursement of US$ 40 millions, of which half went to firms belonging to the electronics complex. Most of the enterprises were medium-sized and already operating, which reduced the risk of the operation. Given this record, in 1999 BNDESPAR introduced two innovations in the programme: first a “simplified” CONTEC, directed to smaller enterprises (earnings below R$ 7 millions), with a ceiling of R$ 1 million from the agency. Under such programme the appraisal is simpler, no real assets are required as collateral and minimum profitability is slightly lower (16%).Second, BNDESPAR is trying to reach smaller enterprises by acquiring shares of Mutual Investment Funds specialising in technology-intensive firms. Such funds are managed by private enterprises and should limit their investment to R$ 1 million by technology enterprise or 40% the latter’s capital. This second line has already performed its first operation (R$ 3 millions for a fund in the State of Rio Grande do Sul)43.
In Argentina the AGENCIA has a credit line (PIT) with a risk component (reimbursal is contingent upon the success of the project) which operates with IDB funds. In the first bidding round for projects, 22 were approved (4 for SME) leading to investments of US$ 13 million, of which two-thirds were covered by the AGENCIA. Similarly to CONTEC in Brazil, PIT operates as a counter.
Such risk-capital programmes, although meritorious, have a punctual nature. They may be very useful to the few enterprises which have access to them but their regional coverage, their passiveness and (at least for CONTEC – we have no information about PIT) their operational criteria limit considerably their strength to act an antidote against the uncertainty deriving from other policies.
Let us consider the cost-reducing STP instruments. Differently from the AGENCIA, which is a new institution, FINEP (as a development bank for S&T44) dates from 1971. In the past FINEP suffered deeply from the instability of budget funds, which led to a loss of credibility in its entrepreneurial constituency. Although its funding has become more stabilised, the credibility takes longer to recover – a point the authorities in charge of the AGENCIA will appreciate. During the nineties FINEP increased its market-oriented operations – reimbursable credits accounted for 90% of its disbursements in 1998 (MCT 1999) and diversified its operations considerably. At the beginning of 1999 it had 14 programmes offering loans for a very wide range of projects – from education to participation in technical fairs, but operations tended to concentrate on projects for experimental development and for managerial and technical reorganisation. The proliferation of programmes probably reflects the search of identity by FINEP after the demise of the old STP. In practice it means only that new counters have been opened, but very few customers come to them. The new administrators of FINEP, which took over this year, have not stated their policies yet.
Similarly to FINEP the AGENCIA operates as a counter but has a clearer focus – SME, as mentioned above. The AGENCIA is highly dependent on IDB funds, which is understandable on the light of fiscal restrictions in Argentina but nonetheless risky. If it is to continue expanding its operations it must find alternative sources of funding.
The cost-reducing programmes (credit and fiscal incentives) in both countries have in common the sharing of costs with private enterprises45. This fulfils a double role: it leads to greater commitment by the enterprise, raising the quality of projects submitted to incentives and it leverages the Government expenditures. As regards the credit mechanisms, the share of the total cost of the project which is covered by the enterprise varies from programme to programme but in both countries the maximum share covered by public loans (80% of the total cost of the project) tended to be the same in 1998. The high share46 of public sector participation, enhanced by the lower cost of technology credit as compared with commercial credit47, indicates that STP policy-makers believe (correctly) that local enterprises need strong incentives to perform S&TA in the country. Looking at the actual Argentinean aggregate figures for the two main lines of credit for technology (projects for technological modernisation and for technological services) the share of public funding has increased from 1997 to 1998: in the first line from 37% to 56% and in the second from 45% to 76% (see GACTEC 1998 p.49). This may due to the greater financial restrictions SME face but it may also indicate that riskier projects are being submitted, requiring greater public participation – an issue that deserves further study.
As regards fiscal incentives, the evidence available suggests that leveraging is higher in Brazil, possibly because enterprises using the incentives are larger than in Argentina: in the former by September 1999 ten enterprises (all of which but one had more than 1000 employees) accounted for two-thirds of total investments and fiscal incentives under Law 8661/93 for the period 1994/99 (www.mct.gov.br), while in Argentina 82% of the enterprises which benefited from fiscal incentives of the Law 23.877/97 in 1998 were SME. In Brazil 109 projects with fiscal incentives had been approved from 1994 to 1999 with planned expenditures by the enterprises of R$3829 millions and fiscal incentives of R$1074 millions – i.e. a ratio of expenditures/incentive of 3.56 (ibid.)48. In Argentina49 94 projects were approved during the first round of bidding in 1998, with circa US$ 40 millions supported by enterprises and US$ 18 millions by fiscal credit – a ratio of 2.2.
Examining the universe of the ten firms which hold the largest technology programmes receiving fiscal incentives confirms the observations made in the previous section about investors in S&TA in Brazil (recalling that the range of S&TA subject to incentives is wide): three State enterprises; two privatised State enterprises, both with a long trajectory of investing in S&T; four subsidiaries of TNC, of which three are producers of durable consumer goods and, finally, a co-operative of sugar-cane producers.
ANPEI (1998) argues that industrial enterprises in the State of São Paulo ignore the existence of the S&T fiscal incentives – out of 568 enterprises interviewed in 1998, only 23% knew the incentives existed. More seriously, of those who knew, only 10% had used them. The usefulness of the incentives for users of the fiscal incentives was assessed by MCT/FINEP (1998) in 1997, based on a small sample of firms50. It shows that the firms benefiting from the incentives increased their technology expenditures/earnings ratio moderately over the period 1994/96, from 0.89% to 0.93%, ratios which are similar to the sample observed by Sbragia et al. (1999) previously discussed and which are consistent with the relatively low pattern of technology expenditures that prevails in Brazilian industry. Nonetheless, the interviews suggest that the fiscal incentives led to an increase in expenditures for about half of the enterprises. In most cases the additional expenditures were directed to quality control and product and process improvements – the general pattern of technological development. The main difference as regards the latter seems to lie in the stimuli the incentives have given to enterprises to contract out S&TA to universities and research institutes and to establish partnerships with suppliers.
To sum it up. From the point of view of integration with macroeconomic policies (and the limited industrial policy which exists in Brazil) STP in both countries is ill-equipped. Its resources are insignificant in the context of overall Federal expenditures and therefore there is room for increasing them, but this seems to depend much on the political savoir faire of the Minister/Secretary – which raises the question of how to attract people with enough political resources to a post with relatively little prestige. Powerful politicians committed to S&T are a rare breed. In the two countries the national system of innovation is rather two systems with limited connections between them. STP has simultaneously fostered the development of the two systems and tried to establish bridges between them.
For the scientific system, STP is a sine qua non condition. In this respect the two countries present different trajectories: while in Argentina there is a clear movement of expansion, in Brazil all signs point to retrenchment. It would not be so serious if Brazilian science were a mature, well-established system, but given the actual conditions the present policy may seriously jeopardise future development. There is no evidence that the gulf which traditionally separated the scientific community from entrepreneurs is being bridged – quite the contrary, it seems to be widening.
As regards the technology system, in both countries the limited resources available and the passiveness of the instruments induced by policy “horizontalism” limit their impact to a scatter of enterprises which has no critical mass and not enough linkages within the productive structure and with the scientific and technological institutions so as to produce a significant impact. Given the much more limited resources and the SME focus this applies more strongly to Argentina. More specifically, looking at the core of the technology system, manufacturing industry, STP instruments seem to be market-conforming in two senses. First, they are not instruments of structural transformation: they lack sector focus and operate passively, as counters to which some enterprises go. Second, even for the enterprises which use them, they do not seem to lead to more complex activities than those performed by enterprises which use other resources. This is not to be understood as stating that they are useless: the evidence available suggests that they are praised by the enterprises which use them and that they leverage resources from the enterprises. The same applies to the bridging mechanisms.
4. MERCOSUL and STP
There is a long history of scientific co-operation between Argentina and Brazil which predates MERCOSUL and continues to unfold independently of the regional integration. Before Brazil established the system of graduate education and research and the military regime in Argentina practically destroyed its scientific system, science in Argentina was more developed than in Brazil and several Argentinean scientists (e.g. Juan Jose Giambiaggi) contributed to the development of scientific institutions in Brazil (Candotti 1999). Co-operation continues, both in hard sciences (e.g. in the cosmic rays observatory in Argentina and in the laboratory of syncrotron light in Brazil) and in social sciences.
Government-sponsored co-operation predates the MERCOSUL too. An agreement for scientific and technological co-operation between the two countries was signed in 1980 and was ratified in 1982. However, such agreement was activated only in 1985, when the two countries were negotiating the bi-lateral trade liberalisation agreements which led to the creation of MERCOSUL in 1990. During such period two major initiatives were taken, following the priorities of the STP of the two countries: the Brazil-Argentina Informatics School (EBAI) and the Brazilian-Argentinean Biotechnology Centre (CBAB).
EBAI lasted from 1985 to 1990, when it was discontinued following the change of policies in the two countries. It trained about 2500 scientists and engineers from Argentina and Brazil and 200 students from other Latin American countries. CBAB was started a year later and was designed as “virtual centre”, focusing on training, scientific co-operation and joint financing of research projects. It survived the policy upheaval of the early nineties (possibly because biotechnology policy was never a symbol of the past as informatics was). Up to 1998 it had trained more than 2000 people and performed about 60 research projects, with significant results in agriculture, human health and animal husbandry. The planned budget of CBAB was US$ 2 millions per country per year but such levels were never met. From its beginning to 1998 Argentina had invested US$ 6 millions and Brazil US$ 6.4 millions. Although GACTEC (1998) states the intention of maintaining its activities the Centre risks falling prey to the Brazilian fiscal strictures: up to the middle of 1999, no resources were made available to it (Candotti 1999)
Co-operation between the two Governments has continued within the institutional framework of MERCOSUL, via RECYT – the Specialised Meeting of Science and Technology. Data bases for the industries of leather and shoes and wood and furniture were made available, as well as systems of information about the environment. At the end of 1998 there was a call for co-operative research projects with the participation of enterprises and academic institutions in the areas of food technology and environment protection.
Bilaterally, SECYT and CAPES in 1998 signed an agreement to finance missions of interchange of scientists and scholarships for graduate students. In 1999 the Brazilian Senate finally approved a protocol of educational integration which, among other objectives, aims at establishing common criteria for the evaluation of graduate courses. Moreover, SECYT has signed an agreement of scientific co-operation with the S&T Secretary of the State of the Rio Grande do Sul (GACTEC 1998).
Some may have expected that a process of regional integration would open more avenues for co-operation in S&TA and STP – in both countries there is plenty of scope for regional specialisation, so as to gather critical mass in some areas, avoid duplications and benefit from scale economies. Nonetheless, it is not surprising that S&T came late to the MERCOSUL agenda and that so little was attempted. The regional agenda was taken up with trade and investment liberalisation, assuming that growth in the two areas would be a consequence of the institutional changes and totally independent of local S&TA. Imports of technology were necessary but they would originate from the more advanced countries51.
In both countries STP still holds essentially a national outlook, but we find in the MERCOSUL and bilateral projects some of the features previously observed: repudiation of the past, emphasis on environment and on supply of technology infrastructure and attempts to establish partnerships between enterprises and research institutions. A major difference lies in a clearer sector focus, albeit for sectors where technological opportunities are limited. The most venturesome project (CBAB) is a reminiscence of the past and is presently under threat, in spite of its positive results.
Nonetheless, MERCOSUL had some indirect effects upon the S&TA performed by local actors, beyond the activities sponsored by Government action.
The regional market has led many transnational companies to reorganise their activities and relocate some of them. In some cases, especially in the all-important automobile industry, this has meant locating in Brazil the more complex productive activities and their related adaptive technological assets. If this is a relevant phenomenon (more study is necessary), then the integration has clearly benefited Brazilian asset availability, now and in the future.
MERCOSUL has also become a subject for research, especially for social scientists. The many economic, social, political, legal and cultural problems involved in the process of integration make “MERCOSUL-studies” a growth area, sometimes blessed by international funds, which make it even more attractive, especially in lean times as the present.
5. Conclusions
To most analyses of complex phenomena such as STP the metaphor of the glass of water, which is half full or half empty depending on the subjectivity of the observer, is applicable. Optimists have scope for rejoicing by observing the resurrection of STP in Argentina, endowed with a new set of instruments, some of which are truly novel in the region, such as the Programme of Technical Advisers and by Congress action, which passed the Law 23877. Or by observing the increase in local S&TA of motor vehicle TNC in Brazil, led by market growth and regional integration. Pessimists will find (I fear) plenty of scope too in the previous sections.
However, the metaphor only holds if pessimists and optimists share the same objective, differing only as regards the assessment of facts and trends52. Expectations are crucial in this respect.
Looking at present conditions from either the perspective of the seventies or as a modern-day evolutionary economist, who holds the faith in the transforming power of science and technology, it is a gloomy situation, not only because S&TA are limited by economic and ideological factors but also because there are no social actors deeply committed to change. The scientific community, probably the most seriously affected by the present conditions (especially in Brazil), would probably be satisfied if the science budget was raised (which is fairly easy to do, if the political will is present). Notwithstanding the social concern of many of its members as individuals, it seems to be self-centred as a community. There is no indication that entrepreneurs are deeply dissatisfied with present conditions, although they would certainly be happy to receive more incentives. The main exceptions are probably the small entrepreneurs of technology-intensive sectors which cannot gain access to the sources of capital or credit. The main State apparatuses, which (in truly Schumpeterian way) in the past created STP in Brazil, have lost interest in the subject, leaving it to a specialised bureaucracy, too weak to propel it much. In Argentina, so far, they were never too interested in STP.
However, if one looks at the present situation with more conservative eyes, with the vision which, up to now, is hegemonic in Argentina and Brazil, it does not present a source of worry. Accepting the present economic and social structure as given or, even better, as satisfactory, there is no strong evidence that much more complex S&TA are necessary. The diffusion of the activities presently performed (mainly improvements in products, processes and methods of organising production) is welcomed, so as to provide the necessary productivity increases and achieving greater international competitiveness, more imports and greater consumer satisfaction. Why commit assets to uncertain endeavours such as R&D investment if the international market provides the necessary results?
But, as any evolutionary economist will be quick to point out, the present does not hold forever and the model of development of the nineties is creaking at the joints. In Washington there is no longer a tight-fit consensus about the development of the under-developed and the Consensus which ruled policy-making South of the Equator has been disowned by its institutional parents – its policies were dubbed “hardly complete and often misleading” by no less than the Senior Vice-President and Chief Economist of the World Bank (Stiglitz 1998, p.1). In Latin America the demand for changes is mounting as shown by the recent political events in Venezuela and the decline of popularity of the Governments in Argentina and Brazil. The outlines of such change remain blurred and it is important to stress that the scope for change is severely constrained by the outcome of the reforms of the decade – history matters and its results are often irreversible. Nonetheless, it is possible that a new model may require more ambitious STP than in the present – for instance to compete internationally in more technology-intensive sectors, or to provide better health care to the less-privileged strata of the population. If this is the case, following the same analytical path pursued above, the new environment may redeem the change of productive structure from oblivion and, coupling it to institutional change, demand more complex S&TA and stronger STP.
Under such hypothetical circumstances, it is possible that, in the future, analysts will see the rebirth of SECYT as a portent of the new times and will rejoice in the fact that the STP institutional structure in Brazil resisted the changes.
TABLE 3 – Argentina: Innovation Efforts by Enterprises and Type of Activity- 1992 and 1996 – In millions of current pesos and %
Sources: GACTEC (1998), p.129 and INDEC (1998) pp. 69 and 88, elaborated by the author.
Notes:
(1) Data for 534 firms which stated spending on innovation in 1996
(2) In “National extramuros” are included expenditures for licenses and agreements with non-profit and public S&T institutions.
TABLE 4 – Brazil: Innovation Efforts by Enterprises(1) and Type of Activity-Average Expenditures by Enterprise – 1993/ 1997 – In thousands of US$ and %
Source: Sbragia et al. (1999).
Notes:
(1) Data for 86 enterprises which have responded to ANPEI throughout the period.
(2) Non-routine engineering
TABLE 5 – Main STP Instruments in Argentina and Brazil – Financial Resouces – 1997 – In US$ Millions.
Notes
1) For Argentina other public institutions not included ((US$ 146 millions). For Brazil, Federal Government expenditures for S&T
2) For Brazil State of São Paulo only, in 1996.
3) For Argentina budget value, for Brazil actual expenditures
4) For Argentina budget of AGENCIA, for Brazil total disbursements of FINEP. Loans and venture capital of BNDES not included.
5) For Brazil estimate based on 1998 values.
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Chudnovsky, D.; Niosi, J. and Bercovich, N. (1999) National sytems of innovation, learning and technology policy - a comparison of Canada and Argentina, Seminário "Políticas para fortalecer el Sistema Nacional de Innovación: la experiencia internacional y el camino emprendido por la Argentina", Buenos Aires, mimeo.
Coutinho, L. and Ferraz, J. (1994) Estudo da Competitividade da Indústria Brasileira, Editora da UNICAMP, Campinas
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___________ (1999) O sistema de inovações em uma economia monetária: uma agenda de pesquisas, in J. E. Cassiolato and H. Lastres (eds.) Globalização & Inovação Localizada - Experiências de Sistemas Locals no Mercosul , IBICT/MCT, Brasília.
Erber, F. and Amaral, L. (1995) Os centros de pesquisa das empresas estatais: um estudo de três casos, in S. Swartzman (ed.) Ciencia e Tecnologia no Brasil: Política Industrial, Mercado de Trabalho e Instituições de Apoio, Fundação Getúlio Vargas Editora, Rio de Janeiro.
Erber, F. and Vermulm, R. (1993) Ajuste Estrutural e Estratégias Empresariais, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, Brasília.
Furniel, C. (1997) Financiamento da Inovação Tecnológica nas Pequenas e Médias Empresas: o caso do PATME, Monografia de Bacharelado, Instituto de Economia, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro.
GACTEC (Gabinete Científico-Tecnológico) (1997) Plan Nacional Plurianual de Ciencia y Tecnología 1998-2000, Presidência de la Nación, Buenos Aires.
__________ (1998) Plan Nacional Plurianual de Ciencia y Tecnología 1999-2001, Presidência de la Nación, Buenos Aires.
Gazeta Mercantil (1999) Engenharia do Brasil tropicaliza tecnologia de autos, Presidência de la Nación, Buenos Aires.
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Sbragia, R; Krugrianksas, I.; Andreassi, T. and Sbragia, R. (1998) Os indicadores de P&D nas empresas mais e menos inovadoras, XX Simpósio de Inovação Tecnológica, São Paulo.
Sbragia, R; Krugrianksas, I. and Andreassi, T. (1999) Innovative firms in Brazil, in H. Etzkowitz, J. Mello, R. Casa and L. Leydesdorff (eds.) Triple Helix in Latin America, forthcoming.
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Veja a primeira parte...
O presente relatório tem como objetivo, em primeiro lugar, examinar as causas da pouca relevância atribuída aos fornecedores regionais de bens de capital e serviços de engenharia nos programas de investimento e compras das empresas estatais latino-americanas. Para tanto, torna-se necessário, entre outros aspectos de três setores escolhidos (de petróleo, energia elétrica e telecomunicações), caracterizar as políticas, procedimentos e instrumentos das empresas estatais utilizados nas licitações públicas e identificar as vinculações entre as empresas estatais e as associações de indústria e consultores.
O relatório está estruturado da seguinte maneira. O capítulo I apresenta em termos descritivos os principais aspectos das políticas, procedimentos e instrumentos de compras das empresas estatais latino-americanas. O capítulo II formula, então um marco analítico e teórico sobre o funcionamento da empresa estatal na América Latina. Neste marco analítico, estão identificados os principais aspectos determinantes do desempenho das empresas estatais, em particular, aqueles incidentes sobre as suas políticas de compras. Finalmente, o capítulo III apresenta sugestões de medidas dirigidas a aumentar as compras das empresas estatais na região.
Empresas estatais latino-americanas e compras regionais
Fabio S. Erber, Jonas Zoninsein, Trabalho preparado para o Sistema Econômico Latino-Americano (SELA) -1986
O presente relatório tem como objetivo, em primeiro lugar, examinar as causas da pouca relevância atribuída aos fornecedores regionais de bens de capital e serviços de engenharia nos programas de investimento e compras das empresas estatais latino-americanas. Para tanto, torna-se necessário, entre outros aspectos de três setores escolhidos (de petróleo, energia elétrica e telecomunicações), caracterizar as políticas, procedimentos e instrumentos das empresas estatais utilizados nas licitações públicas e identificar as vinculações entre as empresas estatais e as associações de indústria e consultores.
O relatório está estruturado da seguinte maneira. O capítulo I apresenta em termos descritivos os principais aspectos das políticas, procedimentos e instrumentos de compras das empresas estatais latino-americanas. O capítulo II formula, então um marco analítico e teórico sobre o funcionamento da empresa estatal na América Latina. Neste marco analítico, estão identificados os principais aspectos determinantes do desempenho das empresas estatais, em particular, aqueles incidentes sobre as suas políticas de compras. Finalmente, o capítulo III apresenta sugestões de medidas dirigidas a aumentar as compras das empresas estatais na região.
Aqui você consegue ver o arquivo PDF original. Por se tratar de um registro histórico, algumas informações podem não estar totalmente legíveis.
This paper is divided into six sections. The first two sections provide the background, by discussing the changing international environment of regional integration and the role of State Enterprises in Latin American countries, in the light of the recent "privatization" drive. The third section addresses...
Este artigo está dividido em seis seções. As duas primeiras apresentaram o pano de fundo, discutindo o ambiente internacional da integração regional em mutação e o papel das empresas estatais nos países latino-americanos, à luz da recente campanha de “privatização”. A terceira seção aborda o papel do Estado na integração regional e a importância das empresas estatais nesse processo. A quarta seção detalha os papéis que tais empresas podem ter ou realmente desempenharam na integração regional, tanto como fornecedores quanto como compradores de bens e serviços. A quinta seção examina os fatores – técnicos, econômicos, financeiros e institucionais – que influenciam seu desempenho como atores regionais. Nas duas últimas seções, os autores se baseiam principalmente na experiência do setor de energia, onde a integração avançou consideravelmente e onde as empresas estatais são atores importantes em todo o continente americano – uma forte presença que provavelmente será mantida no futuro.
State Enterprises and Regional Integration
Fabio S. Erber, Pietro Erber, Preparado para o VI Colloquium on Hemispheric Trade Liberalization, BID/ECLAC, Washington, 1992, mimeo.
Este artigo está dividido em seis seções. As duas primeiras apresentaram o pano de fundo, discutindo o ambiente internacional da integração regional em mutação e o papel das empresas estatais nos países latino-americanos, à luz da recente campanha de "privatização". A terceira seção aborda o papel do Estado na integração regional e a importância das empresas estatais nesse processo. A quarta seção detalha os papéis que tais empresas podem ter ou realmente desempenharam na integração regional, tanto como fornecedores quanto como compradores de bens e serviços. A quinta seção examina os fatores - técnicos, econômicos, financeiros e institucionais - que influenciam seu desempenho como atores regionais. Nas duas últimas seções, os autores se baseiam principalmente na experiência do setor de energia, onde a integração avançou consideravelmente e onde as empresas estatais são atores importantes em todo o continente americano - uma forte presença que provavelmente será mantida no futuro.
This paper is divided into six sections. The first two sections provide the background, by discussing the changing international environment of regional integration and the role of State Enterprises in Latin American countries, in the light of the recent “privatization” drive. The third section addresses the role of the State in regional integration and the importance of State Enterprises in this process. The fourth section details the roles such Enterprises may or actually have played in regional integration , both as suppliers or purchasers of goods and services. The fifth section examines the factors – technical, economic, financial and institutional – that bear influence on their performance as regional actors. In the two latter sections the authors draw mainly from the experience of the energy sector, where integration has advanced considerably and where State Enterprises are important actors throughout the American continent – a strong presence which is likely to be maintained in the future. The last section sums up the analysis.
1. The context of regional integration
Latin-American integration has ancient roots, which may be traced back to the Bolivarian ideals. In this century, however, it began to bear fruits in the fifties only. Although it was attempted in different geographical areas and sectors, its lengthy negotiations and scant results seemed to have discredited the idea. Nonetheless, as the mythological Phoenix, in the recent past it resurrected out of the ashes, stronger than ever, in the Treaty of Assunci¢n, which purports to establish a Common Market comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay by 1995. Pan-American integration ideas have also gained momentum from the creation of the North America Free Trade Agreement and the Initiative of the Americas, leading to proposals of a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Agreement.
Now, one may suggest that the intervening four decades were a period of learning for American countries, so that, at the begining, integration was little more than an ideal and that partners’ interests were not clearly evaluated and neither were the necessary financial, technical and managerial means available. The crisis of the previous pattern of economic and financial development of Latin America, based upon import-substitution industrialization under strong State regulation and participation, and the attempt to overcome it by neo-liberal policies were undoubtedly powerful stimuli to regional integration. Nevertheless, other structural determinants seem to be at work at the international level : the interrelated processes of capital internationalization and centralization in the OECD area; the development of the Asian NICs and the increasing international marginality of Latin America; the creation of other international supra-national blocks such as the EEC and NAFTA and, less formally, the Pacific group under Japanese leadership; the breakdown of the European socialist block and, finally, the intellectual hegemony of neo-liberalism, as expressed by the Washington Consensus.
During the early nineties this context seemed to pave the way to an extensive process of regional integration. However, at the end of 1992, the pendulum seems to have swung back, as expressed by the difficulties experienced in the process of European integration, the stalemate of GATT talks, the increse of protectionism in the OECD area and the economic and political changes in the U.S., which may lead to revisions of the NAFTA.
As a consequence, if integration in the Northern Hemisphere is to advance, it will have to rely more on deliberate State intervention to overcome its obstacles. The importance of industrial policies as means to facilitate European integration is widely recognized within the EEC, where there is a long tradition of State explicit intervention to promote industrial and technological development. Such tradition is also part of Asian history, as exemplified by the cases of Japan and the NICs. Actually, it is part of the American heritage too, albeit disguised under the mantle of defense policies. However, its aknowledgement by U.S. polity represents a major change, which will have repercussions in the process of regional integration in the Southern Hemisphere – at the very least by providing more legitimacy to a stronger action by the State to foster that process. For the same reasons it may facilitate Western Hemisphere integration,
This fast-changing environment, which provides the backdrop to the analysis of the role of State Enterprises developed below, presents new challenges and opportunities to the process of Latin American integration, to the Initiative of the Americas and to an eventual WHAFTA.
2. The State and its Enterprises: Rise and Fall?
As it is well known, rooted upon a strong Iberic tradition, the State played a major role in the post-War development of Latin America. The analysis of the deep-seated economic and political reasons underlying such involvement goes beyond the scope of this paper. For its purposes it is sufficient to note that, until the eighties, the State heavy participation in the economic realm enjoyed widespread social support. However, as the unsolved structural problems of the previous pattern of development, such as income distribution and the funding of investments, came to the fore and the Latin-American economies plunged into a crisis – now lasting more than a decade – such problems clustered around the State, turning support into hostility. As in ancient myths the former hero became a scapegoat. Nonetheless, as suggested above, the tide of anti-Statism seems to be receding. The new context presents strong indications that an active State, albeit with different roles, shall continue to be a major social actor in the region, as well as in other parts of the world.
During the heyday of direct State intervention, enterprises wholly- or partially-owned by the State were one of its main instruments. Until recently, State Enterprises played a major role in Latin-American national economies, since they supplied most public services, and a major share of infrastructure and intermediate industrial products. As a consequence,they were responsible for the major part of the demand for capital goods, civil works and consultancy services, mostly provided by private firms. Their purchasing power was often deliberately used as an instument of industrial policy, to promote local supply of such goods and services, within the scope of import-substituting industrialization. Hence, by virtue of their investments and their forward- and backward-linkages, State Enterprises became one of the main actors in the process of industrialization, especially in the countries where such process advanced further, such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.
Political and economic reasons presided over the creation of State Enterprises. Thus, political reasons, such as the desire for greater national autonomy, often led to the establishment of such Enterprises, especially in sectors considered to be “strategic” for autonomy, as the provision of energy inputs or means of communication. Market failures, either of the international or the local market (and often of the two combined), led to the creation of many other State Enterprises, such as those acting in sectors where the scale and time for recoupement of investments were incompatible with the financial and technical capabilities and objectives of local and foreign entrepreneurs.
Quite often both reasons were present and led to the creation of State Enterprises or to the absorption by the State of erstwhile privately-owned firms. Such is the case of the supply of goods and services (e.g. steel and electricity) which were critical for the processes of capital accumulation and production in large sections of the economic system or served politically powerful groups but, at the same time, were also unnatractive to private investors, not only for the technical reasons above outlined but also because political presssure led to low prices of such goods and services. There are also some State Enterprises that were formerly State agencies, such as the postal, water supply and sewage services, that have been reorganized and transformed into State companies in order to provide them with more flexibility so as to enable them to carry out their jobs more efficiently . Finally, in other cases, enterprises are State-controlled simply because the government took over a formerly private company in order to rescue it from bankruptcy.
Macroeconomic conditions played an important role in the creation of State Enterprises, since expansionary periods increased the demand for their services and import-substituting industrialization put a premium on their backward- and forward-linkages and their contribution to foreign exchange savings. General political factors such as nationalism and the legitimacy of State intervention, as well as more particularistic reasons, such as the development of specific areas within the countries, also supported this process.
Nonetheless, sectoral factors played a major role in the creation of State Enterprises and it is not a coincidence that in the energy sector ( oil, gas and electric power ) their presence is pervasive throughout the region, since in this sector there is a convergence of the most important technical, economic and political determinants of the establishment of State enterprises previously mentioned – scale of investments, critical backward- and forward-linkages in terms of quantity and price, limited tradability (in some cases), efficiency requirements and national sovereignity. In fact, direct State intervention as a provider of energy goods and services is not limited to Latin America – it is widespread in Europe, carried out by national Enterprises, such as Electricit‚ de France, in Canada by provincial Enterprises (e.g. Hydro Quebec) and in the U.S. by regional power Enterprises, as Tennessee Valley Authority. Even when the supply of such goods and services is provided by private enterprises it is normally subject to considerable State regulation.
A main feature of State Enterprises, explicit in their naming, is their “structural ambiguity” : as the Roman god Janus, they have two faces, being led simultaneously by State and market rationales – often in conflict. The conflict becomes most highly visible in Enterprises acting in sectors such as energy, where, on one hand, the large scale of investments and their indivisibility requires either large profits or extensive third party funding but, on the other hand, their products are of general use and not easily substitutable or tradable, thus being under strong political pressure to be cheaply priced. If the State is unable to provide the funding and there are no foreign sources available, the conflict may lead to an impasse.
The conflicts inherent to State Enterprises have a strong sectoral determination. However, the conflicts tend to be heightened during periods of macroeconomic instability, when the overall distributive struggle becomes more acute. Under such conditions, the State often falls prey to the temptation to use its Enterprises as an instrument of short-term stabilization policy, depresssing their prices’ indexation below inflation levels, thus jeopardizing their long-term capability, vocation and role. If, as is often the case, the instability is associated with a fiscal crisis, which prevents the State from compensating its Enterprises for their income losses and by funding their investment, the usefullness of the Enterprises as an instrument of development is severely impaired.
International conditions, such as a foreign exchange scarcity, may fuel such contradictions. State Enterprises normally supply goods and services which are not directly tradable but often require heavy imports, especially for their investments. However, since their output is an input to tradable goods, the conflicts are present here too. In this context, the role of international financial agencies becomes critical. Such agencies have contributed by providing external funding and also by strenghtening the State Enterprises capacity to finance their investment from internal sources, by applying pressure on the Governments to at least maintain stable real prices for their products and services and by conditioning the external funding to local counterparts.
It is not surprising that in many Latin American countries, during the eighties, when growth ceased, macroeconomic instability reached hyperinflation levels and external constraints became stringent, State Enterprises came under disrepute, since many of them were caught in the web of the contradictions outlined above and were unable to fulfill their economic and social roles. Such crisis of State Enterprises was part and parcel of a more general crisis of the State, of which the financial aspect, as expressed by the public indebtedness, is only the most apparent part. In fact, as already mentioned, what was ( and is ) at stake is the collapse of a whole pattern of development.
Under such conditions, and fuelled by the hegemony of the Washington Consensus ( and related pressures ), which proposed an overall reduction of State regulation in favour of market regulation, most countries of the region adopted “privatization” policies, designed to close down some State Enterprises and, mostly, to transfer their control to private hands, especially those that were formerly private and those that have already fulfilled their former pioneering role, as large steel companies. Such policies, implemented under different procedures, have reduced the importance of State Enterprises significantly.
Nonetheless, in most countries, some of the economic and political reasons which led to the creation of State Enterprises persist in the different context. Thus, the State has retained control of companies which play a major role in the international insertion of the country and are important sources of revenues to the State, as in the case of oil in Mexico and Brazil and of copper in Chile. In such cases, political reasons are added to economic motives, since such Enterprises are national symbols of independence.
In other cases some State Enterprises will remain to deal with the tremendous social and regional inequalities that are a characteristic of Latin-American countries. These Enterprises will have to bridge the gap between resources and needs that the local market forces do not perceive as an opportunity, such as the provision of eletric power to remote areas. This type of action of State Enterprises reflects the perception of society, as expressed by the State, of important social benefits which the market will not provide for. At the same time, such action may anticipate and pave the way to privately profitable activities. In the longer run, the cumulative nature of the latter shall render the investment of the State Enterprise profitable in strictly microeconomic terms, albeit under a long-term horizon. This rationale stems from the plurality of objectives of State Enterprises, combining their two sides : State and enterprise. The same rationale applies to regional integration projects and it is not a coincidence that in the energy sector the two elements often converge, with regional projects being developed by State Enterprises .
The sheer weight of the State Enterprises coupled to the fragility of local entrepreneurs and lack of interest of foreign investors, plus political resistance and legal hindrances to privatization, have retarded the process and maintained many other Enterprises under State control. Especially where natural monopolies coupled to indivisibilities are involved, as in electric power supply, not a minor cause of the slowness of the process of privatization can be ascribed to the difficulties of finding legal and institutional regulatory designs to establish an appropriate compromise between public and private interests.
As a consequence, in each country privatization has advanced at a different pace. In this respect, the two larger countries of the MERCOSUL, Argentina and Brazil, stand at the opposite extremes of the spectrum. In the former the scope of privatization was radical, the expectation being that by the end of 1993 no State Enterprise would be left. In Brazil, privatization was reined in by legal and political opposition and is proceeding at a much slower pace, often conditioned by concerns with the resulting supply structure and related market power of groups purchasing the State Enterprises. Such differences in the scope and attitude towards privatization seem to reflect deeply-seated differences in the national trajectories of development, especially as regards the role of industry in the latter.
Therefore, one may assume that, for some time at least ( probably not short ) , State Enterprises, especially in the energy sector, will continue to be important actors in the national economies of Latin America and one of the main instruments of State action. As a consequence, in the future as in the past, they will be one of the major participants and, quite likely, promoters of the process of regional integration. In fact, as argued below, regional integration broadens their scope of activity, strenghtening their economic and political importance.
3. Regional integration and the role of the State
In all processes of regional integration the State is a major actor. Such role is imposed by the political and economic characteristics of the process of integration. By definition, the latter is a collective process which relies on mutual confidence among partners, on their perception of common interests and of advantages to be obtained as well as on the political will to carry out projects and sustain agreements, so that prospective advantages can materialize. On the other hand, integration poses threats, real and apparent, to many social actors, since it increases the intensity of competition, inclusive to the State, which must abdicate from some of its sovereign powers. Therefore, decision-makers, within the State as well as within civil society, must be convinced that what is to be gained by changes in the economic and political context compensates for the losses they may foresee as an effect of integration.
Although market forces may impart a strong rationale (e.g. via scale and scope economies) to a process of regional integration, they lack the cohesive power necessary to lead and implement such process. Moreover, the myopia and limited information intrinsic to market mechanisms, structured around the status quo ante, may hinder the process of integration by overemphasizing the risks and losses it may entail. Therefore, market failures are probably one of the main causes of the limitations of regional integration .
In several Latin-American countries there is already a considerable experience regarding integration projects, acquired in a “learning by doing” process: it points out to the need of having a well defined and planned sequence of events and actors, from preliminary understandings, at a project conception stage, up to official signing of treaties and contracts and, further on, their implementation and supervision by the involved parties; the definition of responsibilities and benefits and their sharing among parties. In other words, integration operates in the realm of hierarchy, of negotiations, treaties and plans. A similar experience was gained in North America through the negotiation of NAFTA and through sectoral experiences as in the case of energy projects, paving thus the way for a process of hemispheric integration.
Since this process depends on the will and action of the region’s States, their governments cannot forsake the potential provided by their Enterprises. In fact, precisely because the State Enterprises are immersed in two worlds, the State and the market, they have a specific and unique role in regional integration – they can be used to overcome market failures (in the ways discussed below) following a strategic political design. In other words, they may be an instrument used by society to organize the market in order to better profit from the advantages of the latter.
4. State Enterprises and Regional Integration : Examples from the Energy Sector in the American Continent
The energy sector provides many successful examples of regional integration, involving Governments, State Enterprises and private companies. In this sector State Enterprises have played a leading role in Latin American integration, acting as suppliers and purchasers of goods and services, carrying out governmental agreements, joining efforts with other State Enterprises and identifying possibilities for collaboration with private enterprises. Integration of the North American economies has also been fostered by State Enterprises, but not so significantly as in the Southern continent. These situations are discussed in more detail below. However, the roles played by State Enterprises in regional integration can still be substantially expanded and the following analysis offers some suggestions of additional ways by which regional integration could be enhanced by State Enterprises.
4.1. State Enterprises As Suppliers of Goods and Services
As mentioned above, State Enterprises were usually established to act as suppliers of essential goods and services to their national economies. However, following their double rationale, driven by a combination of strictly microeconomic reasons and State determinations, they became active partners in regional integration under several forms, stemming from their forward linkages with the rest of the economy. Such types of regional projects, which range from trade to investment, are detailed below.
a) Interchange of goods or services
State Enterprises are becoming active partners in regional trade, as shown by the purchases of oil by the Brazilian State Enterprise from its Venezuelan counterpart, the sale of natural gas from the Bolivian State Enterprise to its Argentinian and Brazilian sisters and the project of Brazilian-Argentinian electric interconnection near the border of the two countries through a 50 MW, 60/50 Hz converting station at Uruguaiana, , about to be commissioned, which is to be followed by another one of 900 MW, at Garabi.
Similarly, electricity trade across USA borders with Mexico and, in a much wider scale, with Canada, provides a major example of this type of integration in the energy sector, in which the participation of State Enterprises is outstanding in spite of the dominance of private enterprises in the U.S. power sector. Thus, in the Mexico-U.S. interconnection cooperate the Comission Federal de Electricidad (CFE) and the the Western Systems Coordinating Council (WSCC) as well as the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), which coordinate the operation of Western and Texan utilities under NERC – North American Electric Reliability Council, a supra-national entity. Crossing the borders of Canada and the U.S. from the west to the east coast, there are many energy interconnections with widely different capacities, with the net flow going from Canada to the U.S.. A major example is the supply of energy to the States of New Jersey and New York, involving Ontario Hydro and the Power Authority of the State of New York, both of which are State Enterprises – a pattern often found in other interconnections between the two countries, such as the one linking British Columbia Hydro to Bonneville Power Authority.
Regional trade can leverage a national project, prior to its construction, providing the most economic scale, even if there is not a joint-venture . An example is the construction of the Acaray hydro power plant (190 MW) in Paraguay, by its State Enterprise, ANDE. Since at the time (in the seventies) the appropriate installed capacity for that development was too large for ANDE’s market, this State Enterprise made a supply contract with a Brazilian counterpart, COPEL, controlled by the State of Paran . This contract provided the necessary demand in order to ensure the economic feasibility of the project and its financing by the Interamerican Development Bank – IDB, as well. A similar situation has been observed along the U.S.-Canada border, where American utilities have financed their Canadian counterparts’ hydroelectric expansion in order to be able to purchase part of the energy the latter generate.
State Enterprises of different countries have also established agreements for the sale of their own goods and services or for their purchases and related funding, entailing scale economies and enhancing the partners’ negotiation power. Binational power generation projects, such as those mentioned below, have provided significant opportunities for such collaboration. Another example is the agreement established between Mexico and Venezuela to guarantee the supply of oil to countries of Central America and the Caribbean, coupled to credits to foster regional trade.
b) Joint-ventures of State Enterprises for the production of goods or services,
Taking integration a step further, State Enterprises have formed joint-ventures, such as the binational hydropower plants of Itaipu (12600 MW), built and operated by a Brazilian-Paraguayan jointly-owned company and Yaciret (2700 MW) developed by Argentina and Paraguay under a similar institutional framework, In the two cases above mentioned, the Federal Government State Enterprises of the two countries formed a new company, equally shared among them. In other cases, such as the Salto Grande Argentinian-Uruguayan project, the plant (1800 MW) was built by the respective State Enterprises, operating together, through a joint commission. The same pattern was adopted for the development and operation of hydroelectric plants on the Rio Grande ( Falcon, of 63 MW and Amistad, of 132 MW ), at the Mexico-U.S. border, by the Comission Federal de Electricidad and the State Department-controlled IBWC – International Boundary and Water Commission.
In both types of joint-ventures described above, the main economic motivations are the possibilities of exploiting scale economies as well as complementarities due to differences in terms of know-how, financial resources, etc.. Natural resources coupled to political factors, such as national boundaries, strongly influence the cooperation. In cases such as the exploitation of an attractive hydro power site on the border between two countries, the collaboration of the respective Governments and, in particular, of their State Enterprises involved in electric power generation is practically mandatory, even if a private concern will carry out the plant construction and, eventually, its operation.
c ) Technical Cooperation
State Enterprises collaborate in order to attain economies due to complementarities in their respective technical specializations or to achieve scale economies, in case a research project of common interest can be carried out by different countries’ State Enterprises, working together.
Regarding the first type of cooperation, a recent agreement signed between the Argentinian and Brazilian Governments has helped the State Enterprises of the two countries in the hydro and nuclear power areas to establish a useful exchange of technical and managerial experiences, leading, among other benefits, to savings of hard currency. Governmental international sectoral organizations such as OLADE – Latin-American Energy Organization, or State Enterprises organizations such as ARPEL – Latin-American Petroleum State Enterprises Reciprocal Assistance, in the petroleum sector, or CIER – Electric Regional Integration Commission, in the electricity sector (in which also private utilities participate) provide an important ground for contact and for the exchange of information, from which collaboration may arise. This is the case of the cooperation between the the Brazilian and Venezuelan oil State Companies ( Petrobras and Petroven ) and the Mexican Instituto de Petroleo, facilitated by ARPEL. Similarly, CIER has provided conditions for the identification of opportunities for cooperation, as the one established between Eletrobr s, from Brazil, and Venezuelan CADAFE, in which the former is providing the latter with technical assistance.
In the second type of technical cooperation, a typical experience has been the association of Argentinian, Brazilian and Italian State Enterprises for the development of techniques for ultra-high voltage (1000 kV) transmission, involving research for the production of the materials and equipments required for the construction of such transmission systems and studies on their environmental impact. Another instance of a similar nature are cooperative projects in the petroleum sector, in which private companies, such as Marathon Oil, have shared technological development programmes with Latin-American State Enterprises.
d) Support of clients
State Enterprises may assist regional integration by enhancing the competitiveness of local products vis a vis extraregional sources. Several instances of such forms of support to regional trade-creation, trade-diversion or entry in third markets are found in the energy sector, exemplified by special power rates for energy-intensive industries or by the low prices for the naphta supplied to the petrochemical sector. The technical assistance provided by Eletrobr s and Petrobr s to their clients, leading to cost reductions and enhanced products, have the same effects, as had the external marketing support given by Petrobr s’ trading company (Interbr s), closed down during the recent privatization drive. In the case of binational State Enterprises or projects, such as Itaipu and Salto Grande, such cooperation benefits the clients of both countries.
4.2. State Enterprises as Purchasers of Goods and Services
By virtue of their backward linkages, State Enterprises have played a major role in the industrial and technological development of Latin-American countries. Such purchasing power can be used for the purposes of regional integration too, if the appropriate political direction is given, eventually complemented by some economic measures. As we shall see below, in the past several initiatives along these lines were already undertaken by State Enterprises of the energy sector, often in ad hoc manner.
a) Cooperation between State Enterprises and local suppliers, aiming at the regional market
The experience of State Enterprises in exporting and importing, as well as their knowledge about investments, may be useful to local suppliers of goods and services for their competitiveness abroad, increasing regional trade and investment. Probably such aid is more important to locally-owned suppliers than to subsidiaries of multinational companies, since the latter have more alternative sources of information and support. To give some examples, the subsidiaries of of Petrobr s dealing with oil exploration and trading abroad played an important role in the exports of the latter’s suppliers of equipment and services. Similarly, Eletrobr s has recently given substantial technical support to regional exports of Brazilian consultants and contractors, as in the case of PARSEICA, a project for the coordination of an integrated power system operation in Central America, and of hydroelectric projects in China. Furnas, an Eletrobr s subsidiary, is giving significant on-site support to Brazilian contractors and to the local authorities in the constructionn of Kapanda hydroelectric project in Angola.
b) Cooperation between State Enterprises to increase regional purchases
A major restriction facing regional suppliers to State Enterprises is the latters’ insufficient information about the former’s technical and managerial capabilities and, consequently, about their delivery time and the performance, reliability and durability of their products. Such ignorance increases the risks perceived in regional purchases and is detrimental to regional integration.
To counteract such factors, the experience as a buyer of regional goods and services can be transferred between State Enterprises of different countries, as well as to the suppliers themselves. Sectoral fora, such as ARPEL and CIER as well as bilateral exchanges of information, very often done informally, have served this purpose, but this aspect of regional cooperation could be substantially strenghtened and extended.
c) Cooperation of State Enterprises of various countries together with local suppliers
Potentially, the joint promotion of regional suppliers by State Enterprises could lead to scale economies, amplification of technical capabilities and earnings of strong currency by exports to third parties. As purchasers of such goods and services, State Enterprises would stand to benefit from the learning and scale economies accruing to their suppliers. However, this type of cooperation requires the coordination of well-defined industrial policies in the countries involved, as well as a strong commitment from the private sector which supplies the State Enterprises. Such policies should include appropriate funding procedures and compensations to national suppliers displaced by regional integration .
A coordination of State Enterprises purchasing policies was envisaged in the capital goods bilateral agreement signed between Argentina and Brazil in 1986, which stands at the origin of MERCOSUL. However, this part of the agreement was never developed.
5. Factors Conditioning the Performance of State Enterprises as Agents for Regional Integration
5.1. Sectoral Factors
The sectoral dimension is a major determinant of the participation of State Enterprises in regional integration. As mentioned above, the very existence of State Enterprises is sector-conditioned, since the most important Enterprises are present in sectors which have specific characteristics in terms of investment, procurement, operation and marketing. Technical and economic characteristics, such as indivisibility and repayment period, may act as strong stimuli to regional integration – increasing the stimulus in proportion to the rigidity of the technical and economic features of the sector. Conversely, some sectoral technical characteristics may go against the grain of regional integration, as in the case of sectors where the technological development of suppliers depends on their experience and the requirements of State Enterprises tend to be highly specific and “customised”. Under such circumstances the customer/supplier relationship tends to be very stable. Such stability tends to hinder the diversification of procurement sources and, in consequence, to hamper regional integration.
The footlooseness of the sector is another major influence on regional integration projects. In sectors where there is a very strong geographical contingency and where best technical and economic solutions do not fit into national borders, regional integration may present a better alternative. When transportability of the products and services of the sector is low, the locational limitation is stronger. Thus, it is not surprising that regional integration has advanced considerably in sectors such as electric power generation, through projects designed to exploit sites located at the border of two countries, as in the case of Itaipu, Salto Grande and Yaciret .
5.2. Firm-specific and project-specific factors
Sectoral factors tend to define the scope and specialization of the State Enterprise and condition its relationship with clients, as well as to define the complexity of its investments, operation and marketing, which entails technological and skilled labour requirements of the Enterprise and its links with suppliers.
State Enterprises, as living organisms, have learning capacities and memories. Besides stocking information and know-how, they may have physical assets that may also be useful for their performance in regard to regional integration. Hence, the selection of State Enterprises for a given activity usually takes into consideration their previous experience – in the sector in which they will act and with similar projects, both within the country or with similar enterprises in other countries. Care should be taken, however, not to simply extrapolate previous experience, without taking into account specific conditions of the project to be carried out and how such conditions apply to the resources availability of the Enterprise. Thus other relevant factors in the design or choice of a State Enterprise for a given regional integration task are the compatibility or adequacy of its resources to the project, e.g. in terms of technical training of its staff, financial and managerial capabilities.
Project- and firm-specific factors also intersect in the motivation of the Enterprise to carry out the proposed regional project. Thus, the effects of the project on the development and consolidation of the Enterprise must be taken into account. In some cases, a State Enterprise may be undergoing a low activity period and its involvement in regional integration may create better prospectives and leverage for hiring more experienced and qualified personnel, obtaining better salaries, acquiring new equipment, training and upgrading existing manpower and, last but not the least, obtaining political prestige. Therefore, a regional project may offer the scope for the use of slack resources and for additions to such resources – a crucial factor in institutions where resources-accretion is a major policy determinant. Alternatively, a State Enterprise may oppose a regional project, often using technical arguments, if it perceives it will hinder other projects, of a national scope, which show higher payoffs in economic, technical, financial and political terms. In other words, atuning the regional project to the Enterprise life-cycle is of paramount importance to the project’s success.
5.3. Institutional Factors
The institutional framework of the regional integration action of State Enterprises is significantly affected by the technical and economic factors that characterize the sector and the project, such as the interdependence of decisions, size of investments, maturation period, volume and kind of inputs to be purchased, , etc.
Thus, in sectors in which individual decisions have reciprocal influence coordination of the economic activities may result more effective than competition, and the extension of that coordination to a supra-national scale provides a sound basis to the effectiveness of regional integration. A good example of this coordination is provided by NERC ( North American Electric Reliability Council ) which brings together U.S. and Canadian power generation utilities .
The larger the projects are, more likely it will be that a project-specific institutional form will be adopted, as in the case of the binational companies formed by Brazil and Paraguay and by the latter and Argentina to build the hydropower plants of Itaipu and Yaciret . When the project is smaller or more divisible, it can be often implemented through the direct cooperation of national Enterprises, as in the case of the electric interconnections across the Argentinian-Brazilian and Mexican-U.S. borders or the two relatively small Rio Grande power plants at the Mexico-U.S. border previosuly mentioned (Falcon and Amistad).
Vice-versa, political and strategic concerns also influence the technical solution that may be adopted It is now hoped that, thanks to a better political relationship among American countries and a more realistic outlook regarding regional integration projects and their strategic influence, the basic design of such projects will give higher priority to economic factors than to national security and similar strategic considerations.
A good instance of this situation is the Garabi Hydro Power Plant. Started in the mid-seventies, the original engineering project was developed by a joint Argentinian-Brazilian team, under the two countries’ Federal State Enterprises supervision. The design considered two symetrical power-houses, one on each margin of the Uruguay River, which is the natural frontier between Argentina and Brazil in that area. Each power-house would be exploited by the respective national power utility and compensations regarding unequal water utilization by each party were foreseen in the agreement between the two countries. Presently, this scheme tends to be superseded by what is expected to be a more economical layout, with a single power-house. This major modification of the project reflects a change in attitude in both countries, marked by increased mutual confidence, as well as the desire to make the project more cost-effective, so as to involve private investors in its construction and exploitation. In this case one may note the interplay of economical, technical, institutional, political and strategic factors. In another project on the same river, named Roncador, economic and environmental components are being, at present, a major consideration, so that it is being completely redesigned in order to reduce major agricultural area flooding.
Nonetheless, institutional factors play an autonomous role too. Thus, a State Enterprise’s regional performance is affected by its institutional origin, scope and subordination. As discussed above, the double nature of State Enterprises makes them a specific social actor, driven by a mix of motives, which may vary along time and which sets them apart from both private enterprises and Government agencies. As a consequence, projects carried out by two or more State Enterprises are probably facilitated by their belonging to the same species of social actors. Although sectoral factors certainly play a major role, it is probably not a coincidence that most of the examples of regional integration above mentioned involve State Enterprises on the two sides.
This feature poses questions about the role State Enterprises shall play in the future, when integration leads them to partnerships with private enterprises, as a result of privatization in Latin America and of an eventual WHAFTA. As suppliers and purchasers of goods and services State Enterprises have a long experience of dealing with private enterprises but cooperation in regional projects will probably lead to a much closer relationship. This new type of relationship will require, at the very least, a period of learning on the two sides, so that motives and operations of the two types of social actors are reciprocally understood and a common basis of trust can be built so as to support the integration projects.
Even when they are dealing with other State Enterprises, institutional constraints play an important role in the regional activities of such Enterprises, as exemplified by their charters. The social and political reasons for the creation of a State Enterprise as well as the scope of its activities are usually embedded in its charter and into the subordination of the Enterprise to the political authorities.
Once a charter of a State Enterprise has been approved by the political authorities to which it is subordinated, it stands as a proof of legitimacy and political support to the activities described therein, as well as a mandate for their implementation. In a sense, the charter is restrictive for a State Enterprise, since it cannot operate beyond the scope defined by this document. Moreover, since State Enterprises are created by some legal act, only chartered activities are admitted. Hence, performing other activities tends to be considered unlawful and the State Enterprise management is subject to legal amends it it does so. On the other hand, a State Enterprise charter bears the effect of a mission, since the State Enterprise is not supposed to abstain from performing its chartered activities, which may be regarded as duties. Since the scope of the State Enterprise is usually quite well defined, the diversification of its activities, directly or through the creation of subsidiaries, may require specific legislation wich may consume time and political resources.
Charters of State Enterprises tend to stress performance of some activities rather than profits. Hence, a State Enterprise is likely to be progressive, in the sense that it will take up the risk of carrying out projects with the characteristics above mentioned and which may hold an uncertain microeconomic profitability. However, it will tend to be conservative in the way it carries out the project, since it will usually employ the most proven technologies, as its management may be criticized if it takes high technical risks ( real or apparent ). The first aspect may help regional integration, since it stimulates State Enterprises to undertake projects of regional scope but the second facet hinders the regionalisation of suppliers of goods and services to the State Enterprise.
Furthermore, the State Enterprise subordination either to Federal, State or Municipal authorities defines and restricts its political, economic and geographical scope . Thus, State Enterprises involved in regional integration are usually controlled by the Federal government or subject to its specific orientation, since regional integration legally belongs to the scope of Federal government action and also because it normally responds to a national policy, even though in some cases such Enterprises may act in association with other enterprises under control of provincial authorities or privately-owned.
Finally, the development of regional activities by State Enterprises is also conditioned by international institutional factors. Thus, treaties between governments, such as NAFTA and the Treaty of Assunci¢n, provide a general framework for such projects. However, special institutional arrangements are normally necessary to implement such projects, as in the case of State Enterprises which are created specifically for such purpose. Therefore, it is often necessary to pass complementary specific legislation at the national level to implement the international agreements. Some aspects that usually require definition in regional integration projects are related to the currency in which accounts will be held, labor legislation to be applied ( since there may be citizens of two or more countries involved ), operative procedures, both technical and commercial, protection to the facilities that support or constitute the regional integration project and the definition of representatives of each party and their decision-making procedures.
Other international treaties, signed by the governments of the regions and international agencies, financial and regulatory (e.g. of trade and environment), may also intervene in the definition and implementation of the project. In the recent past, due to the increasing concern with environmental problems, especially in the energy sector, another type of international ( and national ) actor has come to the fore : non-governmental organizations.
As mentioned above, international sectoral organizations, such as OLADE, ARPEL and CIER in the energy sector, facilitate the integration process by providing a forum where enterprises and regulatory agencies can exchange experiences, identify opportunities and establish the channels of communication (often informal) for joint projects. Probably, additional benefits could be obtained if such sectoral institutions could establish a sustained dialogue with NGOs which may influence the development of the energy sector, such as those concerned with the environmental issues. International technical organizations, such as the Panamerican Union of Engineers, the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, the International Conference on Large Dams and the World Energy Council have played the same roles, facilitating regional integration.
Binational electric power generation projects provide some typical features to be found in the agreements to their implementation :
preliminary understandings, at the technical, diplomatic and political level, defining the objectives, characteristics and scope of the project, and the nature and the organization responsible for its implementation and exploitation;
evaluation of the project feasibility or the definition of the studies that will provide it;
a complete definition of the physical components of the project, and of each party’s responsibilities for implementing it;
definition of the funding of the project;
definition of operational responsibilities;
preservation of the sovereignity of each party, which is fundamental to the feasibility of agreements between countries that are very different in terms of size of their economy, population or territory;
preservation of sovereignity is also necessary to reduce concerns regarding the political and strategic issues arising from the committement to the project, since for each party the project will be a source of supply to local demand and it will be implemented instead of internal alternative sources, on whose construction and operation the country would have full control;
definition, as precise as possible, of the role of institutions not related to the project and to the power sector;
understandings with third party countries, when affected by the project or interested in its implementation;
5.4. Financial Factors
Financial factors play a major role in regional integration projects, especially in sectors characterized by large scale and bulky indivisibilities, such as in the electric power sector or gas transportation systems. In the Latin American experience, such factors have often led State Enterprises to adopt a conservative attitude towards regional integration projects, since the financial agencies often consider the regional integration benefits only at the margin, as an extra bonus that will provide political support, but for which nobody is directly paying. In such cases, regional projects are compared to local alternatives without conferring to the former any specific and quantified advantages. This is the case of the Brazilian interconnection with Argentina (Uruguaiana-Paso de los Libres), which Centrais El‚tricas do Sul do Brasil S.A. – ELETROSUL and Agua y Energ¡a El‚ctrica – AyE, are about to complete. No particular credits were extended to the former, which bears the major part of the investment. Although, besides regional integration gains, the project yielded benefits to Eletrosul in terms of technical capability, such results are not financially tangible.
Integration projects carried out by new State Enterprises must count on third party financing, since the Enterprise earns no revenue during their inception. Under such circumstances, that were present, for instance, in the Itaipu binational project, the States sponsoring the project are obliged to provide appropriate funding – a feature which may explain why already existing Enterprises may prefer establish a joint-venture consisting of a new company, which can rely on diplomatic pressures to get the funding it needs.
Finally, projects or activities are also committed to State Enterprises accordingly to their firm-specific capability of raising funds from international institutions such as IBRD and IDB, as well as getting the support of non-financial organizations, like OLADE, OAS or specific UN agencies .
6. Conclusions
It was argued above that State intervention is necessary for regional integration and that State Enterprises, a lasting feature of American economies, have important and specific roles to play as instruments of their States’ regional strategy, as illustrated by the examples from the energy sector. If regional integration is extended to an hemispheric scale, the role to be played by State Enterprises is commensurately expanded too, but the widening of integration will pose new challenges to such Enterprises, involving a renewal of the learning process they have been recently through.
To conclude, it is worthwhile to stress the complexity of the relationship between the State and its Enterprises, deriving from the nature of the latter – their “structural ambiguity”, which obliges them to straddle over two realms : the market and the polity. Such ambiguity is strenghtened in the case of regional integration, where, for the reasons above outlined, the two logics often conflict.
Thus, the State participation in regional integration through State Enterprises is not limited to the creation of such Enterprises or the adaptation of already existing ones to perform the tasks required for regional integration. As shown above, the State must deploy a full panoplia of policy instruments to support the regional projects of its Enterprises – ranging from financial support to the design of appropriate institutional devices, both nationally and internationally. As a consequence, State Enterprises will be fully effective instruments of regional integration only if their activities are part of wider strategy of development, in which integration is an important feature. Such strategy requires more than market mechanisms – it involves political decisions which may converge on the State but must be democratically supported by the rest of society, which should be enabled to pass a judgement on the importance and validity of this policy and on the costs and benefits of its major projects.
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This paper was prepared for the project on Hemispheric Trade Liberalization jointly sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank and by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. It was presented at the Sixth Colloquium of the project, held in Washington, D.C. in December 1992. The authors benefited from the comments of the participants of the Colloquium and of the technical staff in charge of the project, especially Ron Sprout, but they retain the responsibility for the opinions here conveyed, which do not necessarily represent those of the institutions to which they are attached.
Fabio Erber is BNDES (Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social)’s Director
Pietro Erber is ELETROBRAS (Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras S.A)’s Assistant to Director
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As políticas para as áreas de novas tecnologias nos anos 1980 tornaram-se uma questão de interesse nacional no Brasil, especialmente a política de informática. A primeira seção deste artigo aponta algumas causas do novo status adquirido por estas políticas. As três seções seguintes analisam alguns dos problemas levantados no debate sobre a política de informática e que são aplicáveis às demais áreas de novas tecnologias também: o hiato tecnológico observado entre a oferta brasileira e internacional de bens e serviços de alta tecnologia, o desenvolvimento tecnológico interno e o planejamento e execução das políticas.
A ênfase do artigo é analítica. Em parte, por limitação de tempo e espaço e por ser a política de informática bem conhecida factualmente e, principalmente, pela convicção do autor de que uma das principais tarefas que a academia pode prestar à evolução das políticas é aperfeiçoar a base analítica sobre a qual estas, frequentemente de forma implícita e mesmo ignara, repousam.
Políticas de Alta Tecnologia no Brasil: Problemas Falsos e Reais
Fabio S. Erber, Trabalho feito para o Seminário Internacional de Novas Tecnologias, IUPERJ e Stanford University, Rio de Janeiro, janeiro de 1987.
As políticas para as áreas de novas tecnologias nos anos 1980 tornaram-se uma questão de interesse nacional no Brasil, especialmente a política de informática. A primeira seção deste artigo aponta algumas causas do novo status adquirido por estas políticas. As três seções seguintes analisam alguns dos problemas levantados no debate sobre a política de informática e que são aplicáveis às demais áreas de novas tecnologias também: o hiato tecnológico observado entre a oferta brasileira e internacional de bens e serviços de alta tecnologia, o desenvolvimento tecnológico interno e o planejamento e execução das políticas.
A ênfase do artigo é analítica. Em parte, por limitação de tempo e espaço e por ser a política de informática bem conhecida factualmente e, principalmente, pela convicção do autor de que uma das principais tarefas que a academia pode prestar à evolução das políticas é aperfeiçoar a base analítica sobre a qual estas, frequentemente de forma implícita e mesmo ignara, repousam.
Aqui você consegue ver o arquivo PDF original. Por se tratar de um registro histórico, algumas informações podem não estar totalmente legíveis.
Aqui você consegue ver o arquivo PDF original. Por se tratar de um registro histórico, algumas informações podem não estar totalmente legíveis.
Veja o artigo completo
Não foi por acidente que a recente eleição presidencial levou ao confronto final dois candidatos que se apresentavam como “novos”, não apenas etariamente mas, acima de tudo, como rejeição do quadro político e econômico anterior.
Com efeito, a crise dos anos oitenta, que se prolonga na década atual, é uma crise de esgotamento de um padrão de desenvolvimento, entendido este como o conjunto de normas que regem os processos econômicos e políticos. Em consequência, a retomada de industrialização, com novas normas de produção e acumulação, envolve também modificações nas normas de incorporação do progresso técnico, financiamento, relação salarial, intervenção do Estado e inserção internacional.
As notas a seguir enfocam algumas destas relações, especialmente aquelas relativas à incorporação do progresso técnico, intervenção do Estado e inserção internacional, que estão intimamente ligadas. A análise toma por base as Diretrizes Gerais para a Política Industrial e de Comércio Exterior anunciadas pelo Governo em 26/06/90. Como é comum neste tipo de documento, estas diretrizes são frequentemente imprecisas. Tampouco são imutáveis e imunes ao debate, que precisa ser amplo. Ao cabo e fim, a política industrial afeta a todos e não apenas o Governo e empresários.
Nem tudo que reluz é ouro e nem tudo que é novo é contemporâneo. Como advertia Keynes, frequentemente os homens “pragmáticos” são governados por ideias de economistas há muito tempo mortos. A política econômica do presente governo e, dentro desta a política industrial, é regida pelo velho paradigma liberal. Este identifica a raiz da crise industrial nos empecilhos postos ao livre funcionamento dos mecanismos de mercado pela proteção dada à indústria nacional contra as importações, pelas estruturas oligopólicas de produção, por algumas diferenças de tratamento entre capitais de origem nacional e estrangeira e pela intervenção do Estado.
Nas Diretrizes Gerais para a Política Industrial e de Comércio Exterior recentemente definidas pelo Governo há, contraditoriamente traços da visão schumpetriana, na ênfase dada ao progresso técnico e na prioridade concedida aos setores de ponta. No entanto, conforme veremos a seguir, o paradigma liberal é hegemônico dentro da política industrial proposta e acabará por impor sua predominância se esta for implementada na forma prevista nas Diretrizes. Em consequência, longe em termos um novo padrão de industrialização, os resultados negativos da substituição de importações serão reforçados.
A Política Industrial – Paradigmas Teóricos e Modernidade
Fabio S. Erber, Seminário Internacional sobre el Nuevo Contexto de las Políticas de Desarrollo Científico y Tecnológico – Montevideo, deciembre 6, 7 y 8, 1990
Não foi por acidente que a recente eleição presidencial levou ao confronto final dois candidatos que se apresentavam como “novos”, não apenas etariamente mas, acima de tudo, como rejeição do quadro político e econômico anterior.
Com efeito, a crise dos anos oitenta, que se prolonga na década atual, é uma crise de esgotamento de um padrão de desenvolvimento, entendido este como o conjunto de normas que regem os processos econômicos e políticos. Em consequência, a retomada de industrialização, com novas normas de produção e acumulação, envolve também modificações nas normas de incorporação do progresso técnico, financiamento, relação salarial, intervenção do Estado e inserção internacional.
As notas a seguir enfocam algumas destas relações, especialmente aquelas relativas à incorporação do progresso técnico, intervenção do Estado e inserção internacional, que estão intimamente ligadas. A análise toma por base as Diretrizes Gerais para a Política Industrial e de Comércio Exterior anunciadas pelo Governo em 26/06/90. Como é comum neste tipo de documento, estas diretrizes são frequentemente imprecisas. Tampouco são imutáveis e imunes ao debate, que precisa ser amplo. Ao cabo e fim, a política industrial afeta a todos e não apenas o Governo e empresários.
Nem tudo que reluz é ouro e nem tudo que é novo é contemporâneo. Como advertia Keynes, frequentemente os homens “pragmáticos” são governados por ideias de economistas há muito tempo mortos. A política econômica do presente governo e, dentro desta a política industrial, é regida pelo velho paradigma liberal. Este identifica a raiz da crise industrial nos empecilhos postos ao livre funcionamento dos mecanismos de mercado pela proteção dada à indústria nacional contra as importações, pelas estruturas oligopólicas de produção, por algumas diferenças de tratamento entre capitais de origem nacional e estrangeira e pela intervenção do Estado.
Nas Diretrizes Gerais para a Política Industrial e de Comércio Exterior recentemente definidas pelo Governo há, contraditoriamente traços da visão schumpetriana, na ênfase dada ao progresso técnico e na prioridade concedida aos setores de ponta. No entanto, conforme veremos a seguir, o paradigma liberal é hegemônico dentro da política industrial proposta e acabará por impor sua predominância se esta for implementada na forma prevista nas Diretrizes. Em consequência, longe em termos um novo padrão de industrialização, os resultados negativos da substituição de importações serão reforçados.
Aqui você consegue ver o arquivo PDF original. Por se tratar de um registro histórico, algumas informações podem não estar totalmente legíveis.
Science and Technology Policies and the Latitude...
Este artigo procura contribuir para a seleção de critérios apropriados a serem aplicados ao desenvolvimento da ciência e da tecnologia nos países em desenvolvimento, explorando as implicações do “princípio da latitude para o mau desempenho”, originalmente proposto por Albert Hirschman no...
Este artigo procura contribuir para a seleção de critérios apropriados a serem aplicados ao desenvolvimento da ciência e da tecnologia nos países em desenvolvimento, explorando as implicações do “princípio da latitude para o mau desempenho”, originalmente proposto por Albert Hirschman no livro clássico “A estratégia do desenvolvimento econômico” (Hirschman, 1961).
A ideia central do princípio é que a formação de estruturas industriais eficientes em países em desenvolvimento requer o estabelecimento de certos ramos de produção, onde as regras operacionais são submetidas a uma latitude (ou tolerância) estreita de desempenho fraco. A próxima seção desenvolve as principais ideias subjacentes ao princípio mais plenamente e argumenta que o princípio pode ser usado como um guia para a política tecnológica de um país em desenvolvimento, um uso que a literatura tem geral negligenciado.
A terceira seção examinará as políticas brasileiras de ciência e tecnologia. A primeira parte da seção descreve brevemente o desenvolvimento institucional e as prioridades do sistema brasileiro de ciência e tecnologia, enquanto a segunda parte examina em mais detalhes as políticas adotadas para a indústria eletrônica, um setor onde o princípio da latitude se aplica claramente e que tem sido uma das prioridades do governo brasileiro.
Por fim, a quarta seção analisa o caso brasileiro à luz do princípio da latitude, mostrando que tal princípio ajuda a entender alguns dos problemas institucionais enfrentados pelas políticas de ciência e tecnologia, quando tentam utilizar a experiência de outras áreas políticas problema, que não são exclusivos para o Brasil. A seção e o artigo concluem relacionando as condições para uma política baseada no princípio da latitude, discutida na segunda seção, ao caso da política brasileira de mercado reservado para a indústria de equipamentos de dados eletrônicos. Condições similares podem existir em outros países em desenvolvimento, talvez em diferentes setores elegíveis de acordo com o princípio da latitude, para o qual a experiência brasileira em eletrônica pode ser útil. Como o texto argumenta, o princípio da latitude é uma ferramenta analítica importante para o desenvolvimento de estruturas institucionais, procedimentos políticos e políticas setoriais específicas, que podem ser úteis para muitos países em desenvolvimento.
Science and Technology Policies and the Latitude Principle
Fabio S. Erber, José Tavares de Araújo Júnior, An Application of the Brazilian Case. Araújo Júnior, J. Tavares and ERBER, F. In UNESCO. Meeting of experts on social assessment of Technologies in a number of developing countries. Nairobi, Kenya, November 1985
This paper attempts to contribute to the selection of appropriate criteria to be applied to the development of science and technology in developing countries, by exploring the implications of the “principle of latitude for poor performance”, originally proposed by Albert Hirschman in the classical book “The Strategy of Economic Development” (Hirschman, 1961).
The central idea of the principle is that the formation of efficient industrial structures in developing countries requires the establishment of certain branches of production where the operational rules are submitted to a narrow latitude (or tolerance) of poor performance. The next section develops the main ideas underlying the principle more fully and argues that the principle may be used as a guide for the technology policy of developing countries, a use which the literature has generally overlooked.
The third section will look at the Brazilian science and technology policies. The first part of the section describes briefly the institutional development and the priorities of the Brazilian science and technology system, while the second part examines in more detail the policies adopted for the electronics industry, a sector where the latitude principle clearly applies, and which has been one of the priorities of Brazilian Government.
Finally, the fourth section analyses the Brazilian case in light of the latitude principle, showing that such a principle helps to understand some of the institutional problems faced by science and technology policies when they try to use the experience of other policy area problems which are not exclusive to Brazil. The section and the paper conclude by relating the conditions for a policy based on the latitude principle, discussed in the second section, to the case of the Brazilian reserved market policy for the electronic data equipment industry. Similar conditions may exist in other developing countries, perhaps in different industries eligible according to the latitude principle, for which the Brazilian experience in electronics may be useful. As the text argues, the latitude principle is an important analytical tool for developing institutional structures, policy procedures and specific sectoral policies, which may be useful for many developing countries.
Este artigo procura contribuir para a seleção de critérios apropriados a serem aplicados ao desenvolvimento da ciência e da tecnologia nos países em desenvolvimento, explorando as implicações do “princípio da latitude para o mau desempenho”, originalmente proposto por Albert Hirschman no livro clássico “A estratégia do desenvolvimento econômico” (Hirschman, 1961).
A ideia central do princípio é que a formação de estruturas industriais eficientes em países em desenvolvimento requer o estabelecimento de certos ramos de produção, onde as regras operacionais são submetidas a uma latitude (ou tolerância) estreita de desempenho fraco. A próxima seção desenvolve as principais ideias subjacentes ao princípio mais plenamente e argumenta que o princípio pode ser usado como um guia para a política tecnológica de um país em desenvolvimento, um uso que a literatura tem geral negligenciado.
A terceira seção examinará as políticas brasileiras de ciência e tecnologia. A primeira parte da seção descreve brevemente o desenvolvimento institucional e as prioridades do sistema brasileiro de ciência e tecnologia, enquanto a segunda parte examina em mais detalhes as políticas adotadas para a indústria eletrônica, um setor onde o princípio da latitude se aplica claramente e que tem sido uma das prioridades do governo brasileiro.
Por fim, a quarta seção analisa o caso brasileiro à luz do princípio da latitude, mostrando que tal princípio ajuda a entender alguns dos problemas institucionais enfrentados pelas políticas de ciência e tecnologia, quando tentam utilizar a experiência de outras áreas políticas problema, que não são exclusivos para o Brasil. A seção e o artigo concluem relacionando as condições para uma política baseada no princípio da latitude, discutida na segunda seção, ao caso da política brasileira de mercado reservado para a indústria de equipamentos de dados eletrônicos. Condições similares podem existir em outros países em desenvolvimento, talvez em diferentes setores elegíveis de acordo com o princípio da latitude, para o qual a experiência brasileira em eletrônica pode ser útil. Como o texto argumenta, o princípio da latitude é uma ferramenta analítica importante para o desenvolvimento de estruturas institucionais, procedimentos políticos e políticas setoriais específicas, que podem ser úteis para muitos países em desenvolvimento.
Aqui você consegue ver o arquivo PDF original. Por se tratar de um registro histórico, algumas informações podem não estar totalmente legíveis.
Aqui você consegue ver o arquivo PDF original. Por se tratar de um registro histórico, algumas informações podem não estar totalmente legíveis.
Veja o artigo completo
O objetivo deste artigo é analisar o padrão de desenvolvimento de países, como o Brasil, que atravessaram um processo de industrialização tardia e parcial, e o papel representado pela difusão das capacitações para usar e desenvolver tecnologias em tal padrão de desenvolvimento.
Porque o padrão de desenvolvimento desses países semi-industrializados (PSIs) é o resultado da interação da projeção internacional do padrão de desenvolvimento dos países capitalistas avançados (PCAs) com as forças políticas e econômicas internas nos PSIs, é necessário discutir o padrão de desenvolvimento dos PCAs. Não para objetivos de comparações estáticas, no estilo de “sistemas comparados”, mas como uma parte integral do processo de estabelecimento do padrão de desenvolvimento dos PSIs. Este procedimento é especialmente importante para a análise da difusão de tecnologia, já que as normas de inovação e operação de tecnologias se originam dos PCAs.
Portanto, a segunda seção delineia o padrão de desenvolvimento que prevaleceu nos países avançados durante o longo período de expansão seguinte à Segunda Grande Guerra. Ela é baseada na “teoria de regulamentação” desenvolvida por Aglietta (1976) e Coriat (1982), entre outros.
O padrão de desenvolvimento, ou mais precisamente, o “regime de regulamentação” é caracterizado por um conjunto de “normas” inter-relacionadas, pertinentes ao fenômeno da produção industrial (organização de processo de trabalho, escala de produção, relações entre trabalhadores e capitalistas, etc.), consumo (especialmente a reprodução de força de trabalho), acumulação (a relação entre os departamentos produtores de bens de produção e de consumo e sua composição setorial), financiamento e, finalmente, às funções desempenhadas pelo Estado.
Os fatores técnicos têm um papel importante na conformação das normas, mas surpreendentemente, a literatura sobre regulamentação dá pouca atenção ao processo de inovação que produz tal progresso técnico. Incorporamos este dentro da análise através de uma ‘norma de inovação’, a qual se baseia muito no trabalho de Nelson e Winter (1977) e Dosi (1982) e torna explícito o papel crucial do Estado em promover a inovação e os setores que incorporam progresso técnico.
De acordo com a teoria de regulamentação, o suporte principal deste sistema de normas é fornecido pela norma de produção, o lócus de extração de mais valia. Esta importância está refletida na denominação do regime de regulamentação – “fordismo”. Não obstante o papel desempenhado pela norma de produção, desejamos acentuar a importância do papel da norma de inovação, e da intervenção do Estado a está relacionada, para a dinâmica do Sistema, fornecendo respostas aos impasses da norma de produção, como está detalhado na quarta seção deste artigo.
A terceira seção discute o desenvolvimento do fordismo nos “países subdesenvolvidos”. O desenvolvimento dos PSIs destruiu o conceito de “periferia” homogênea do sistema capitalista, especializada na produção de bens primários para exportação para os PCAs.
Finalmente, a quinta seção examina as implicações da crise internacional e das novas tecnologias para o regime de regulamentação dos PSIs. A seção complementar com uma breve avaliação do papel que as novas tecnologias podem desempenhar na solução dos impasses do regime de regulamentação dos PSIs e as consequências para os PCAs.
Padrões de Desenvolvimento e Difusão de Tecnologia
Fabio S. Erber, Texto para Discussão n. 90 | IEI/UFRJ, 1986
O objetivo deste artigo é analisar o padrão de desenvolvimento de países, como o Brasil, que atravessaram um processo de industrialização tardia e parcial, e o papel representado pela difusão das capacitações para usar e desenvolver tecnologias em tal padrão de desenvolvimento.
Porque o padrão de desenvolvimento desses países semi-industrializados (PSIs) é o resultado da interação da projeção internacional do padrão de desenvolvimento dos países capitalistas avançados (PCAs) com as forças políticas e econômicas internas nos PSIs, é necessário discutir o padrão de desenvolvimento dos PCAs. Não para objetivos de comparações estáticas, no estilo de “sistemas comparados”, mas como uma parte integral do processo de estabelecimento do padrão de desenvolvimento dos PSIs. Este procedimento é especialmente importante para a análise da difusão de tecnologia, já que as normas de inovação e operação de tecnologias se originam dos PCAs.
Portanto, a segunda seção delineia o padrão de desenvolvimento que prevaleceu nos países avançados durante o longo período de expansão seguinte à Segunda Grande Guerra. Ela é baseada na “teoria de regulamentação” desenvolvida por Aglietta (1976) e Coriat (1982), entre outros.
O padrão de desenvolvimento, ou mais precisamente, o “regime de regulamentação” é caracterizado por um conjunto de “normas” inter-relacionadas, pertinentes ao fenômeno da produção industrial (organização de processo de trabalho, escala de produção, relações entre trabalhadores e capitalistas, etc.), consumo (especialmente a reprodução de força de trabalho), acumulação (a relação entre os departamentos produtores de bens de produção e de consumo e sua composição setorial), financiamento e, finalmente, às funções desempenhadas pelo Estado.
Os fatores técnicos têm um papel importante na conformação das normas, mas surpreendentemente, a literatura sobre regulamentação dá pouca atenção ao processo de inovação que produz tal progresso técnico. Incorporamos este dentro da análise através de uma ‘norma de inovação’, a qual se baseia muito no trabalho de Nelson e Winter (1977) e Dosi (1982) e torna explícito o papel crucial do Estado em promover a inovação e os setores que incorporam progresso técnico.
De acordo com a teoria de regulamentação, o suporte principal deste sistema de normas é fornecido pela norma de produção, o lócus de extração de mais valia. Esta importância está refletida na denominação do regime de regulamentação – “fordismo”. Não obstante o papel desempenhado pela norma de produção, desejamos acentuar a importância do papel da norma de inovação, e da intervenção do Estado a está relacionada, para a dinâmica do Sistema, fornecendo respostas aos impasses da norma de produção, como está detalhado na quarta seção deste artigo.
A terceira seção discute o desenvolvimento do fordismo nos “países subdesenvolvidos”. O desenvolvimento dos PSIs destruiu o conceito de “periferia” homogênea do sistema capitalista, especializada na produção de bens primários para exportação para os PCAs.
Finalmente, a quinta seção examina as implicações da crise internacional e das novas tecnologias para o regime de regulamentação dos PSIs. A seção complementar com uma breve avaliação do papel que as novas tecnologias podem desempenhar na solução dos impasses do regime de regulamentação dos PSIs e as consequências para os PCAs.
Aqui você consegue ver o arquivo PDF original. Por se tratar de um registro histórico, algumas informações podem não estar totalmente legíveis.
Aqui você consegue ver o arquivo PDF original. Por se tratar de um registro histórico, algumas informações podem não estar totalmente legíveis.
Veja o artigo completo
A eletrônica constitui um novo paradigma tecnológico cuja importância técnica, econômica, política e social é tão conhecida que, provavelmente dispensa maiores comentários. Este paradigma expressa-se produtivamente por uma série de indústrias e serviços cuja dinâmica é interdependente, constituindo um “complexo industrial”, no qual as indústrias de componentes semicondutores e de processamento de dados jogam um papel estratégico.
Nos países avançados o Estado desempenhou um papel crítico na constituição à o das indústrias centrais do complexo eletrônico, mobilizando uma ampla gama de instrumentos de política, que inclui subsídios creditícios e fiscais para pesquisa e desenvolvimento, financiamentos para instalações produtivas, estímulos à ação conjunta de empresas nacionais no mercado interno, incentivos fiscais à importação de insumos e componentes, crédito para exportações, etc.
Este apoio, extenso e contínuo ao longo do tempo, não é acidental. Com efeito, na informática aparecem todas as razões classicamente levantadas para justificar a intervenção do Estado – desde o papel político e econômico como instrumento de soberania nacional até o funcionamento inadequado do mercado, que impõe diferenças entre o cálculo privado e social, devido ao uso intensivo da ciência básica, externalidades, economias de mercado, etc.
Cabe destacar também a desigualdade na difusão internacional do complexo eletrônico.
Diversos países semi-industrializados, como Argentina, Brasil e Coréia do Sul, adotaram no passado recente políticas de fomento à indústria nacional de informática. O caso brasileiro, no entanto, ganhou notoriedade, talvez por praticar, explicitamente, uma reserva de mercado, para algumas faixas de produtos, que excluem as firmas multinacionais do suprimento destes bens.
A seção 2 deste artigo descreve a evolução da política brasileira de informática. A terceira seção apresenta as principais características da indústria, enquanto a última seção apresenta uma avaliação sumária dos resultados da política.
A Experiência Brasileira de Informática
Fabio S. Erber, Artigo preparado para o Simpósio IESA – “Hacia Una Política Nacional em Informática”, Caracas – 27 e 28 de julho de 1986
A eletrônica constitui um novo paradigma tecnológico cuja importância técnica, econômica, política e social é tão conhecida que, provavelmente dispensa maiores comentários. Este paradigma expressa-se produtivamente por uma série de indústrias e serviços cuja dinâmica é interdependente, constituindo um “complexo industrial”, no qual as indústrias de componentes semicondutores e de processamento de dados jogam um papel estratégico.
Nos países avançados o Estado desempenhou um papel crítico na constituição à o das indústrias centrais do complexo eletrônico, mobilizando uma ampla gama de instrumentos de política, que inclui subsídios creditícios e fiscais para pesquisa e desenvolvimento, financiamentos para instalações produtivas, estímulos à ação conjunta de empresas nacionais no mercado interno, incentivos fiscais à importação de insumos e componentes, crédito para exportações, etc.
Este apoio, extenso e contínuo ao longo do tempo, não é acidental. Com efeito, na informática aparecem todas as razões classicamente levantadas para justificar a intervenção do Estado – desde o papel político e econômico como instrumento de soberania nacional até o funcionamento inadequado do mercado, que impõe diferenças entre o cálculo privado e social, devido ao uso intensivo da ciência básica, externalidades, economias de mercado, etc.
Cabe destacar também a desigualdade na difusão internacional do complexo eletrônico.
Diversos países semi-industrializados, como Argentina, Brasil e Coréia do Sul, adotaram no passado recente políticas de fomento à indústria nacional de informática. O caso brasileiro, no entanto, ganhou notoriedade, talvez por praticar, explicitamente, uma reserva de mercado, para algumas faixas de produtos, que excluem as firmas multinacionais do suprimento destes bens.
A seção 2 deste artigo descreve a evolução da política brasileira de informática. A terceira seção apresenta as principais características da indústria, enquanto a última seção apresenta uma avaliação sumária dos resultados da política.
Aqui você consegue ver o arquivo PDF original. Por se tratar de um registro histórico, algumas informações podem não estar totalmente legíveis.
Aqui você consegue ver o arquivo PDF original. Por se tratar de um registro histórico, algumas informações podem não estar totalmente legíveis.
Veja o artigo completo
